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Diplomatic assurances issued by states declaring that they
will not mistreat individuals returned to them occupy a strange
middle ground between being legal and non-legal obligations.
The question of their value forces us to re-evaluate our
understanding of the law of treaties, which, like law in general,
requires a binary approach to obligation: either there is a legal
obligation or not, even if the fit with either of these categories
is not precise. This study concludes that some of the obligations
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in certain assurances can be understood as legal obligations,
and some cannot; and it will state a methodology for
determining which obligations are legal under the law of
treaties. The examination of this particular type of
international communication can shed light on the larger
phenomenon of soft law instruments and similar instruments
whose legal value is unclear.
The paper begins in Section I with relevant background of
the legal environment of diplomatic assurances and their use in
cases of expulsion. The next sections discuss the legal nature of
diplomatic assurances. Section II discusses diplomatic
assurances as treaties; Section III discusses diplomatic
assurances as binding unilateral statements; and Section IV
discusses diplomatic assurances as subsequent practice that
1
would inform treaty interpretation.
The lengthiest of these examinations is Section II on
whether diplomatic assurances could be considered treaties.
This is because the claim that diplomatic assurances—which
purport to not be legally binding—could qualify as treaties is
the most controversial of the questions considered by this
paper. Although there are strong arguments on both sides, in
the end, they prove to be unsatisfactory.
I. BACKGROUND
In many instances a state may have an obligation not to
return an individual to a state from which he came even where
the person is otherwise lawfully deportable. This obligation is
termed the “non-refoulement” obligation. The obligation arises
in instances where an individual faces some risk of poor
treatment upon return. The most common risks are persecution
and torture, but the risk of other human rights violations may
2
also trigger the non-refoulement obligation.
1. This paper will not examine the legal value of diplomatic assurances
under customary international law other than the way in which customary
international law might further refine the definition of treaty.
2. See, e.g., Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951,
art. 1, 189 U.N.T.S. 150 as amended by Protocol Relating to the Status of
Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 [together hereinafter Refugee
Convention] (“No Contracting State shall expel or return (‘refouler’) a refugee
in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or
freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality,
membership of a particular social group or political opinion.”); Geneva
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, art.
31, 32, 45, 147, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287; Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950,
art. 2–3, 6, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter European Convention on Human
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This non-refoulement obligation sometimes inhibits a state
that wishes to remove a person who presents a security risk or
danger to society. There are limited exceptions to the nonrefoulement obligation, but they are neither universal nor
3
absolute. In cases where the expelling state cannot invoke an
exception to non-refoulement, it may ask the receiving state for
assurances that the person will not face the feared problematic
treatment—i.e. that the person will not be tortured or will not
4
face persecution by the receiving state. These are termed

Rights or ECHR]; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec.
16, 1966, art. 6–7, 14, S. TREATY DOC. No. 95–20, 999 U.N.T.S. 171
[hereinafter ICCPR]; Organization for African Unity, Convention Governing
the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, Sept. 10, 1969, art. II(3),
1001 U.N.T.S. 45; American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, art.
4, 5(2), 8, 22(8), 1144 U.N.T.S. 143; African Charter on Human and Peoples’
Rights, June 27, 1981, art. 4, 5, 7, 1520 U.N.T.S. 363; Cartagena Declaration
on Refugees, Nov. 22, 1984, § III(5), reprinted in 2 COLLECTION OF
INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS AND OTHER LEGAL TEXTS CONCERNING
REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS 206, 208 (1995); Convention Against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,
Dec. 10, 1984, art. 1, 3, 16, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Convention Against
Torture or CAT]; Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture,
Dec. 9, 1985, art. 2, O.A.S.T.S. No. 67; Arab Charter on Human Rights, Sept.
15, 1994, art. 13, reprinted in 18 HUM. RTS. L.J. 151, 152 (1997); Arab Charter
on Human Rights, May 22, 2004, art. 5, 6, 7, 8, 14, 16, reprinted in 12 INT’L
HUM. RTS. R. 893, 896–97 (2005). See generally U.N. High Commissioner for
Refugees [UNHCR], UNHCR Note on Diplomatic Assurances and
International Refugee Protection, ¶ 15 (Aug. 2006), available at
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/44dc81164.pdf [hereinafter UNHCR Note]
(“The principle of non-refoulement as enshrined in Article 33 of the 1951
Convention is part of customary international law. As such, it is binding on all
States, including those which have not yet become party to the 1951
Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol.”) (citation omitted).
3. Compare Refugee Convention, supra note 2, art. 33(2) (prohibiting
refugees from claiming the protection of non-refoulement if they are deemed a
“danger to the security of the country” or who have been convicted of serious
crimes), with Rep. of the U.N. Comm. Against Torture, U.N. GAOR, 52d Sess.,
Supp. No. 44, A/52/44, Commc’n No. 39/1996, ¶ 14.5 (Apr. 28, 1997) (“The
Committee considers that the test of article 3 (the non-refoulement principle of
the CAT) is absolute. Whenever substantial grounds exist for believing that an
individual would be in danger of being subjected to torture upon expulsion to
another State, the State party is under obligation not to return that person
concerned to that State. The nature and activities in which the person
concerned engaged cannot be a material consideration when making a
determination under article 3 of the [CAT].”).
4. It is also possible that the receiving state might, in some situations,
assure the expelling state that the relevant person would not face persecution
by non-state agents. The credibility of these kinds of assurances would simply
fall into the general assessment of credibility for any assurances. The
existence of non-state agent persecution, where it is recognized as a valid basis
for non-refoulement, would not per se bar the state from issuing assurances.
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“diplomatic assurances.” They can take the form of a blanket
agreement (usually called a “Memorandum of Understanding”),
6
a case-by-case agreement, or a combination of the two.
Diplomatic assurances were initially used without much
scholarly comment in extradition cases for common crimes, and
7
in non-expulsion matters. Assurances were usually sought to
assure the expelling state that the individual would not face an

5. See generally UNHCR Note, supra note 2, ¶ 1 (“The term ‘diplomatic
assurances’, as used in the context of the transfer of a person from one State to
another, refers to an undertaking by the receiving State to the effect that the
person concerned will be treated in accordance with conditions set by the
sending State or, more generally, in keeping with its human rights obligations
under international law.”).
6. See Memorandum of Understanding Between the Gov’t of the U.K.
and the Gov’t of Eth. Concerning the Provision of Assurances in Respect of
Persons Subject to Deportation, Dec. 12, 2008, available at
http://www.fco.gov.uk/resources/en/pdf/3849543/mou-ethiopia-combined
[hereinafter U.K.–Eth. MOU]; Memorandum of Understanding Between the
Gov’t of the U.K. and the Gov’t of Leb. Concerning the Provision of Assurances
in Respect of Persons Subject to Deportation, Dec. 23, 2005, available at
http://www.fco.gov.uk/resources/en/pdf/lebanon-mou [hereinafter U.K.–Leb.
MOU]; Memorandum of Understanding Between Gov’t of Libya and the Gov’t
of the U.K. Concerning the Provision of Assurances in Respect of Persons
Subject
to
Deportation,
Oct.
18,
2005,
available
at
http://www.fco.gov.uk/resources/en/pdf/libya-mou [hereinafter Libya–U.K.
MOU]; Memorandum of Understanding Between the Gov’t of the U.K. and the
Gov’t of Jordan Regulating the Provision of Undertakings in Respect of
Specified Persons Prior to Deportation, Aug. 10, 2005, available at
http://www.fco.gov.uk/resources/en/pdf/jordan-mou [hereinafter U.K.–Jordan
MOU]. For a helpful history of the negotiation of the U.K.–Jordan MOU, see
Othman v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, [2007] S.I.A.C. No. SC/15/2005,
¶¶
171–174
(Eng.),
available
at
http://www.siac.tribunals.gov.uk/Documents/QATADA_FINAL_7FEB2007.pdf.
7. See, e.g., Early Warning System, U.S.–Isr., Sept. 1, 1975, 26 U.S.T.
2271; Memorandum of Agreement Concerning Assurances, Consultations, and
U.S. Policy on Matters Related to Middle East Peace., U.S.–Isr., Sept. 1, 1975,
32 U.S.T. 2150. The United States appears to regard the MOU as a treaty
because it has recorded it in the United States Treaties and Other
International Agreements series (U.S.T.) and referenced it in U.S. Department
of State, Treaties in Force: A list of Treaties and Other International
Agreements of the United States in Force on January 1, 2011. See U.S. DEP’T
OF
STATE,
TREATIES
IN
FORCE
138
(2011),
available
at
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/169274.pdf; see also Noriega v.
Pastrana, 564 F.3d 1290, 1298 (11th Cir. 2009) (relying on diplomatic
assurances regarding the application of the Third Geneva Convention); Eain v.
Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504, 512 n.8, 519 (7th Cir. 1981) (assurances from Israel for a
fair trial); M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, Judgment, App. No. 30696/09, Eur.
Ct.
H.R.
(Jan.
21,
2011),
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en (search case name
“M.S.S.” and respondent state “Belgium) (regarding assurances that an
asylum hearing would be conducted).
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unfair trial or the death penalty. Beginning with the Soering
case, however, the European Court of Human Rights
(“European Court”) held that extradition could result in a
violation of article 3 of the European Convention on Human
9
Rights (“ECHR”) on the part of the expelling state. Because
this violation would be reviewable by the European Court,
10
assurances became even more important.
Increased attention on diplomatic assurances was also
created by the policies, collectively known as the “War on
Terror,” that were adopted by the United States subsequent to
the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11,
2001, because assurances have been used in connection with
11
the extradition of persons suspected of terrorism offenses.
8. See, e.g., ECHR, supra note 2, art. 2; Protocol No. 6 to the ECHR
Concerning the Abolition of the Death Penalty Apr. 28, 1983, 1496 U.N.T.S.
281, as amended by Protocol No. 11 to the ECHR, May 11, 1994, 2061 U.N.T.S.
7; Protocol No. 13 to the ECHR Concerning the Abolition of the Death Penalty
in All Circumstances, May 3, 2002, 2246 U.N.T.S. 110; Cipriani v. Italy,
Admissibility Decision, App. No. 22142/07, Eur. Ct. H.R. (Mar. 30, 2010),
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=2&portal=hbkm&action=html
&highlight=cipriani&sessionid=89743436&skin=hudoc-en;
Koktysh
v.
Ukraine, Final Judgment, App. No. 43707/07, Eur. Ct. H.R. (Dec. 10, 2009),
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=1&portal=hbkm&action=html
&highlight=43707/07&sessionid=89536360&skin=hudoc-en;
Kaboulov
v.
Ukraine, Final Judgment, App. No. 41015/04, Eur. Ct. H.R. (Nov. 19, 2009),
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=1&portal=hbkm&action=html
&highlight=kaboulov%20|%20ukraine&sessionid=89536360&skin=hudoc-en;
Einhorn v. France, Admissibility Decision, App. No. 71555/01, Eur. Ct. H.R.
(Oct.
16,
2001),
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=1&portal=hbkm&action=html
&highlight=einhorn%20|%20france&sessionid=89536360&skin=hudoc-en;
United States v. Burns, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 283 (Can.) (regarding assurances from
the United States that the death penalty would not be applied), X v. The
Netherlands, Admissibility Decision, App. No. 15216/89, Eur. Comm’n H.R.
(Jan.
16,
1991),
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=1&portal=hbkm&action=html
&highlight=15216/89&sessionid=89536360&skin=hudoc-en; Soering v. United
Kingdom, Final Judgment, App. No. 14038/88, Eur. Ct. H.R. (July 7, 1989),
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=3&portal=hbkm&action=html
&highlight=soering%20|%20united%20|%20kingdom&sessionid=89536360&s
kin=hudoc-en; Bamohamed v. France, Admissibility Decision, App. No.
13706/88,
Eur.
Ct.
H.R.
(Dec.
9,
1988),
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=1&portal=hbkm&action=html
&highlight=Bamohamed&sessionid=89743436&skin=hudoc-en.
9. Soering, App. No. 14038/88, ¶¶ 44–45.
10. See, e.g., Cipriani, App. No. 22142/07; Einhorn, App. No. 71555/01, X
v. The Netherlands, App. No. 15216/89, Bamohamed, App. No. 13706/88.
11. See, e.g., Othman v. United Kingdom, Judgment, App. No. 8139/09,
Eur.
Ct.
H.R.
(Jan.
17,
2012),
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=1&portal=hbkm&action=html
&highlight=8139/09&sessionid=89743436&skin=hudoc-en, Sellem v. Italy,
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This attention on assurances was heightened when several
persons were extradited on the basis of assurances from states
well known for employing torture and then were tortured
12
notwithstanding these assurances.
As an initial matter, it does not appear to be a violation of
international law either to issue or to solicit and receive
diplomatic assurances. Amnesty International and Human
Rights Watch have criticized the use of diplomatic assurances

Final Judgment, App. No. 12584/08, Eur. Ct. H.R. (May 5, 2009),
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/search.asp?sessionid=89743436&skin=hudoc
-en (search “12584/08” in application number field); Cherif v. Italy, Final
Judgment, App. No. 1860/07, Eur. Ct. H.R. (Apr. 7, 2009),
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/search.asp?sessionid=89743436&skin=hudoc
-en (search “1860/07” in application number field), Abdelhedi v. Italy, Final
Judgment, App. No. 2638/07, Eur. Ct. H.R. (Mar. 24, 2009), Ben Salah v. Italy,
Final Judgment, App. No. 38128/06, Eur. Ct. H.R. (Mar. 24, 2009),
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=2&portal=hbkm&action=html
&highlight=38128/06&sessionid=90121775&skin=hudoc-en; C.B.Z. v. Italy,
Final Judgment, App. No. 44006/06, Eur. Ct. H.R. (Mar. 24, 2009),
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=2&portal=hbkm&action=html
&highlight=44006/06&sessionid=90121775&skin=hudoc-en; Darraji v. Italy,
Final Judgment, App. No. 11549/05, Eur. Ct. H.R. (Mar. 24, 2009),
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=2&portal=hbkm&action=html
&highlight=11549/05&sessionid=90121775&skin=hudoc-en;
Hamraoui
v.
Italy, Final Judgment, App. No. 16201/07, Eur. Ct. H.R. (Mar. 24, 2009),
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=2&portal=hbkm&action=html
&highlight=16201/07&sessionid=90121775&skin=hudoc-en; O. v. Italy, Final
Judgment, App. No. 37257/06, Eur. Ct. H.R. (Mar. 24, 2009),
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=2&portal=hbkm&action=html
&highlight=37257/06&sessionid=90121775&skin=hudoc-en; Soltana v. Italy,
Final Judgment, App. No. 37336/06, Eur. Ct. H.R. (Mar. 24, 2009),
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=2&portal=hbkm&action=html
&highlight=37336/06&sessionid=90121775&skin=hudoc-en; Ben Khemais v.
Italy, Final Judgment, App. No. 246/07, Eur. Ct. H.R. (Feb. 24, 2009),
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=4&portal=hbkm&action=html
&highlight=246/07&sessionid=90121775&skin=hudoc-en; Gasayev v. Spain,
Admissibility Decision, App. No. 48514/06, Eur. Ct. H.R. (Feb. 17, 2009),
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=1&portal=hbkm&action=html
&highlight=48514/06&sessionid=90121775&skin=hudoc-en; Boumediene v.
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Admissibility Decision, App. No. 38703/06, Eur. Ct.
H.R.
(Nov.
18,
2008),
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=1&portal=hbkm&action=html
&highlight=38703/06&sessionid=90121775&skin=hudoc-en.
12. See, e.g., Alzery v. Sweden, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/88/D/1416/2005 (U.N.
Human
Rights
Comm.,
Nov
10,
2006),
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/47975afa21.html.; Agiza v. Sweden, U.N.
Doc. CAT/C/34/D/233/2003 (U.N. Comm. Against Torture, May 20, 2005),
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/42ce734a2.html;
Daniel
J.
Wakin,
Tempers Flare After U.S. Sends a Canadian Citizen Back to Syria on Terror
Suspicions, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 2002, at A9 (reporting on the situation of
Maher Arar).
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to relieve the expelling state of its non-refoulement obligations
but have not argued that the solicitation, issuance, or receipt of
assurances is itself unlawful. Without a rule of international
law prohibiting them, their request and issuance must be per se
14
lawful.
Receipt of assurances may diminish or alleviate the risk
that an expelled person will face problematic treatment, so that
the individual may be returned without violating domestic or
international law prohibiting his or her return. It is not
entirely clear, however, which legal element of the nonrefoulement obligation is directly affected by assurances.
Instead, it appears that the receipt of assurances contributes to
15
defeating the application of several elements collectively.
The assurances, in and of themselves, are not sufficient to
16
relieve the state of its non-refoulement obligation. Rather, the
13. See generally Amnesty Int’l, Dangerous Deals: Europe’s Reliance on
‘Diplomatic Assurances’ Against Torture, AI Index EUR 01/012/2010 (Apr.
2010); Human Rights Watch, Still at Risk: Diplomatic Assurances No
Safeguard Against Torture, Vol. 17, No. 4(D) (Apr. 2005).
14. See The Case of the S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No.
10 (Sept. 7). This author has already concluded elsewhere that the request,
issuance, and use of diplomatic assurances is permissible under customary
international law, see William Thomas Worster, The Evolving Definition of the
Refugee in Customary International Law, 30 BERKELEY J. INT’L L.
(forthcoming 2012); Rep. of the U.N. Comm. Against Torture, U.N. GAOR, 52d
Sess., Supp. No. 44, A/52/44, Commc’n No. 39/1996, ¶ 14.5 (Apr. 28, 1997).
15. See Hilal v. United Kingdom, Final Judgment, App. No. 45276/99,
Eur.
Ct.
H.R.
(Mar.
6,
2001),
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=1&portal=hbkm&action=html
&highlight=45276/99&sessionid=90121775&skin=hudoc-en. But see Svazas v.
Sec’y of State for the Home Dept., [2002] EWCA (Civ) 74 (Eng.) (holding in a
Refugee Convention case that the test is whether there exists sufficient
protection in respect of the acts of rogue state agents measured in a general or
systemic manner, and may co-exist with a real risk of prohibited ill
treatment); Regina v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dept., [2005] UKHL 38
(Eng.) (applying the Svazas test to ECHR art. 3).
16. See Othman, App. No. 8139/09; Rep. of the U.N. Comm. Against
Torture, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties under Article 19
of the Convention, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/CR/33/3 (Dec. 10, 2004) (expressing
concern at the U.K.’s reliance on diplomatic assurances in the refoulement
context); UNHCR, No. 30 (XXXIV) The Problem of Manifestly Unfounded or
Abusive Applications for Refugee Status or Asylum* (1983), in CONCLUSIONS
ADOPTED BY THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE ON THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION
OF REFUGEES 1975–2009 (CONCLUSION NO. 1–109) 39 (2009) (“Recognized the
substantive character of a decision that an application for refugee status is
manifestly unfounded or abusive, the grave consequences of an erroneous
determination for the applicant and the resulting need for such a decision to
be accompanied by appropriate procedural guarantees.”); Rep. of the Special
Rapporteur of the Comm’n on Human Rights, Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, transmitted by Note of the
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state must complete an individualized assessment of the person
being expelled to determine whether the assurances overcome
the reasons for non-refoulement. This evaluation must include
an assessment of the credibility and reliability of the
assurances, taken in light of such factors as the receiving
state’s history of human rights abuses, its history of honoring
assurances, and the ability of the expelling state or a third
17
party to monitor compliance with the assurances.
Secretary-General, ¶ 51, U.N. Doc. A/60/316 (Aug. 30, 2005) (“It is the view of
the Special Rapporteur that diplomatic assurances are unreliable and
ineffective in the protection against torture and ill-treatment.”).
17. See Agiza v. Sweden, Commc’n No. 223/2003, ¶ 13.4 U.N. Doc.
CAT/C/34/D/233/2003 (Comm. Against Torture 2005):
The Committee considers at the outset that it was known, or should
have been known, to the State party’s authorities at the time of the
complainant’s removal that Egypt resorted to consistent and
widespread use of torture against detainees, and that the risk of such
treatment was particularly high in the case of detainees held for
political and security reasons. . . . In the Committee’s view, the
natural conclusion from these combined elements, that is, that the
complainant was at a real risk of torture in Egypt in the event of
expulsion. . . . The procurement of diplomatic assurances, which,
moreover, provided no mechanism for their enforcement, did not
suffice to protect against this manifest risk.
Suresh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2002] 1 S.C.R.
3, ¶ 124 (Can.) (“A distinction may be drawn between assurances given by a
state that it will not apply the death penalty (through a legal process) and
assurances by a state that it will not resort to torture (an illegal process) . . . .
The former [death penalty] are easier to monitor and generally more reliable
than the latter [torture].”); Mahjoub v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration), [2005] 3 F.C.R. 334 (Can.); Hof 's-Gravenhage 20 januari 2005,
NJF 2005, 106 m. nt. BPV (De Staat der Nederlanden (Ministerie van
Justitie)/Geïntimeerde) (Neth.); HR 7 mei 2004, NJ 2007, 276 m. nt. A.H. Klip
(Advies inzake [de opgeëiste persoon]) (Neth.); Youssef v. Home Office, [2004]
EWHC (QB) 1884 (Eng.); Russia v. Akhmed Zakaev, [2003] Bow Street
Magistrates’ Court (unreported decision) (Eng.); Khouzam v. Att’y Gen., 549
F.3d 235 (3d Cir. 2008):
Prior to removal on the basis of diplomatic assurances, Khouzam
must be afforded notice and an opportunity to test the reliability of
those assurances in a hearing . . . . The alien must have an
opportunity to present, before a neutral and impartial decisionmaker,
evidence and arguments challenging the reliability of diplomatic
assurances proffered by the Government, and the Government's
compliance with the relevant regulations. The alien must also be
afforded an individualized determination of the matter based on a
record disclosed to the alien.
(citations omitted); In re Ashraf Al-Jailani, File A73 369 984 – York, 2004 WL
1739163 (BIA June 28, 2004); Human Rights Comm., Consideration of Reports
Submitted by States Parties under Article 40 of the Covenant, ¶ 12,
CCPR/CO/74/SWE, 74th Sess. (Apr. 24, 2002) (“[Assurances may be accepted
provided the state] institute[s] credible mechanisms for ensuring compliance
of the receiving State with these assurances from the moment of expulsion.”);
Rep. of the Special Rapporteur of the Comm’n on Human Rights, Torture and
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Additionally, the expelling state must consider whether the
18
state is even able to ensure compliance with the assurances.
Strangely, although the seeking of assurances itself appears to
be an admission of risk that the individual could face unlawful
19
treatment upon expulsion, courts do not appear to consider
that fact as actually weighing against an expulsion.
There are many cases where, even after the expelling state
sought and received assurances that an expelled person would
not be tortured, the receiving state tortured the person anyway.
This article will set aside questions of attribution and whether
the state’s obligation is one of conduct or result, to focus on the
question of whether the failure to honor the assurances is a
violation of a legal obligation under international law.
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, transmitted by
Note of the Secretary-General, ¶ 35 U.N. Doc. A/57/173 (July 2, 2002)
(Assurances may be accepted provided “the Government of the receiving
country has provided an unequivocal guarantee to the extraditing authorities
that the persons concerned will not be subjected to torture or any other forms
of ill-treatment upon return, and that a system to monitor the treatment of
the persons in question has been put into place with a view to ensuring that
they are treated with full respect for their human dignity.”).
18. See, e.g., Chahal v. United Kingdom, Final Judgment, App. No.
22414/93,
Eur.
Ct.
H.R.,
¶¶
104–05
(Nov.
15,
1996),
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=1&portal=hbkm&action=html
&highlight=22414/93&sessionid=90121775&skin=hudoc-en:
[T]he United Nations' Special Rapporteur on torture has described
the practice of torture upon those in police custody as "endemic" and
has complained that inadequate measures are taken to bring those
responsible to justice. The NHRC [Indian National Human Rights
Commission] has also drawn attention to the problems of widespread,
often fatal, mistreatment of prisoners and has called for a systematic
reform of the police throughout India . . . . Although the Court does
not doubt the good faith of the Indian Government in providing the
assurances mentioned above, it would appear that, despite the efforts
of that Government, the NHRC and the Indian courts to bring about
reform, the violation of human rights by certain members of the
security forces in Punjab and elsewhere in India is a recalcitrant and
enduring problem . . . . Against this background, the Court is not
persuaded that the above assurances would provide Mr Chahal with
an adequate guarantee of safety.
(citations omitted).
19. See U.N. Comm. on Human Rights, Promotion and Protection of
Human Rights, transmitted by Note of the High Comm’r for Human Rights,
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2005/103, ¶ 56 (Feb. 7, 2005) (by Robert K. Goldman) (“[T]he
mere fact that such assurances are sought is arguably a tacit admission by the
sending State that the transferred person is indeed at risk of being tortured or
ill-treated.”); Rep. of the Comm’r for Human Rights, on His Visit to Sweden
21–23 April 2004, C.O.E. Doc. CommDH(2004)13 (July 8, 2004) (“The
weakness inherent in the practice of diplomatic assurances lies in the fact that
where there is a need for such assurances, there is clearly an acknowledged
risk of torture and ill-treatment.”).
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One difficulty with examining particular assurances is that
their text is most often confidential, and in some cases the
executive has even misrepresented the nature of the
20
assurances to the judiciary. But on occasion the texts of some
assurances are made public. Assurances between Jordan and
the United Kingdom took the form of a blanket Memorandum
of Understanding (“MOU”) under which individual assurances
were issued. The MOU with Jordan was made public as an
21
annex to the judgment in the Othman case (sometimes
alternatively referred to as “Abu Qatada”.) Similarly, the MOU
between Ethiopia and the United Kingdom was reprinted in
the XX case, which, like the Othman case, was heard before the
22
U.K. Special Immigration Appeals Commission (“SIAC”).
Additional U.K. MOUs have also now been published on the
website of the U.K. Foreign and Commonwealth Office
23
(“FCO”).
Many other assurances and MOUs regarding
expulsion cases remain confidential, however.
The legal nature of diplomatic assurances is disputed. It
has been argued that diplomatic assurances are not binding in
24
the sense of giving rise to state responsibility for violations,
20. See, e.g., United States v. Pileggi, 361 F. App’x 475, 476–77 (4th Cir.
2010):
At sentencing, the Government made the following misrepresentation
about the assurances it provided to Costa Rica: “the United States, we
gave a sentencing assurance to the government of Costa Rica that we
would not seek a sentence in excess of 50 years.” When the court
asked if this bound the court or the executive branch, the Government
responded, “I think technically what it says is that the United States,
the executive branch will not seek a sentence in excess of fifty years
or death.”
(citations omitted). Executive Branches have even disregarded the judiciary’s
holding regarding assurances altogether. See Labsi v. Slovakia, Statement of
Facts, App. No. 33809/08, Eur. Ct. H.R. (July 18, 2008),
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=1&portal=hbkm&action=html
&highlight=33809/08&sessionid=90362720&skin=hudoc-cc-en (alleging the
Slovakian Executive expelled Labsi despite a stay entered by the Slovakian
Constitutional Court).
21. See Othman v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, [2007] S.I.A.C. No.
SC/15/2005,
Annex
1A
(Eng.),
available
at
http://www.siac.tribunals.gov.uk/Documents/QATADA_FINAL_7FEB2007.pdf.
22. See XX v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, [2007] S.I.A.C. No.
SC/61/2007, ¶ 20 (Eng.).
23. See U.K.–Leb. MOU, supra note 6; U.K.–Eth. MOU, supra note 6;
Libya–U.K. MOU, supra note 6; U.K.–Jordan MOU, supra note 6.
24. See Thomas Hammarberg, Commissioner for Human Rights, Council
of Europe, Torture Can Never, Ever Be Accepted, (June 27, 2006),
http://www.coe.int/t/commissioner/viewpoints/060626_en.asp:
[Diplomatic assurances] are not credible and have also turned out to
be ineffective in well-documented cases. The governments concerned
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and even that assurances have no legal value at all. It has
also been suggested, however, that diplomatic assurances are
26
not “mere piece[s] of paper,” and specifically that they are
27
28
29
“irrevocable” or “formal,” may be “binding” or may even be
have already violated binding international norms and it is plain
wrong to subject anyone to the risk of torture on the basis of an even
less solemn undertaking to make an exception in an individual case.
In short, the principle of non-refoulement should not be undermined
by convenient, non-binding promises of such kinds.
See Human Rights Watch, supra note 13, at 21–22:
Diplomatic assurances against torture represent a set of
“understandings” agreed in principle between two governments. They
have no legal effect and the person who they aim to protect has no
recourse if the assurances are breached . . . . It is unlikely that
governments that practice torture unconstrained by international
legal commitments will rein in abuse on the basis of non-binding
assurances.
25. See Alzery v. Sweden, Commc’n No. 1416/2005, ¶ 4.11, U.N.
Doc.CCPR/C/88/D/1416/2005 (Human Rights Comm., Nov. 10, 2006):
In May 2004, when Sweden unsuccessfully sought an investigation,
the Egyptian authorities were unsympathetic to the suggestion that
the claims of mistreatment be investigated by any foreign
independent person or body. The Swedish authorities, while
expressing their disappointment, were unable to further act. The
author notes in this regard that the assurance is of no legal value in
Egypt and cannot be enforced or utilised as a legal document by him.
See Human Rights Watch, supra note 13, at 21 (“Diplomatic assurances
against torture represent a set of “understandings” agreed in principle
between two governments. They have no legal effect and the person who they
aim to protect has no recourse if the assurances are breached.”).
26. Othman, [2007] S.I.A.C. No. SC/15/2005, ¶ 501:
The significance of the MOU against that political background, is first
in the fact of its negotiation. It plainly did require some political
thought at all levels, political, security and diplomatic. This is an
agreement which we accept has been supported and agreed to not just
at the highest level but also by the GID which has to operate within
it. It is not a mere piece of paper which some ordinary official could
sign and then leave others to ignore, hoping that that was enough to
satisfy an old friend.
27. Alzery v. Sweden, Commc’n No. 1416/2005, ¶ 3.12, U.N.
Doc.CCPR/C/88/D/1416/2005 (Human Rights Comm., Nov. 10, 2006):
In its follow-up report of 6 May 2003 to the Human Rights
Committee, the Swedish Government also stated that it: “[i]s the
opinion of the Swedish Government that the assurances obtained
from the receiving State are satisfactory and irrevocable and that
they are and will be respected in their full content. The Government
has not received any information which would cast doubt at this
conclusion.”
(citations omitted).
28. See Othman, [2007] S.I.A.C. No. SC/15/2005, ¶ 283:
Mr Oakden however said that failure to comply with formal political
commitments in an MOU could do serious damage to diplomatic
relations between the signatory states, and would harm a state's
reputation as a reliable international partner. The Appellant was a
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Moreover, some authorities seem to shift

well known figure in the United Kingdom and in Jordan, and his case
had been well publicised. Allegations of a breach of the conditions in
the MOU in his case would inevitably attract considerable publicity
and damage the international reputations of both governments.
(emphasis added).
29. See UNHCR Note, supra note 2, ¶¶ 5, 21:
Diplomatic assurances given by the receiving State do not normally
constitute legally binding undertakings. . . . In determining the
weight which may be attached to diplomatic assurances, the sending
State must consider a number of factors, including the degree and
nature of the risk to the individual concerned, the source of the
danger for the individual, and whether or not the assurances will be
effectively implemented. This will depend, inter alia, on whether the
undertaking provided is binding on those State organs which are
responsible for implementing certain measures or providing
protection, and whether the authorities of the receiving State are in a
position to ensure compliance with the assurances given.
(emphasis added).
There is no inherent reason why diplomatic assurances, or the frameworks in
which they might be applied, could not be legally binding. The Council of
Europe had proposed to draft an instrument, apparently proposed to be
binding, on the use of diplomatic assurances in expulsion cases, although the
project was dropped. Compare Steering Comm. for Human Rights, Rep. on its
52nd Meeting, Nov. 6–9, 2001, app. VIII ¶ 4, Doc. No. CDDH(2001)035 (Nov.
19, 2001), and Steering Comm. for Human Rights, Group of Specialists on
Human Rights and the Fight Against Terrorism, Rep. on its 1st Meeting, Dec.
7–9, 2005, app. III ¶ 4, Doc. No. DH-S-TER(2005)018 (Dec. 16, 2005) (“[T]he
Group . . . is called to . . . (ii) consider the appropriateness of a legal
instrument,
for
example
a
recommendation
on
minimum
requirements/standards of such diplomatic assurances, and, if need be,
present concrete proposals.”) (emphasis added), with Steering Comm. for
Human Rights, Group of Specialists on Human Rights and the Fight Against
Terrorism, Rep. on its 2nd Meeting, Mar. 29–31, 2006, app. III ¶¶ 12–17, Doc.
No. DH-S-TER(2006)(005) (Apr. 3, 2006) (recommending against such an
instrument).
30. See Yin Fong v. Australia, ¶¶ 7.4, 9.7, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/97/D/1442/2005 (Human Rights Comm., Nov. 23, 2009),
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4b1d223d2.html
(summarizing
the
submissions of Australia on the legally binding nature of assurances and
possibility endorsing that view):
The State party submits that a legally binding assurance is one given
by the part of the government or the judiciary that would usually
have the responsibility of carrying out the act or enforcing the
assurance . . . .
For all of the above reasons and while recognizing the State party’s
assertion (para.7.1) that it currently has no plans to remove her from
Australia, the Committee considers that an enforced return of the
author to the Peoples’ Republic of China, without adequate
assurances, would constitute violations by Australia, as a State party
which has abolished the death penalty, of the author’s rights under
art.6 and art.7 of the Covenant.
In the alternative, or additionally, assurances could be legally binding under
domestic law. See, e.g., United States v. Pileggi, 361 F. App’x. 475, (4th Cir.,
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their perspective over time from non-binding to legally binding,
31
or the reverse.
Disagreements over the legal value of assurances and
similar communications are not just isolated to academia.
32
Disagreements occur there, but disagreements also play out
33
between States on a case-by-case basis. This paper will first
Jan. 20, 2010) (enforcing U.S. assurances given to Costa Rica that Pileggi
would not be subjected to the death penalty or life imprisonment by requiring
resentencing).
31. Compare MANFRED NOWAK, U.N. COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL
RIGHTS, CCPR COMMENTARY 150 (2d ed. 2005) (“If a real risk [of the
imposition of the death sentence] exists . . . Governments are prohibited from
expelling or extraditing the person concerned unless the Government which
has requested extradition provides a legally binding assurance not to execute
the person.”), with Rep. of the Special Rapporteur of the Comm’n on Human
Rights, Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, transmitted by Note of the Secretary-General, supra note 16, ¶ 51
(“[D]iplomatic assurances are not legally binding, therefore they carry no legal
effect and no accountability if breached; and the person whom the assurances
aim to protect has no recourse if the assurances are violated.”), in Sultanov v.
Russia, App. No. 15303/09, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 58 (Nov. 4, 2010),
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=1&portal=hbkm&action=html
&highlight=15303/09&sessionid=90849272&skin=hudoc-en, also in Yuldashev
v. Russia, App. No. 1248/09, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 70 (July 8, 2010),
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=1&portal=hbkm&action=html
&highlight=1248/09&sessionid=90849272&skin=hudoc-en. It is not clear why
this type of shift would occur.
32. In favor of the legally binding nature of assurances, MOUs and
similar communications, see Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n, 18th sess, May 4–
19, 1966, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/186 and Add.1-7, 188, reprinted at II(2) YB. INT’L
L. COMM’N 188 (1966) (“[T]he use of the term ‘treaty’ as a generic term
embracing all kinds of international agreements in written form is accepted by
the majority of jurists.”); Eduardo Jimenez de Arechaga, International Law in
the Past Third of a Century, 159 REC. DES COURS HAGUE ACAD. 1, 37 (1978).
See generally JAN KLABBERS, THE CONCEPT OF TREATY IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW (1996); ARNOLD D. MCNAIR, THE LAW OF TREATIES 15 (1961). For those
authorities not in favor of the binding nature of assurances and similar
communications, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF
THE UNITED STATES § 301 cmt. e (1987); ANTHONY AUST, MODERN TREATY
LAW AND PRACTICE 32–57 (2d ed. 2007); OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW
1201–03, 1209 n.8 (Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts ed., 9th ed. 1992).
33. See generally Arbitration Concerning Heathrow Airport User Charges
(U.S./U.K.), Award on the First Question, XXIV R.I.A.A. 3 (1992) [hereinafter
Heathrow Airport Arbitration Award]. For a discussion of the divergent
opinions of the United States and China in connection with communiqués that
China believes to be binding and the United States does not, see Jerry Z. Li,
The Legal Status of Three Sino-US Joint Communiqués, 5 CHINESE J. INT'L L.
617 (2006). Li analyzes the countries’ interpretations of three agreements. See
Shanghai Communiqué, Feb. 27, 1971, 66 DEP’T OF ST. BULL. NO. 1708, 435
(1972); Joint Communiqué on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations, Dec.
15, 1978, 79 DEP’T OF ST. BULL. NO. 2022, 25 (1979); Joint Communiqué on US
Arms Sales to Taiwan, Aug. 17, 1982, 82 DEP’T OF ST. BULL. NO. 2067, 20 (Oct.
1982). For further analysis of these agreements, see ZHU QIWU, ZHONGGUO
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examine whether assurances and similar communications
might qualify as treaties and then consider whether they might
otherwise qualify as binding unilateral statements or
34
subsequent practice.
II. DIPLOMATIC ASSURANCES AS TREATIES
The Vienna Convention provides that:
For the purposes of the present Convention:
(a) ‘Treaty’ means an international agreement concluded between
States in written form and governed by international law, whether
embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related
35
instruments and whatever its particular designation.

GUOJIFA DE LILUN YU SHIJIAN [INTERNATIONAL LAW – THEORY AND PRACTICE
IN CHINA] 368 (1998); MU YAPING ET AL., DANGDAI GOUJIFA LUN [MODERN
INTERNATIONAL LAW] 474 (1998) (evidencing that China has recorded the
communiqués in its domestic treaty register); John H. McNeill, International
Agreements: Recent US–UK Practice Concerning the Memorandum of
Understanding, 88 AM. J. INT’L L. 821, 821–22 (1994).
34. A preliminary observation is that law must be categorical in a binary
fashion—either some act is legal or not legal—at least insofar as international
law is currently structured. This is a fact which literary writers have
frequently observed that binary categorization of situations with legal value is
not satisfactory. See e.g., Mary Gaitskill, On Not Being a Victim: Sex, Rape,
and the Trouble With Following Rules, HARPER’S MAG. (Mar. 1, 1994), at 35,
reprinted in HERE AND NOW: CURRENT READINGS FOR WRITERS 167 (Gilbert
Muller ed.,1998) (arguing that the categories of rape and non-rape are
insufficient). This does not necessarily mean that obligations are truly binary
in a moral or social sense—they rarely are—but it does mean that we can only
apply them legally in that way, so every rule must be forced into either the
obligatory or optional categories. The act of forcing a rule that might not be
clearly obligatory or not into one of these binary categories is somewhat
fictional, based partly on our degree of certainty that the norm is either
obligatory or not. Our certainty is in turn based on the assessment of evidence
pointing in one direction or the other. If we wish to move to a graduated
system of obligation then we can, but it does not appear to be the case today.
35. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 2(1), opened for
signature May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention on
Treaties]. See Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of
Treaties art. 2(1)(a), Aug. 23, 1978, 1946 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Vienna
Convention on Succession of States] (‘“treaty’ means an international
agreement concluded between States in written form and governed by
international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more
related instruments, and whatever its particular designation”); Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International
Organizations or between International Organizations art. 2(1)(a), Mar. 20,
1986, 25 I.L.M. 543, 578 [hereinafter Vienna Convention on Treaties between
States] (‘“treaty’ means an international agreement governed by international
law and concluded in written form: (i) between one or more States and one or
more
international
organizations;
or
(ii)
between
international
organizations.”).
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Most of the states to which a discussion of diplomatic
assurances is applicable have adhered to this convention, which
provides that agreements qualifying under its terms will be
36
governed by it. Of the states which are parties to the
diplomatic assurances discussed here, the following are also
37
38
39
parties to the Vienna Convention : Algeria , Australia ,
36. It must be acknowledged that the Vienna Convention does not
specifically purport to define what a treaty is. It merely provides for the use of
terms for its own purposes. See Vienna Convention on Treaties, supra note 35.
Additionally, the Vienna Convention applies only to agreements between
states. This article exclusively analyzes the legal nature of inter-state
diplomatic assurances, but an MOU could also be concluded inter-agency. See
e.g., Memorandum of Understanding between the Secretaries of State and
Homeland Security Concerning Implementation of Section 428 of the
Homeland Security Act of 2002, H.R. Doc. No. 108-131 (2003) [hereinafter
DOS-DHS
MOU],
available
at
http://www.nafsa.org/uploadedFiles/dos_dhs_mou_on_respective.pdf (effective
on Sept. 30, 2003, in accordance with Report to the Congress on the
Memorandum of Understanding Between the Secretaries of State and
Homeland Security Concerning Implementation of Section 428 of the
Homeland Security Act of 2002, 68 Fed. Reg. 56,519 (Sept. 29, 2003))
(providing a method to determine which agency would undertake tasks
relating to visa adjudication, classification, admission documentation, refusal,
and revocation; coordinating the issuance of legal advisory opinions; staffing
consular posts and evaluating and training staff; and maintaining records
databases). In these cases, the precise legal value of the MOU can also be
questioned. See e.g., id. ¶ 14 (providing for a dispute resolution mechanism);
id. ¶ 15 (providing for terms of modification of termination of the MOU); id. ¶
16 (providing for an “effective date”). However, the DOS-DHS MOU explicitly
states that “[n]othing in this MOU is intended, or should be construed, to
create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law by
any person against the United States, or any of its agencies, officers, or
employees.” although it does not say anything about Legal rights and
obligations between the Departments of State and Homeland Security. Id. ¶
18.
37. The current status of states as parties to the Vienna Convention can
be found on the UN Treaty Database. See UNITED NATIONS TREATY
COLLECTION,
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetailsIII.aspx?&src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=X
XIII~1&chapter=23&Temp=mtdsg3&lang=en (last visited Apr. 5, 2012).
Bosnia and Herzegovina succeeded to adherence since the former Soviet
Federal Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia and its successor were parties.
Although the Republic of China, now on Taiwan Island only, signed in 1970,
the People’s Republic later acceded in 1997. Russia succeeded to adherence
since the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was a party. Slovakia
succeeded to adherence since the former Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and
its successor were parties. Turkmenistan acceded in its own right. The USSR
was party to the Vienna Convention, but the successor states to the USSR
largely regarded themselves as not succeeding to the treaty, with many of
them later acceding in their own right. Armenia, Estonia, Georgia,
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Lithuania and Uzbekistan are parties. Ukraine
acceded in 1986 separately from the USSR. Since Azerbaijan has not
confirmed that it has succeeded to it, we can presume it is not a party. There
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Austria , Belgium , Bosnia and Herzegovina , Canada ,
44
45
46
47
48
49
China , Colombia , Denmark , Egypt , Germany , Italy ,

are also two other Vienna Conventions regarding treaties that are relevant.
See Vienna Convention on Succession of States, supra note 35; Vienna
Convention on Treaties between States, supra note 35, (not yet in force).
38. See e.g., Moloud Sihali v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, (2010) No.
SC/38/2005 (S.I.A.C.)[6]–[7] (U.K.); MT, RB, & U v. Sec’y of State for the Home
Dep’t, [2007] E.W.C.A. (Civ) 808, [125]–[129], [168], [2008] Q.B. 533, 583–585,
593;
39. See, e.g., Amnesty Int’l, Dangerous Deals, supra note 13, at 33 n.3;
40. See, e.g., Amnesty Int’l, Europe and Central Asia: Summary of
Concerns in the Region, January-June 2004, Sept. 1, 2004, at 6 [hereinafter
Amnesty Int’l, Central Asia] (regarding the case of Akhmed A., expelled to
Uzbekistan). But see Amnesty Int’l, Dangerous Deals, supra note 13, at 18
(noting that Austria appears to have ceased relying on assurances).
41. See, e.g., M.S.S. v. Belg., App. No. 30696/09, Judgment Eur. Ct. H.R.
(2011).
42. See, e.g., Al Hanchi v. Bosnia & Herzegovina, App. No. 48205/09 Eur.
Ct. H.R. ¶ 27 (2011); Amnesty Int’l, Bosnia and Herzegovina:
Deportation/Fear of Torture and Other Ill-Treatment: Awad Aiman, AI Index
EUR 63/004/2009 (May 6, 2009); Amnesty Int’l, Bosnia and Herzegovina:
Forcible Return/Fear of Torture or Ill-Treatment: Imad Al Husin, AI Index
EUR 63/005/2008 (Oct. 20, 2008).
43. See, e.g., Suresh v. Minister of Citizenship & Immigration, 2002 SCC
1, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 3 (Can.); Mahjoub v. Minister of Citizenship & Immigration,
2006 FC 1503, [2007] 4 F.C.R. 247, paras. 39, 53 (Can. Fed. Ct.); Sing v.
Minister of Citizenship & Immigration, 2006 FC 672, para. 6 (Can. Fed. Ct.).
44. See, e.g., Amnesty Int’l, USA: Fear of Forcible Return / Fear of
Torture / Fear of Execution: Uighers Held in Guantanamo Bay, AI Index AMR
51/147/2003 (Dec. 4 2003).
45. See, e.g., Klein v. Russia, App. No. 24268/08 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 21, 37–
40 (2010).
46. See, e.g., Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Report on His Mission to Denmark,
Human Rights Council, ¶ 69, U.N. Doc. No. A/HRC/10/44/Add.2 (Feb. 18,
2009).
47. See, e.g., Mahjoub, 2006 FC at ¶¶ 39, 53; Youssef v. Home Office,
[2004] EWHC (QB) 1884 (Eng.); See Agiza v. Sweden, Commc’n No. 233/2003,
U.N. Doc. CAT/C/34/D/233/2003 (Comm. Against Torture 2005); Attia v.
Sweden, Commc’n No. 199/2002, U.N. Doc. No. CAT/C/31/D/199/2002 (U.N.
Comm. Against Torture, Nov. 24, 2003); Alzery v. Sweden, Commc’n No.
1416/2005, ¶¶ 3.6–3.9, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/88/D/1416/2005 (Human Rights
Comm. 2006).
48. See, e.g., Gemeinsames Ministerialblatt (“GMBl”) 42-61, S. 877ff, sec.
60(2)(3) (Oct. 30, 2009); Verwaltungsgericht Düsseldorf [VG] [Administrative
Trial
Court
for
Düsseldorf]
Mar.
4,
2009,
available
at
http://www.asyl.net/index.php?id=185&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=34308&cHash=51
8e0da6f1; VG Düsseldorf, Jan 16, Case No. 21 K 3263/07.A, available at
http://www.asyl.net/index.php?id=185&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=33716&cHash=7a
95fe16d8.
49. See, e.g., Saadi v. Italy, App. No. 37201/06 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 51 (2009);
Ben Khemais v. Italy, App. No. 246/07 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2009).
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50

51

52

53

54

Kyrgyzstan , Morocco , the Netherlands , Russia , Slovakia ,
55
56
57
58
59
Spain , Sweden , Syria , Tunisia , Turkmenistan , the
60
61
62
United Kingdom , Uzbekistan , and possibly Azerbaijan.
50. Maksudov, et al. v. Kyrgystan, Comm. Nos. 1461, 62, 76, 77 2006,
¶12.5, UN Doc. CCPR/C/93/D/1461, 1462, 1476 & 1477/2006 (Human Rights
Comm. July 30, 2008)
51. See, e.g., In re Charkaoui, [2005] FC 1670, [2006] 3 F.C.R. 325, para.
14 (Can. Fed. Ct.).
52. See, e.g., HR 7 mei 2004, NJ 2007, 276 m.nt. AHK (Kesbir) (Neth.)
(rejecting reliance on assurances); Ramzy v. Netherlands, App. No. 25424/05,
Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 106, 126 (2008).
53. See, e.g., Klein v. Russia, App. No. 24268/08 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 21, 37–
40 (2010); Ryabikin v. Russia, App. No. 8320/04 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 109 (2008);
Ismoilov v. Russia, App. No. 2947/06 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 30–31 (2008); Shamayev
v. Georgia, App. No. 36378/02 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 20, 62 (2005); Amnesty Int’l,
Dangerous Deals, supra note 13 (discussing Spain’s extradition of Murad
Gasayev, a Chechen, to Russia); Amnesty Int’l, Central Asia, supra note 40
(regarding the case of Akhmet A.).
54. See, e.g., Amnesty Int’l, Slovakia: Constitutional Court Upholds the
Absolute Ban on Torture, AI Index EUR 72/005/2008 (June 27, 2008)
(reporting the case of Mustapha Labsi in the Constitutional Court of Slovakia
(June 2008), which rejected reliance on Algerian assurances).
55. See, e.g., Amnesty Int’l, Dangerous Deals, supra note 13, at 25-27.
56. See, e.g., Agiza v. Sweden, Commc’n No. 223/2003, ¶ 4.12 U.N. Doc.
CAT/C/34/D/233/2003 (Comm. Against Torture 2005); Alzery v. Sweden,
Commc’n No. 1416/2005, ¶¶ 3.6–3.9 (Hum Rts. Comm., Nov. 10, 2006);
Switzerland, see e.g., Khouzam v. Hogan, 529 F. Supp. 2d 543, 547, 565–66
(M.D. Pa. 2008) (“Austria, Canada, Germany, Netherlands, Russia, Sweden,
Switzerland, Turkey and the United Kingdom, all parties to [the Convention
Against Torture], provide for judicial review of the reliability and sufficiency of
diplomatic assurances.”); see also Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 604–05
(2005) (indicating it is proper to consider the legislation of other countries in
US Constitutional interpretation).
57. See, e.g., Diplomatic Assurances and Rendition to Torture: The
Perspective of the State Department’s Legal Adviser: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. On International Organizations, Human Rights, and Oversight of
the H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 110th Cong. 1–2, 35–40 (2008) (discussing
the torture of Maher Arar after transfer to Syria based on diplomatic
assurances); 29-B DEPARTMENT OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN
RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 2004: SYRIA 1979 (2005).
58. See, e.g., Verwaltungsgericht Düsseldorf [VG] [Administrative Trial
Court for Düsseldorf] Mar. 4, 2009, Case No. 11 K 4716/07.A, available at
http://www.asyl.net/index.php?id=185&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=34308&cHash=5
18e0da6f1; Al Hanchi v. Bosnia & Herzegovina, App. No. 48205/09 Eur. Ct.
H.R. ¶ 27 (2009); Ben Khemais v. Italy, App. No. 246/07 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 26–
28 (2009); Saadi v. Italy, App. No. 37201/06 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 51–55 (2009).
59. See, e.g., Ryabikin v. Russia, App. No. 8320/04 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 109–
19 (2008).
60. See, e.g., id.; U.K.–Eth. MOU, supra note 6, U.K.–Jordan MOU, supra
note 6, U.K.–Leb. MOU, supra note 6; Libya–U.K. MOU, supra note 6; Youssef
v. Home Office, [2004] EWHC (QB) 1884 (Eng.); AS & DD v. Sec’y of State for
the Home Dep’t, [2008] EWCA (Civ) 289, [2008] H.R.L.R. 28; MT, RB, & U v.
Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, [2007] EWCA (Civ) 808, [125]–[129], [168],
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64

Additionally, Ethiopia and the United States have signed
65
the Convention but have not ratified it. By contrast, the
following states which are parties to diplomatic assurances
discussed here are neither signatories nor parties to the
66
67
68
69
70
Convention: France , India , Jordan , Lebanon , Libya , Sri
71
72
73
74
Lanka, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, and Yemen.
[2008] Q.B. 533, 583–85, 593; DD & AS v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t,
(2007) Nos. SC/42/2005 and SC/50/2005 (S.I.A.C.); Moloud Sihali v. Sec’y of
State for the Home Dep’t, (2010) No. SC/38/2005 (S.I.A.C.); Chahal v. United
Kingdom, 1996-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 1831, ¶ 37 (1996); Othman (Abu Qatada) v.
United Kingdom, App. No. 8139/09 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2012); Comm. Against
Torture, Consideration of Reports Submitted By States Parties Under Article
19 of the Convention: Conclusions and Recommendations of the Committee
Against Torture, ¶ 4(d), U.N. Doc. CAT/C/CR/33/3 (Dec. 10, 2004).
61. See, e.g., Ismoilov v. Russia, App. No. 2947/06 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 30–31
(2008); Mamatkulov & Askarov v. Turkey, 2005-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 295 ¶¶ 28–31;
and Yemen, see e.g., Abdah v. Bush, No. 04-1254 (D.D.C. Mar. 12, 2005)
(temporary restraining order); Abdah v. Bush, No. 04-1254 (D.D.C., Mar. 29,
2005) (prohibiting transfer of detainees to foreign jurisdictions without notice).
62. See, e.g., Pelit v. Azerbaijan, Commc’n No. 281/2005, ¶ 4.8, U.N. Doc.
No. CAT/C/38/D/281/2005 (Comm. Against Torture 2007).
63. See, e.g., U.K.–Eth. MOU, supra note 6.
64. See, e.g., 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(c); Yusupov v. Attorney Gen., 518 F.3d 185,
189 n.4 (2008) (indicating assurances could be sufficient but not relying on
them).
65. Id.
66. See e.g., Amnesty Int’l, Russian Federation: Rule without Law:
Human Rights Violations in the North Caucasus, at 11, AI Index EUR
46/012/2009 (July 2009) (Russian assurances to France).
67. See e.g., Chahal v. United Kingdom, 1996-V Eur. Ct. Hum. Rts. 1831,
¶ 37 (1996); Iraq, see, e.g., Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 702 (2008) (Iraqi
assurances to U.S.).
68. See, e.g., U.K.–Jordan MOU, supra note 6; VG Düsseldorf, Jan. 16,
Case
No.
21
K
3263/07.A,
available
at
http://www.asyl.net/index.php?id=185&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=33716&cHash=7a
95fe16d8; Othman (Abu Qatada) v. United Kingdom, App. No. 8139/09 Eur.
Ct. H.R. (2012).
69. See, e.g., U.K.–Leb. MOU, supra note 6.
70. See, e.g., Libya–U.K. MOU, supra note 6; AS & DD v. Sec’y of State
for the Home Dep’t, [2008] EWCA (Civ) 289, [2008] H.R.L.R. 28 (U.K.); DD &
AS v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, (2007) Nos. SC/42/2005 and
SC/50/2005 (S.I.A.C.) (U.K.).
71. See, e.g., Suresh v. Minister of Citizenship & Immigration, 2002 SCC
1, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 3, (Can.).
72. See, e.g., HR 7 mei 2004, NJ 2007, 276 m.nt. AHK (Kesbir) (Neth.);
Pelit v. Azerbaijan, Commc’n. No. 281/2005, ¶ 4.8, U.N. Doc. No.
CAT/C/38/D/281/2005 (Comm. Against Torture 2007); Mamatkulov & Askarov
v. Turkey, 2005-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 295.
73. See, e.g., Lodhi v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, [2010] EWHC
(Admin) 567, [62]–[67] (Eng.) (rejecting reliance on assurances).
74. See, e.g., Abdah v. Bush, No. 04-1254 (D.D.C. Mar. 12, 2005)
(temporary restraining order); Abdah v. Bush, No. 04-1254 (D.D.C., Mar. 29,
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However, the Vienna Convention definition may not be
limited to only those agreements undertaken by signatories to
75
it. The convention’s terms have also been held to constitute a
definitive definition of a treaty and have otherwise inspired
76
domestic definitions of a treaty. Many terms of the Vienna
Convention have also been found to restate customary
international law, and while it is not clear that the convention’s
definition of treaty is such a term, the International Court of
77
Justice (“ICJ”) has reached a conclusion suggesting that it is.
There are several elements of the Vienna Convention’s
definition that, when met, demand that a given instrument be
regarded as a treaty, at least for purposes of the convention’s
rules on reservations, invalidity, and interpretation. Those
elements are (1) that the agreement be concluded between
States; (2) that the agreement be made in writing; and (3) that
it be governed by international law. Additionally, in case of any
doubt, two factors are specifically designated as irrelevant to
this inquiry: (a) its form in two or more related instruments;
and (b) its particular designation.
2005) (prohibiting transfer of detainees to foreign jurisdictions without notice).
75. See generally Certain Questions of Mutual Assistance in Criminal
Matters (Djib. v. Fr.), 2008 I.C.J. Reps. 177 (June 4) (where neither France nor
Djibouti objected or argued against the application of the Vienna Convention
to their dispute, despite the fact that neither is a party).
76. See, e.g. Harksen v. President of the Republic of South Africa & Others
1999 (A) (S. Afr.) (“The term ‘international agreement’, according to Mr.
Seligson, is wider than ‘treaty’ and includes ad hoc agreements of an informal
nature entered into between South Africa and other States. He referred in this
regard to [art. 2.1 (a) of] the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969)
as being declarato[r]y of customary international law and hence becoming part
of South African law in terms of s 232 of the Constitution.”), aff’d, 2000 (2) SA
825 (CC), reprinted in 132 I.L.R. 529, 541 (S. Afr. (A) 1999). See also Federal
Law of Russian Federation on International Treaties of the Russian
Federation, 1995, art. 2 (Russ.), in WILLIAM E. BUTLER, RUSSIAN LAW OF
TREATIES 13 (1997) (defining “treaty” under domestic law as “an international
agreement concluded by the Russian Federation with a foreign State(s) or with
an international organization in written form and regulated by international
law, irrespective of whether such agreement is contained in one or in several
related documents, and also irrespective of its specific name.”); Constitutional
Reform & Governance Act, 2010, c. 25 (Eng.) (defining “treaty” in the sense of
treaties that must be laid before Parliament, as “(1) a written agreement — (a)
between States or between States and international organisations, and (b)
binding under international law. (2) But ‘treaty’ does not include a regulation,
rule, measure, decision or similar instrument made under a treaty (other than
one that amends or replaces the treaty (in whole or in part)).”).
77. See Case Concerning Mar. Delimitation & Territorial Questions
Between Qatar & Bahrain (Qatar v. Bahr.), 1995 I.C.J. Reps. 6 (Feb. 15); Case
Concerning Mar. Delimitation & Territorial Questions Between Qatar &
Bahrain (Qatar v. Bahr.), 1994 I.C.J. Reps. 112 (July 1).
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A. AN AGREEMENT CONCLUDED BETWEEN STATES
1. In General
The first question is whether assurances amount to
78
agreements at all. Not all pledges amount to agreements. For
example, in the Nicaragua case, the ICJ held that the letter
sent by Nicaragua to the Organization of American States was
a “political pledge” only, without legal effects. However, before
we jump to the conclusion that pledges and similar promises
are not legally binding, we should observe that the ICJ appears
to have reached that conclusion because the pledge contained
79
no concrete commitments. In short, Nicaragua did not agree
78. See Vienna Convention on Treaties, supra note 35; Vienna Convention
on Succession of States, supra note 35; Vienna Convention on Treaties
between States, supra note 35. For purposes of this discussion we will omit an
analysis of whether the entities are states or not. See e.g. Wei Wang, CEPA: A
Lawful Free Trade Agreement Under One Country, Two Customs Territories?,
10 L. & BUS. REV. AMS. 647, 656–57 (2004) (arguing that the CEPA does not
qualify as a treaty because it does not satisfy the Vienna Convention
requirement of an agreement between states).
79. See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua
(Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 261 (June 27):
However, the Court is unable to find anything in these documents,
whether the resolution or the communication accompanied by the
‘Plan to secure Peace’, from which it can be inferred that any legal
undertaking was intended to exist. Moreover, the Junta made it plain
in one of these documents that its invitation to the Organization of
American States to supervise Nicaragua's political life should not be
allowed to obscure the fact that it was the Nicaraguans themselves
who were to decide upon and conduct the country's domestic policy.
The resolution of 23 June 1979 also declares that the solution of their
problems is a matter “exclusively” for the Nicaraguan people, while
stating that that solution was to be based . . . on certain foundations
which were put forward merely as recommendations to the future
government. This part of the resolution is a mere statement which
does not comprise any formal offer which if accepted would constitute
a promise in law, and hence a legal obligation. Nor can the Court take
the view that Nicaragua actually undertook a commitment to
organize free elections, and that this commitment was of a legal
nature. The Nicaraguan Junta of National Reconstruction planned
the holding of free elections as part of its political programme of
government following the recommendation of the XVIIth Meeting of
Consultation of Foreign Ministers of the Organization of American
States. This was an essentially political pledge, made not only to the
Organization, but also to the people of Nicaragua, intended to be its
first beneficiaries. But the Court cannot find an instrument with legal
force, whether unilateral or synallagmatic, whereby Nicaragua has
committed itself in respect of the principle or methods of holding
elections. . . . It is evident that provisions of this kind are far from
being a commitment as to the use of particular political mechanisms.
Also note that the terms of the Vienna Convention defining a treaty as an
agreement between states have been complemented by the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties between States and International Organizations or
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80

to anything. The concept of “agreement” appears, therefore, to
contemplate bilateral (at least) communication regarding a
commitment.
What it means for a country to make an agreement is a
question that can be analyzed by reference to domestic contract
81
law. We can and should consider private law contract
analogies in our analysis of the law of treaties, especially
because every legal system selects certain agreements to be
between International Organizations, which provides the same definition for
agreements with international organizations. See Vienna Convention on
Treaties between States, supra note 35. Arguably, its terms restate customary
international law.
80. Also, the communication from Nicaragua was unilateral and, without
reliance by any other state, did not satisfy the Nuclear Tests standard for
binding unilateral statements. But see infra Sec. III (discussing the
questionable nature of reliance in the Nuclear Tests cases).
81. Hersch Lauterpacht argued that we can look to private law to assist in
resolving issues of international law, and the practice that has since become
almost axiomatic. See generally Second Report on the Law of Treaties, 1954 II
Y.B.
Int'l
L.
Comm'n
125, ¶ 10, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1954/Add.1; HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, THE
FUNCTION OF LAW IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 115, 205 (1933);
HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, PRIVATE LAW SOURCES AND ANALOGIES OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW (1927). In the Second Report on the Law of Treaties,
Lauterpacht cited Rose & Frank Co. v. R. Crompton Bros. Ltd., [1923] 2 K. B.
261, 293 (Eng.):
“To create a contract there must be a common intention of the parties
to enter into legal obligations . . . Such an intention ordinarily will be
inferred when parties enter into an agreement which in other
respects conforms to the rules of law as to the formation of contracts.
It may be negative impliedly by the nature of the agreed promise or
promises.”
Lauterpacht also cited Balfour v. Balfour, [1919] 2 K.B. 571 (Eng.):
“[such agreements] are not sued upon, not because the parties are
reluctant to enforce their legal rights when the agreement is broken,
but because the parties, in the inception of the arrangement, never
intended that they should be sued upon.”
See also Wolfgang Friedmann, The Uses of ‘General Principles’ in the
Development of International Law, 57 AM. J. INT'L L. 279 (1963); MCNAIR,
supra note 32; WOLFGANG FRIEDMANN, LAW IN A CHANGING SOCIETY 383
(1959). It is now commonplace to observe that many aspects of the law of
treaties have come to us from principles of domestic contract law. See Law of
Treaties, [1953] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 90, art. 1, comments, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/63 (noting that a treaty embodied contractual elements).
Admittedly contract law is not a perfect parallel to treaty law, so we must
remain mindful of the important differences, but the parallels between
treaties and private contract law have been highlighted many times. See e.g.
ANTHONY CARTY, THE DECAY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW?: A REAPPRAISAL OF
THE LIMITS OF LEGAL IMAGINATION IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS (1986);
SHABTAI ROSENNE, DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW OF TREATIES 1945–1986
(1989).
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legally binding and certain agreements not to be. Domestic
83
contract law looks for a consensus ad idem —an objective
assessment of whether the parties agreed to the same thing.
84
This assessment is, of course, partly a legal fiction; the
interpreter of the instrument will look for evidence that the
parties “said the same thing,” not for what they subjectively
85
understood or intended. Proving intent to create a new
82. See e.g. Herbert Bernstein & Joachim Zekoll, The Gentleman's
Agreement in Legal Theory and in Modern Practice: United States, 46 AM. J.
COMP. L. SUPP. 87, 88 (1998); Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System:
Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD.
115 (1992). In addition to agreements that are intentionally removed from the
legal system, most legal systems also provide for contracts that are nonbinding despite their intent to be governed by law. See, e.g., Comm’n on
European Contract Law, Principles of European Contract Law: Excessive
Benefit or Unfair Advantage, art. 4:109 (1999) [hereinafter PECL], available at
http://frontpage.cbs.dk/law/commission_on_european_contract_law/PECL%20e
ngelsk/engelsk_partI_og_II.htm (providing that a lawfully concluded contract
is not enforceable in certain circumstances).
83. See generally FRIEDRICH KARL VON SAVIGNY, SYSTEM DES HEUTIGEN
RÖMISCHEN RECHTS (1840).
84. See generally Anne de Moor, Intention in the Law of Contract: Elusive
or Illusory?, 106 L. Q. REV. 632, 648 (1990) (‘“[T]he intent of man cannot be
tried, for the devil himself knows not the intent of man.”’). It is arguable that
knowing the intent of a state is perhaps even more difficult than knowing the
intent of a man. Contract law in continental Europe is similar. For example,
the PECL states that “[t]he intention of a party to be legally bound by contract
is to be determined from the party's statements or conduct as they were
reasonably understood by the other party.” PECL, supra note 82, at art. 2:102.
85. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV.
457, 464 (1897):
From the time of the Romans down to now, this mode of dealing has
affected the language of the law as to contract, and the language used
has reacted upon the thought. We talk about a contract as a meeting
of the minds of the parties, and thence it is inferred in various cases
that there is no contract because their minds have not met; that is,
because they have intended different things or because one party has
not known of the assent of the other. Yet nothing is more certain than
that parties may be bound by a contract to things which neither of
them intended, and when one does not know of the other's assent. . . .
The parties are bound by the contract as it is interpreted by the court,
yet neither of them meant what the court declares that they have
said. In my opinion no one will understand the true theory of contract
or be able even to discuss some fundamental questions intelligently
until he has understood that all contracts are formal, that the making
of a contract depends not on the agreement of two minds in one
intention, but on the agreement of two sets of external signs — not on
the parties' having meant the same thing but on their having said the
same thing . . . .
See also Jan Klabbers, How to Defeat a Treaty’s Object and Purpose Pending
Entry Into Force: Toward Manifest Intent, 34 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 283, 305
(2001) (“Nothing is particularly novel about a manifest intent test. One could
argue that in many cases when trying to determine whether a violation of
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obligation can be problematic, but courts and commentators are
always attempting to discover the intent of the parties to
agreements. A similar problem occurs in cases in which the
international legal personality of an international organization
is disputed and the organization’s constitutive instrument is
silent on the question of personality. Courts address the
problem by looking to what the constitutive instrument
objectively did, rather than to the subjective understandings of
86
its signers.
Thus, the Vienna Convention’s requirement of an
agreement should not be read to mean that a pledge cannot
result in legal effects; rather it means that a mutual agreement
to some commitment must be made before a communication
may be called an agreement. It also does not mean that only
synallagmatic agreements are agreements, as there does not
appear to be any quid pro quo requirement in the Vienna
Convention. Instead, the parties must simply, objectively,
communicate an identical promise that in the future one or
both will do a certain thing.
If an agreement stating commitments if found, the next
question is whether the assurances are creating new,
international law has taken place, intent is ‘constructed’ or implied from the
nature of the acts themselves’. Much the same applies to reconstructing the
terms of an agreement. In the context of determining whether there is an
intent to be bound by a treaty, a manifest intent test also is involved.”)
(internal citations omitted) (citing Martti Koskenniemi, Evil Intentions or
Vicious Acts? What is Prima Facie Evidence of Genocide?, in LIBER AMICORUM
BENGT BROMS 180, 196 (Matti Tupamaki ed., 1999); FRIEDRICH V.
KRATOCHWIL, RULES, NORMS, AND DECISIONS: ON THE CONDITIONS OF
PRACTICAL AND LEGAL REASONING IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND
DOMESTIC AFFAIRS 235 (1989)). Comparisons to finding objective intent in the
field of tort law can also be drawn. See John Finnis, Intention in Tort Law, in
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW 229, 229 (David G. Owen ed.,
1995) (“[Intention is] the linking of means and ends in a plan or proposal-foraction adopted by choice in preference to alternative proposals (including to do
nothing).”). See H.L.A. Hart, Negligence, Mens Rea, and Criminal
Responsibility, in PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 136 (1968), for an argument that negligence is an
emanation of subjective intent rather than of inadvertence.
86. See e.g. Tarcisio Gazzini, NATO’s Role in the Collective Security
System, 8 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 231, 240–41 (2003) (citing IAN
BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 678–80 (1998)):
The Washington Treaty is silent on the international legal status of
the Alliance. A specific norm in the constituent treaty, however, is
neither sufficient nor necessary to establish the international
personality of the organization. What needs to be demonstrated is the
exercise, based on an autonomous decision-making process, of powers
not limited to the national systems of one or more member states.
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additional obligations, and are thus an agreement, or whether
they constitute a re-statement of existing obligations that are
obligatory by force of a different source of law.
Several examples will illustrate the possibility that an
obligation may be doubly owed by force of different sources of
law. One way in which a subsequent, additional obligation
might be incurred, in addition to the pre-existing obligation, is
through the law of international organizations and the legal
effect of their acts. A recent example is the Chapter VII
resolution by the UN Security Council regarding the violence in
87
Libya. In the resolution, the Security Council reiterated its
referral of the situation to the International Criminal Court
88
and established a flight ban, among other measures. It also
89
demanded that attacks on civilians cease, and that Libya
comply with its legal obligations under international law,
specifically international humanitarian law, human rights law
90
and refugee law. Of course, Libya was already held to those
obligations under international law, notwithstanding the UN
Security Council Resolution, but now it has the additional
obligation under the UN Charter to comply with a Chapter VII
resolution of the Security Council regarding those obligations.
Its obligations were doubly owed, due to having been made
obligatory by two different sources.
Another illustrative example of legal duties made
obligatory by different sources of law occurs in the context of
“umbrella clauses” in Bilateral Investment Treaties (“BITs”)
91
and similar agreements. The language of such a clause varies
87. See S.C. Res. 1973, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1973 (Mar. 17, 2011). It is,
however, doubtful that the Security Council finding that “the widespread and
systematic attacks currently taking place in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya
against the civilian population may amount to crimes against humanity” and
the affirmation of the conclusions by other international organizations that
“serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law . . .
have been and are being committed in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya” is in any
way binding on the International Criminal Court, the Court not being a party
to the UN Charter, among other considerations. See id.
88. See S.C. Res. 1973, supra note 87, ¶¶ 6–12, 17–18 (regarding the flight
ban); id. ¶¶ 19–21 (regarding freezing assets); id. ¶¶ 22–23 (regarding
designated certain individuals).
89. See id. ¶ 1 (“Demands the immediate establishment of a cease-fire and
a complete end to violence and all attacks against, and abuses of, civilians”).
90. See id. ¶ 3. (“Demands that the Libyan authorities comply with their
obligations under international law, including international humanitarian
law, human rights and refugee law . . . .”).
91. In the literature, these clauses are also referred to as ‘elevator,’
‘mirror’ or ‘parallel’ clauses, among other names. See Thomas W. Wälde, The
“Umbrella” Clause in Investment Arbitration: A Comment on Original
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from “[e]ach Party shall observe any obligation it may have
92
entered into with regard to investments”
to “[e]ach
Contracting Party shall observe any contractual obligation it
may have entered into towards an investor of the other
Contracting Party with regard to investments approved by it in
93
its territory,” and all the way to the extreme of “[a]
Contracting Party shall, subject to its law, do all in its power to
ensure that a written undertaking given by a competent
authority to a national of the other Contracting Party with
94
regard to an investment is respected.” Treaties also situate
these provisions in varying sections, such as in sections
95
providing for protections and commitments, or in sections
divorced from specific obligations and dispute resolution
96
mechanisms. That these provisions are slightly different from
each other, and are stated in different contexts, suggests
differing degrees of commitment.
The question that arbitral tribunals have to address when
Intentions and Recent Cases, 6 J. WORLD INVESTMENT & TRADE 183, 185
(2005); Anthony C. Sinclair, The Origins of the Umbrella Clause in the
International Law of Investment Protection, 20 ARB. INT’L 411, 412 (2004). An
example of such a provision in a multilateral treaty would be the Energy
Charter Treaty. See Energy Charter Treaty art. 10(1), Dec. 17, 1994, 2080
U.N.T.S. 100 (“Each Contracting Party shall observe any obligations it has
entered into with an Investor or an Investment of an Investor of any other
Contracting Party.”).
92. Treaty Between United States of America and the Argentine Republic
Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment,
U.S.–Arg., art. 2(2)(c), Nov. 14, 1991, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 103–2 (1993). See
also Agreement Between the Lao People’s Democratic Republic and the
Federal Republic of Germany Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal
Protection of Investments, Laos–Ger., art. 8(2), Aug. 9, 1996, 2109 U.N.T.S. 32
[hereinafter German Model BIT] (“Each Contracting Party shall observe any
other obligation it has assumed with regard to investments in its territory by
nationals or companies of the other Contracting Party.”).
93. Agreement Between the Republic of Austria and the Republic of
Croatia for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, Austria–Croat., art.
8(2), Feb. 19, 1997, 2098 U.N.T.S. 517, 529 [hereinafter Austrian Model BIT].
94. Agreement Between Australia and the Republic of Poland on the
Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments, Austl.–Pol., art. 10, May
7, 1991, 1680 U.N.T.S. 235.
95. See, e.g., Agreement Between the Belgo-Luxemburg Economic Union
and the Government of the United Mexican States on the Reciprocal
Promotion and Protection of Investments, Lux.–Mex., art. 10, Aug. 27, 1998,
223 U.N.T.S. 3, 21; Agreement on Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of
Investments Between the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Socialist
Republic of Vietnam, Neth–Viet., art. 3, Mar. 10, 1994, 2240 U.N.T.S. 355, 365
[hereinafter Netherlands Model BIT].
96. See e.g. German Model BIT, supra note 92, at art. 8. It is not entirely
clear whether the placement of a clause and the section headings and
groupings constitute context for purposes of treaty interpretation.
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determining their jurisdiction under such treaties is whether
such a clause serves to transform existing obligations in a
contract between a state and an investor into additional
obligations under a BIT. If so, any violation of the investment
contract by the state would necessarily result in a violation of
the treaty in addition to any violation under domestic contract
97
law. Not all investment treaties include such a provision, so
where one is included, its presence appears to be meaningful,
suggesting a meaning beyond simply restating the binding
nature of the contract. Scholarly opinion tends to favor the
opinion that the clause creates new, additional obligations
98
under international law. The case law of investment arbitral
tribunals is divided, but there is an observable trend away from
a very restrictive reading of these clauses toward a more
99
expansive reading. Nonetheless, factors such as the clause’s
97. Compare Agreement Between the Government of the Kingdom of
Sweden and the Government of the Republic of Albania on the Promotion and
Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Swed.–Alb. art. 10, Mar. 31, 1995, 2087
U.N.T.S. 291, 307 [hereinafter Swiss Model BIT] and United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland and Argentina Agreement for the
Promotion and Protection of Investments, U.K.–Arg., art. 2(2), Dec. 11, 1990,
1765 U.N.T.S. 33, 35 [hereinafter U.K. Model BIT] (where it is included) with
Agreement Between the Government of Hong Kong and the Government of
the Republic of France for the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of
Investments, H.K.–Fr., art. 3, Nov. 30, 1995, 2053 U.N.T.S. 221, 237 and
Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of Peru and the
Government of the Republic of France on the Reciprocal Promotion and
Protection of Investments, Fr.–Peru, art. 2, 1992 and Agreement Between the
Government of the Republic of France and the Government of the Russian
Federation on the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments, Fr.–
Russ., art. 8, 1989; Agreement Between the Government of Hong Kong and
the Government of Japan for the Promotion and Protection of Investment,
H.K.–Japan, art. 2(3), 1997; Agreement Between the Government of Japan
and the Government of the Russian Federation Concerning the Promotion and
Protection of Investments, Japan–Russ., art. 3(3), 1998, (where it is missing).
98. See Christoph Schreuer, Travelling the BIT Route: Of Waiting Periods,
Umbrella Clauses and Forks in the Road, 5 J. WORLD INVESTMENT & TRADE
231 (2004); F.A. Mann, British Treaties for the Promotion and Protection of
Investments, 52 BRIT. YB INT’L L. 241, 246 (1981). But see Wälde, supra note
91 (taking a middle position that only very large investments would suggest
the exercise of sovereign functions); Charles N. Brower, The Future of Foreign
Investment — Recent Developments in the International Law of Expropriation
and Compensation, in PRIVATE INVESTORS ABROAD – PROBLEMS AND
SOLUTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS IN 1975 93, 105 (Virginia S. Cameron
ed., 1976).
99. See LG & E Energy Corp. v. Argentine Republic, I.C.S.I.D. Case No.
ARB/02/1, Decision on Liability, ¶¶ 169–75 (2006); Noble Ventures, Inc. v.
Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/11, Award, (Oct. 12, 2005),
http://italaw.com/documents/Noble.pdf; Eureko B.V. v. Republic of Poland,
Partial Award (Aug. 19, 2005), 12 ICSID Rep. 331 (2007); Sempra Energy Int’l
v. Argentine Republic, I.C.S.I.D. Case No ARB/02/16, Decision on Objections to
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precise text and location in the treaty instrument may play
some role in particular interpretations, because each clause
100
must be assessed on its own merits. However, this individual
variance does not detract from the general conclusion that a
treaty provision creating an obligation of the state to observe
undertakings can operate to create international legal
responsibility for a violation of a contract with a private
investor.
This means that even where an instrument restates
existing obligations, it may still constitute a binding agreement
101
to re-impose those obligations under another source of law.
In other cases, however, an instrument might simply restate
obligations that already exist under international law in a nonbinding way. Thus the instrument as a whole would only serve
as a subsidiary source of law.
2. Application to Diplomatic Assurances
The conclusion that additional obligations are being
undertaken by givers of diplomatic assurances is borne out in
state practice. Diplomatic assurances often contain obligations
that are additional to and distinct from a state’s pre-existing
obligations under international law. These additional pledges
102
are often very clear—e.g. the obligation to permit monitors —
Jurisdiction (May 11, 2005); Waste Mgmt Inc. v. United Mexican States,
I.C.S.I.D. Case No. ARB(AF)/00/3, Award, ¶ 73 (Apr. 30, 2004); SGS Société
Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. Republic of Philippines., I.C.S.I.D. Case No.
ARB/02/6, Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 130–135 (Jan. 29, 2004).
100. See SGS Société Générale de Surveillance, S.A. v. Islamic Republic
Pakistan, I.C.S.I.D. Case No. ARB(AF)/00/3 (where the tribunal concluded
that the section of the treaty where the umbrella clause was situated
suggested that it was not an additional, enforceable undertaking). But see SGS
Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. Republic of Philippines, I.C.S.I.D.
Case No. ARB/02/6 (concluding the opposite—that situation of the clause was
not determinative).
101. See e.g. UNHCR, Manual on Effective Investigation and
Documentation of Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment (“Istanbul Protocol”), (Aug. 9, 1999), U.N. Doc. No.
HR/P/PT/8/Rev.1 [hereinafter Istanbul Protocol] (restating obligations under
international law regarding torture, although for purposes of this analysis,
this document is assumed to be non-legally-binding).
102. See Alzery v. Sweden, Commc’n No. 1416/2005, ¶ 3.28, U.N.
Doc.CCPR/C/88/D/1416/2005 (Human Rights Comm., Nov. 10, 2006):
On 21 September 2005, Parliament's Standing Committee on the
Constitution reported on an investigation that had been initiated in
May 2004 at the request of five members of Parliament . . . . With
respect to the assurances procured, the Committee was of the view
that a more detailed plan for a monitoring mechanism had not been
agreed with the Egyptian authorities and appears not to have existed
at all prior to the decision to expel. This shortcoming was reflected in
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and they indicate that some additional agreement is being
reached already. Additionally, where diplomatic assurances reaffirm existing international obligations, they usually contain
very strong language normally reserved for binding
commitments—e.g. that the assuring state “will” comply with a
103
certain pre-existing obligation. A restatement of pre-existing
obligations might constitute a new, supplementary obligation if
the new instrument produces separate and independent legal
the actual monitoring of the guarantee, which was not consistent with
the recommendations issued later on by the UN Special Rapporteur
on issues relating to torture or the practice established by the Red
Cross.
Regarding the provision for an independent monitoring body, there is a
discrepancy between the Libyan and Lebanese MOUs on the one hand and the
Jordanian MOU on the other. The Libyan and Lebanese MOUs provide for it
in the “Application and Scope” section while the Jordanian and Ethiopian
provides for it in the “Understandings” section. In all three cases, though,
there does not appear to already be an obligation under international law to
provide for monitoring bodies, so it must be seen as an additional obligation,
and thus an agreement to do something. See, e.g., Libya–U.K. MOU, supra
note 6.
An independent body (“the monitoring body”) will be nominated by
both sides to monitor the implementation of the assurances given
under this Memorandum, including any specific assurances, by the
receiving state. The responsibilities of the monitoring body will
include monitoring the return of, and any detention, trial or
imprisonment of, the person. The monitoring body will report to both
sides.
See also U.K.–Jordan MOU, supra note 6, ¶ 4; U.K.–Leb. MOU, supra note 6
at 2; XX v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, [2007] S.I.A.C. No. SC/61/2007, ¶
20 (Eng.) (Mitting, J.):
Having clarified that the parties will comply with their existing
international obligations and will permit the creation and operation
of an independent monitoring body, the agreements proceed to lay
out several obligations on the states – which are understood to
already bind the states under international law – but here are
affirmed to apply to circumstances where a person is being returned
under the agreement. Each provision in turn uses the phrasing “will
be afforded adequate accommodation, nourishment, and medical
treatment . . . .” See U.K.–Jordan MOU, supra note 6,¶ 1 (“will be
brought promptly before a judge”); id. ¶ 2 (“will be informed promptly
. . . of any charge against him”); id. ¶ 3 (“will be entitled to contact . . .
from the representative of an independent body”); id. ¶ 4 (“the
receiving state will not impede . . . access . . . to the consular posts”);
id. ¶ 5 (“will be allowed to follow his religious observance”); id. ¶ 6
(“will receive a fair and public hearing”); id. ¶ 7 (“will be allowed
adequate time and facilities to prepare his defence”); id. ¶ 8. None of
these understandings appear to be simply political statements in the
sense of Nicaragua’s pledges to the OAS in the Nicaragua case, but
are instead statements of the parties obligations under international
law, applied to the particular case.
103. But see AUST, supra note 32, at 27 (arguing that “will” is less
obligatory than “shall”).
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effects. The precise content of some of the additional pledges
104
may be somewhat unclear,
but objectively speaking it
appears that states believe that giving an assurance imposes
some obligations, additional to those already existing under
105
international law.
Some courts have agreed that diplomatic assurances create
additional binding obligations. For instance, SIAC concluded
that the MOU between Jordan and the United Kingdom did
create its own obligations, so that it was not merely a
106
restatement of existing international law. SIAC also noted
104. For example, what the steps are for investigating purported
violations, See Othman v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, [2007] S.I.A.C.
No. SC/15/2005, ¶ 505 (Eng.)
It is right that the MOU does not specify the steps which are to be
taken in order to investigate an allegation of a breach; indeed there is
no provision for an investigation as such at all. Mr Oakden could only
say that an investigation would be consonant with the MOU.
However, in reality, if an allegation of a breach were made or if the
Centre were to be hindered in the way in which it went about its work
. . . the most obvious starting point for any diplomatic response would
be to try to find out or to require that the Jordanians find out what
had happened and to do so quickly.
105. See id. ¶¶ 502–03.
Second, the level of scrutiny which Jordan has accepted, through
giving another individual state with which it has close relations a real
interest in the way in which one of its own nationals is treated,
cannot but show that it is willing to abide by the terms and spirit of
the MOU. The MOU was not the result of a desire by Jordan to obtain
the return of the Appellant. It gives standing to the UK and to
another body to intervene, ultimately through diplomatic measures,
in what it has done or might do. It knows that a failure on its part to
observe the MOU and the monitoring arrangements would lead to a
diplomatic response at all levels and quickly.
[H]ere there is a specific agreement, which has a specific purpose
engaging the self-interest of the UK and, in differing ways, of Jordan.
We accept that there must be a limit, albeit undefined, as to how far
the UK Government would go in taking measures against Jordan in
the event of a breach or a failure to investigate a well-founded
allegation of a breach, or in the event of obstruction of the monitors.
There is an obvious problem about the UK taking steps which would
harm itself in the apparent interest of this Appellant. But there is
scope and an incentive for measures to be taken by the UK and an
incentive to take steps to obviate such a response on the part of the
Jordanians.
106. See id. ¶ 176.
The MOU is couched as a document the obligations in which apply
equally to removals from Jordan to the UK, and to those from the UK
to Jordan. Each is obliged to “comply with their human rights
obligations under international law regarding a person returned
under this arrangement”. A monitoring body is envisaged. There are
eight specific provisions which govern the proper treatment of those
in custody . . . .
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that, in contrast to the MOU, the “side letter” on the
enforcement of the death penalty did not have the same gravity
107
as the MOU on compliance with other human rights norms.
It used the expression “formal undertaking” to refer to the
108
MOU, but not to the “side letter.”
In addition, the European Court also appears to
contemplate the possibility that diplomatic assurances may
create additional binding obligations. In general, the Court
appears to consider diplomatic assurances as a part of the
factual assessment of the risk of ill treatment, and on occasion,
the Court has found diplomatic assurances to be insufficient.
The Court’s position on the legally binding nature of
assurances is more equivocal, but in some cases, the Court has
suggested that real obligations may need to be undertaken in
assurances in order to render them valid. In Saadi, the Court
cited the text of assurances in that case given by Algeria, and
109
found fault with them:
The note [verbale] in question, written in French, reads as follows:
. . . - please give assurances that the fears expressed by Mr Saadi
of being subjected to torture and inhuman and degrading
treatment on his return to Tunisia are unfounded;
- please give assurances that if he were to be committed to prison
he would be able to receive visits from his lawyers and members
of his family.
In addition, the Italian embassy would be grateful if the Tunisian
authorities would keep it informed of the conditions of Mr Saadi’s
detention if he were to be committed to prison.
. . . On 4 July 2007 the Tunisian Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent a
note verbale to the Italian embassy in Tunis. Its content was as
follows:
“The Minister of Foreign Affairs . . . has the honour to inform the
ambassador that the Tunisian Government confirm that they are

107. See id. ¶ 177.
The side letter on the death penalty, whilst containing the UK
Government's policy on return where execution is a significant risk,
recognises that "for constitutional reasons" Jordan is not able to give a
formal undertaking in the MOU itself. It records that if someone
returned were sentenced to death, "the British Government would
consider asking the Jordanian Government to commute the sentence".
There was no formal response from the Jordanians; there was a
debate over whether one had been expected. The terms of the UK
letter had been discussed with them beforehand and agreed.
108. Id. The question of whether the agreement is governed by
international law or not will be addressed in the section on that point.
109. Saadi v. Italy, Application No. 37201/06, Judgment, Eur. Ct. H.R.¶¶
51–55 (2008), reprinted in (2009) 49 E.H.R.R. 30 (ECHR (Gr. Ch.)); Ben
Khemais v. Italy, Application No. 246/07, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2009), reviewed in 3
Eur. Hum. Rts L. Rev. 450–54 (2009).
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prepared to accept the transfer to Tunisia of Tunisians
imprisoned abroad once their identity has been confirmed, in
strict conformity with the national legislation in force and under
the sole safeguard of the relevant Tunisian statutes.”
. . . A second note verbale, dated 10 July 2007, was worded as follows:
“. . . The Minister of Foreign Affairs hereby confirms that the
Tunisian laws in force guarantee and protect the rights of
prisoners in Tunisia and secure to them the right to a fair trial.
The Minister would point out that Tunisia has voluntarily
acceded to the relevant international treaties and conventions. ..”
The Court held that the assurances were not sufficient because
. . . the Tunisian authorities did not provide such assurances. At
first they merely stated that they were prepared to accept the
transfer to Tunisia of Tunisians detained abroad . . . It was only
in a second note verbale . . . that the Tunisian Ministry of Foreign
Affairs observed that Tunisian laws guaranteed prisoners’ rights
and that Tunisia had acceded to “the relevant international
treaties and conventions” . . . In that connection, the Court
observes that the existence of domestic laws and accession to
international treaties guaranteeing respect for fundamental
rights in principle are not in themselves sufficient to ensure
adequate protection against the risk of ill-treatment where, as in
the present case, reliable sources have reported practices resorted
to or tolerated by the authorities which are manifestly contrary to
110
the principles of the Convention.”

This decision, and others like it, reaffirm the requirement
that for assurances to even be considered in the assessment of
risk to the person—i.e. to even constitute assurances in the
first place—they must be individualized to that person or
otherwise provide for specific promises regarding procedures
and potential sentences in the particular case, which by
implication is a pledge to respect that person’s individual
111
human rights. Where the assurances merely confirm already
110. Id. ¶ 147.
111. See Kaboulov v. Ukraine, Final Judgment, ¶¶ 33–34, 113, App. No.
41015/04,
Eur.
Ct.
H.R.
(Nov.
19,
2009),
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=1&portal=hbkm&action=html
&highlight=kaboulov%20|%20ukraine&sessionid=89536360&skin=hudoc-en,
(holding that the assurances, to be considering in reaching the factual
determination of risk of maltreatment, must contain specific and explicit
promises regarding the particular individual, not be merely blanket, nonindividualized pledges). Also see Khaydarov v. Russ., Application No.
21055/09, Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 111 (2010); Klein v. Russ., Application No.
24268/08, (Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 55 (2010); Hamraoui v. It., Application No.
16201/07, Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 15 (2009); Bouyahia v. It., Application No.
46792/06, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 16 (2009); C.B.Z. v. It., Application No. 44006/06,
Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 17 (2009); Ben Salah v. It., Application No. 38128/06, Eur. Ct.
H.R. ¶ 14 (2009); Soltana v. It., Application No. 37336/06, Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 20
(2009); O v. It., Application No. 37257/06, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 18 (2009); Darraji v.
It., Application No. 11549/05, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 35 (2009); Sellem v. It.,
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existing domestic and international obligations, there is no
additional substance to the assurances. There was no
imperative to act using mandatory language such as “will
comply”. There was not even a statement by the state issuing
the assurances, Algeria that it would comply with its own laws.
The Court was quite right in holding that there was no
agreement to anything.
The European Court again considered assurances in MSS
112
v. Belgium and upheld its assessment in Saadi.
. . . The Belgian Government argued that in any event they had
sought sufficient assurances from the Greek authorities that the
applicant faced no risk of treatment contrary to the Convention in
Greece. In that connection, the Court observes that the existence of
domestic laws and accession to international treaties guaranteeing
respect for fundamental rights in principle are not in themselves
113
sufficient to ensure adequate protection . . .

The Court added that the content necessary must include
an additional undertaking regarding the specific person.
. . . Secondly, [the Court] notes that the agreement document . . .
contains no guarantee concerning the applicant in person. No more
did the information document the Belgian Government mentioned,
provided by the Greek authorities, contain any individual guarantee;
it merely referred to the applicable legislation, with no relevant
114
information about the situation in practice.

Other courts and foreign affairs ministries appear to hold
the same opinion that additional undertakings, beyond mere
restatements of the merely pre-existing obligations of
115
international law, are included in assurances. The conclusion
Application No. 12584/08, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 18(2009); Cherif, Application No.
1860/07, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 17, 26 (2009); Ben Khemais v. It., Application No.
246/07, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 27–28 (2009); Muminov v. Russ., Application
No.42502/06, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 12, 79, 97–8 (2008).
112. M.S.S. v. Belg., Application No. 30696/09, Judgment (Eur. Ct. H.R.
2011).
113. Id. at ¶ 353.
114. Id. at ¶ 354.
115. See Gasayev v. Spain, Application No. 48514/06, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 2–3
(2009) (observing that the assurances from Russia provided that the CAT
Committee would be able to have private visits with the applicant); John R.
Crook, ed., State Department Legal Advisor Testifies Regarding Diplomatic
Assurances, 102 AM. J. INT'L L. 882 (2008) (providing transcript of testimony of
John Bellinger before the US Congress).
. . . [T]he Department may obtain arrangements by which U.S.
officials or an agreed upon third party will have physical access to the
individual . . . in the custody of the foreign State for purposes of
verifying the treatment he or she is receiving. In addition, . . . we . . .
pursue any credible report and take appropriate action if we have
reason to believe that those assurances will not be, or have not been,
honored.
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to be drawn is that in order to constitute a fact that might
overcome a risk of ill treatment, an assurance must contain a
116
new undertaking, which is an agreement between the states.
In sum, assurances can provide for additional, mutual
pledges to do some act. Similar to pledges undertaken in
umbrella clauses, those pledges are made in addition to already
existing obligations under general international law and do not
result in mere restatement. Furthermore, some of the pledges
are new and not elsewhere covered by pre-existing promises or
international law, such as the provision for monitoring bodies.
These assurances then must be seen as new obligations that
the parties have agreed to, and thus we have an agreement in
the sense of the Vienna Convention.
B. IN WRITING
The second element of the treaty definition is that the
117
agreement be made in writing.
Assurances are issued in
116. Also see M.S.S. v. Belg., Application No. 30696/09, Judgment Eur. Ct.
H.R.(2011) (Bratza, J., partly dissenting, at ¶ 12).
The diplomatic assurances given by Greece to the Belgian authorities
are found in the judgment not to amount to a sufficient guarantee
since the agreement of Greece to take responsibility for receiving the
applicant under the Dublin Regulation was sent after the order to
leave Belgium had been issued and since the agreement document
was worded in stereotyped terms and contained no guarantee
concerning the applicant in person.
It is true that the assurances of the kind sought by the United
Kingdom authorities in the K.R.S. case after interim measures had
been applied and after specific questions had been put by the Court to
the respondent Government, were not sought by the Belgian
authorities in the present case. However, the assurances given in
K.R.S. were similarly of a general nature and were not addressed to
the individual circumstances of the applicant in the case . . . .
Also see Ismoilov et al. v. Russ., Application. No. 2947/06, Judgment, Eur. Ct.
H.R., ¶ 127 (2008)
Finally, the Court will examine the Government's argument that the
assurances of humane treatment from the Uzbek authorities provided
the applicants with an adequate guarantee of safety. . . . Given that
the practice of torture in Uzbekistan is described by reputable
international experts as systematic . . . the Court is not persuaded
that the assurances from the Uzbek authorities offered a reliable
guarantee against the risk of ill-treatment.
117. Vienna Convention, supra note 35 art. 2(1); Vienna Convention on
Succession of States in respect of Treaties, supra note 35 art. 2(1)(a); Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International
Organizations or between International Organizations, supra note 35 art.
2(1)(a). Also see UN, TREATY SECTION OF THE OFFICE OF LEGAL AFF’RS,
TREATY
HANDBOOK
23–6
(2006),
available
at
http://untreaty.un.org/English/TreatyHandbookEng.pdf
(hereinafter
“UN
TREATY HANDBOOK”); IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 610
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119

either written or oral form. It would appear, however, that
oral agreements could nonetheless qualify as treaties where
there is a written documentation of the oral agreement. In such
a case, the written documentation of the agreement is binding
in its own right, notwithstanding the legal force of the oral
120
agreement.
Clearly for those assurances that have been documented in
public writing, the second element is satisfied. As noted
121
above,
however, many assurances are secret. In fact,
assurances are often used for the very reason that they are
secret; as well as because they are informal and are not subject
to domestic, parliamentary scrutiny. The Vienna Convention,
however, does not appear to require publicity of the writing as
an inherent aspect of the written element of the definition of
treaty.
Lack of publication does present itself as an issue with
respect to deposit or registration, however. Failure to deposit a
treaty with a depository does not render the agreement non(1998).
118. See, e.g., Abdelhedi v. It., Application No. 2638/07, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 17
(2009); Hamraoui v. It., Application No. 16201/07, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 15 (2009);
Bouyahia v. It., Application No. 46792/06, ¶ 16 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 16 (2009);
C.B.Z. v. It., Application No. 44006/06, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 17 (2009); Ben Salah v.
It., Application No. 38128/06, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶14 (2009); Soltana v. It.,
Application No. 37336/06, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 20 (2009); O v. It., Application No.
37257/06 Eur. Ct. H.R. , ¶ 18(2009); Darraji v. It., Application No. 11549/05,
Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 35 (2009); Sellem v. It., Application No. 12584/08, Eur. Ct.
H.R. ¶ 18(2009); Cherif v. It., Application No. 1860/07, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 26
(2009); Ben Khemais v. It., Application No. 246/07, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 27 , (2009).
119. See, e.g., Shamayev v. Geor. & Russ., Eur. Ct. H.R. (2005) 153, 243
(court considers oral assurances, supplemented by written assurances, as
relevant evidence).
120. This assumes that the parties have the intent to reduce their
agreement to writing. We can imagine a situation where a written document,
e.g. a politician’s memoirs, personal negotiation notes or a secretly
documented transcript of an oral agreement, contains a written agreement,
but where the documentation in writing was performed against the will of the
other party. We will limit our discussion in this paper to agreements where
neither party argues that it was written without its consent. Surely in the
cases of exchanges of notes the writing can be presumed to be intentional.
121. The secret nature of some of the diplomatic assurances is not, in itself,
determinative of the statement’s legal value. See e.g. Becker v. Préfet de la
Moselle (=[Trib. de Sarreguemines] June 22, 1948 (Fr.) reprinted at Ann. Dig.
321-2 (1948) (holding that an unpublished, and therefore confidential,
agreement was still an agreement under international law). In one case, a
court held that the secret nature of the assurances was itself a bar to their use
since the court would be prohibited from examining them, and thus could not
examine whether the non-refoulement obligation was overcome). Also see
Khouzam v. Hogan, et al., 529 F.Supp.2d 543 (M.D.Pa. 2008).
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legal, though it may have effects on the ability to cite the
122
agreement before a dispute settlement body. Where certain
documents have declared that they are not eligible for
123
registration, some authors have taken this language to mean
124
that the instrument was not legally binding. The Helsinki
Accords are often cited as an example of this practice, which
125
supposedly leads to a non-legally binding instrument. This
conclusion is a stretch, especially since drafters have been
known to include explicit language that an agreement is not
126
legally binding when that result is sought. Given that a more
clear formulation that attempts to exempt an agreement from
law is available, the statement that an agreement may not be
registered should be taken at face value. It means quite simply
that the parties to the agreement may not register the
agreement, the consequence of which is that they might not be
able to invoke the agreement in a dispute between them. It is
true that states party to the UN Charter have an obligation to
register their treaties with the organization, but the
consequences of failure to register are not that the treaty is
non-binding, but rather that the treaty cannot be invoked in

122. Cf. Covenant of the League of Nations, art. 18, June 28, 1919,
at
available
http://foundingdocs.gov.au/resources/transcripts/cth10_doc_1919.pdf (“Every
treaty or international engagement entered into hereafter by any Member of
the League shall be forthwith registered with the Secretariat and shall as soon
as possible be published by it. No such treaty or international engagement
shall be binding until so registered.”) with Charter of the United Nations, art.
102, June 26, 1945, available at http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter
(“[e]very treaty and every international agreement entered into by any
Member of the United Nations after the present Charter comes into force shall
as soon as possible be registered with the Secretariat and published by it.”)
123. See, e.g. Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in
Europe [Helsinki Final Act], Aug. 1, 1975, reprinted at 14 INT’L L. MATS. 1292.
124. See AUST, supra note 32 at 34 (substituting the language of “not
eligible for registration under Article 102 of the Charter” to “not eligible for
registration [i.e. as a treaty] under Article 102 of the Charter”)
125. See Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, Charter of
Paris for a New Europe, Nov. 19–21, 1990, at 13, available at
http://www.osce.org/documents/mcs/1990/11/4045_en.pdf
(declaring
the
charter “not eligible for registration”). The conclusion that the Helsinki
Accords are not legally binding because they are not eligible for registration is
not particularly satisfactory. The condition states simply that the Accords
cannot be registered; it does not say anything, other than an attenuated
implication, about their legal value.
126. See e.g. Declaration on Trade in Services, Isr.–U.S., Apr. 22, 1985
available at
http://www.sice.oas.org/Trade/US-Israel/DECLARATION%20.doc
(“the
principles set forth below shall not be legally binding”).
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the UN.
Beyond this, there does not appear to be any
obligation for states to otherwise publicize their treaties in
order for them to be considered as creating legal rights and
128
obligations. But prohibiting registration does not necessarily
mean that the instrument is non-legally binding. Based on this
argument, even if diplomatic assurances are kept secret, as
long as they are documented in some kind of writing, such as
through the exchange of notes, they will satisfy this element of
the treaty definition.
C. GOVERNED BY INTERNATIONAL LAW
A written agreement must be governed by international
129
law in order to be a treaty, but it is unclear whether intent
plays a role in this element. UN practice as a depositary of
treaties does not seem to understand intent as an aspect of the
“governed by international law” element in the definition of
130
treaty. The European Union, on the other hand, appears to
131
understand the opposite. The ICJ specifically stated in the
127. See D.N. Hutchinson, The Significance of the Registration or NonRegistration of an International Agreement in Determining Whether or not it is
a Treaty, 46 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 257 (1993); R.B. Lillich, The Obligation
to Register Treaties and International Agreements with the United Nations, 65
AM. J. INT’L L. 771, 772 (1971).
128. Special Rapporteur, Second Rep. on the Law of Treaties, II YB INT’L L.
COMM’N 126, ¶ 13, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1954/Add.l (1954), (by Hersch
Lauterpacht).
[the Special Rapporteur] continues to believe that the mere fact of
registration is not decisive. In particular, it cannot be admitted that
the Secretary-General can be entrusted with the function of giving, by
complying with the request for registration, the complexion of a legal
instrument to something which otherwise would not possess that
character.
129. Vienna Convention, supra note 35 art. 2(1); Vienna Convention on
Succession of States in respect of Treaties, supra note 35 art. 2(1)(a); Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International
Organizations or between International Organizations, supra note 35 art.
2(1)(a).
130. See UN TREATY HANDBOOK, supra note 117 at 61
The term memorandum of understanding (M.O.U.) is often used to
denote a less formal international instrument than a typical treaty or
international agreement. . . . The United Nations considers M.O.U.s
to be binding and registers them if submitted by a party or if the
United Nations is a party.
131. See EU, TREATIES OFFICE, GLOSSARY, available at
http://ec.europa.eu/world/agreements/glossary/glossary.jsp?internal=true
In order to speak of a “treaty” in the generic sense, an instrument has
to meet various criteria. First of all, it has to be a binding instrument,
which means that the contracting parties intended to create legal
rights and duties. Secondly, the instrument must be concluded by
states or international organizations with treaty-making power.
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The Court does not find it necessary to consider what might have
been the intentions of the Foreign Minister of Bahrain or, for that
matter, those of the Foreign Minister of Qatar. The two Ministers
signed a text recording commitments accepted by their Governments,
some of which were to be given immediate application. Having signed
such a text, the Foreign Minister of Bahrain is not in a position
subsequently to say that he intended to subscribe only to a “statement
recording a political understanding”, and not to an international
agreement.

The two major figures in the debate over the role of intent
133
to be “governed by international law” are Anthony Aust and
134
Generally speaking, Aust favors the intent
Jan Klabbers.
element being determinative and Klabbers is against it. This
paper concludes that both arguments have their shortcomings
and neither is satisfactory.
1. Anthony Aust
Anthony Aust argues, based on his considerable experience
with the FCO, that there are a large number of agreements
which he generically calls “Memoranda of Understanding” (or
“MOUs”) that are made between states but which are not
legally binding. Instead, they are merely politically binding,
and thus are enforceable only through the diplomatic process.
Aust argues that states demonstrate the practice of not
intending to create international legal relations and therefore
intent must be an element, albeit an implied element, of the
definition in the law of treaties. Based on the massive volume
of MOU examples supporting this practice, he concludes that it
135
is permissible. He states his position most succinctly in his
response to the argument of Jan Klabbers:
Professor Jan Klabbers has expressed doubts whether the distinction
between MOUs and treaties is legally valid . . . This sweeping
assertion immediately runs up against the fact that when states do
not intend to enter into a legally binding instrument they generally
make this clear by a deliberate and careful choice of words. Klabbers
Thirdly, it has to be governed by international law. Finally the
engagement has to be in writing.
However, in the EU’s understanding the intent aspect is not a part of the
element “governed by international law”, rather it is an aspect of the
“agreement” element. As we will see this is not so different from the UN’s
position after all.
132. Mari. Delimitation & Territorial. Questions (Qatar v. Bahr.), 1994
I.C.J. Reps. 112, ¶ 27 (July 1).
133. See generally AUST, supra note 32.
134. See e.g. KLABBERS, supra note 32.
135. See generally AUST, supra note 32.
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argues that intention is not decisive. But to argue so ignores, first, the
history behind the definition of treaty in the [Vienna] Convention . . .
Secondly, Klabbers’ theory is incompatible with the basic principle
that a sovereign state is free to exercise (or not to exercise) its treatymaking power . . . Moreover, there is no principle or rule in the law of
treaties or in general international law that requires that every
transaction between states has to be legally binding, or, more
particularly, to be a treaty. Thirdly, the hypothesis is just not
supported by the extensive practice of states . . . Klabbers’ theory,
though thought-provoking, relies heavily on academic writing,
136
interpretations of judicial decisions and philosophical arguments.

There are, however, several shortcomings with his
argument. Aust sets up a straw man argument with his
assertion that “there is no principle or rule . . . that requires
that every transaction between states has to be legally
binding”. The problem with this argument is that it is not clear
what he means by “transaction”. Certainly characterizing the
relations of states in that way would lead to the conclusion that
not all interactions in the realm of foreign relations are legally
binding. “Transactions” could involve anything from the gift of
a pen set to a visiting ambassador to inter-state loans. The
difficulty is that we are not discussing “transactions”, but
rather agreements to undertake commitments. Where there is
no agreement to undertake a commitment, then, of course, the
state is not legally bound.
Aust is quite right to look to state practice, and there is
considerable evidence of the practice of using assurances and
137
similar communications.
Certainly it is possible for this
extensive practice to create customary international law that
clarifies, or even amends, the definition of treaty in the Vienna
136. See AUST, supra note 32 at 49-51. Aust also notes that one of the
principle reasons that states claim that an instrument is non-binding is to
avoid constitutional requirements of parliamentary approval. This assessment
comes dangerously close to permitting reference to domestic constitutional
practice regarding treaties to be determinative of their value under
international law. Whether an agreement is governed by international law
should be determined by international law. See also Othman v. Sec’y State
Home Dep’t, (2007) No. SC/15/2005 (S.I.A.C.), ¶ 500 (U.K.). This author will
omit a response to Aust’s pejorative references to “academic writing” and
“philosophic arguments” other than to wonder how either of these expressions
constitute a critique.
137. See Nicaragua judgment, supra note 79 at ¶ 261; Border and
Transborder Armed Acts (Nicar. v. Hond.), Juris. Ct. & Admission Application,
Judgment, 1988 I.C.J. ¶ 69, 70 (Dec. 20); Land, Island & Maritime Frontier
Dispute (El Sal./Hond.; Nic. intervention), 1992 I.C.J. 351, ¶¶ 99–101 (Sept.
11); Sultanov v. Russ., Application No. 15303/09, Judgment, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 58
(2010) (request for referral to the Grand Chamber pending); Yuldashev v.
Russ., Application No. 1248/09, Judgment, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 70 (2010); Human
Rights Watch, Still at Risk, supra note 13; NOWAK, supra note 31.
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Convention; however, the practice of using these kinds of
instruments began before the Vienna Convention was adopted
and continues after, and parties continue to refer to the Vienna
Convention in their dispute settlement. This practice does not
suggest that the definition in the Vienna Convention has been
significantly modified or eclipsed by custom. Even if it does not
change the definition, it is also possible that this practice
merely aids in our interpretation of the Vienna Convention
138
definition as subsequent practice;
however, that practice
would have to establish agreement and it seems in many
situations the parties were in disagreement about the
normative value of the assurances. In any event, before we
even reach these analyses, we might consider the practice and
opinio juris, if any, that is being expressed and manifested.
The practice of states is far more equivocal than Aust
139
presents it. Although the FCO may be an exception, there
does not appear to be “deliberate and careful choice of words” in
140
all treaty drafting. On many occasions, states have indeed
141
argued that certain instruments are not legally binding,
138. Vienna Convention on Treaties, supra note 35 art. 31(3)(b).
139. However, Aust does cite, e.g., an instance of the inclusion of a terms in
a treaty that claim to replace one MOU and preserve another. See AUST, supra
note 32 at 33 (citing the UK-US Maritime and Aerial Operations to Suppress
Illicit Trafficking by Sea in the Waters of the Caribbean and Bermuda
Agreement, 1998, 2169 U.N.T.S. 252).
140. Perhaps many cases of complex, multi-party diplomatic negotiations
with parties of varying degrees of legal sophistication prevented the careful
choice of words in favor of deliberately vague constructions. It might be that
the Helsinki Accords suffered this fate, though there is no evidence to suggest
sloppy draftsmanship in that case.
141. See e.g. U.S. Dept. of State, Cable 10-PARIS-183 ¶ 1 (Feb. 17, 2010)
available at http://wikileaks.org/cable/2010/02/10PARIS183.html# (emphasis
added):
French Environment Minister Jean-Louis Borloo told the Ambassador
that the key to advancing climate negotiations is to drop the notion of
a legally binding TREATY in favor of a system of national
commitments . . . Borloo attributed the European obsession with
legally binding treaties to its post-war history and experience in
creating the EU by progressively ceding sovereignty via TREATY.
U.S. Dept. of State, Cable N10-RIYADH-184, ¶ 11 (Feb. 12, 2010) available at
http://wikileaks.org/cable/2010/02/10RIYADH184.html# ([Prince Abdulaziz
told the Minister that Saudi Arabia had missed a real opportunity to submit
“something clever,” like India or China, that was not legally binding but
indicated some goodwill towards the process without compromising key
economic interests]. U.S. Dept. of State, Cable 10-MADRID-174,¶¶. 8–11 (Feb.
12, 2010) available at http://wikileaks.org/cable/2010/02/10MADRID174.html#
(discussing the 1998 Washington Conference on Nazi Confiscated Art and
2009 Prague Conference on Nazi Confiscated Art, and the US signature on the
“Declarations of Principles” in the context of the Cassirer claim to a Pissarro
painting; acknowledging the signature on the Declaration of Principles but
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although they are frequently confused or deliberately vague,
stating in the same document that an agreement is not legally
binding, but then arguing that the agreement “authorized” a
142
certain act and demanded “compliance”. There are several
stating that Spain could rely on its internal law to bar the claim – not possible
if the agreement was concluded under international law – and seek alternate
“creative solutions” amounting to “gestures to the family and to the Los
Angeles Jewish community”); U.S. Dept. of State, Cable 09-KYIV-1942, ¶¶ 6,
54
(Nov.
9,
2009)
available
at
http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/11/09KYIV1942.html# (discussing “security
assurances”)
The first item Nykonenko raised during the one-on-meeting was an
appeal for additional security assurances for Ukraine, beyond those
the U.S. had provided in the 1994 Budapest Declaration . . . Legally
binding assurances were best, he concluded, but he said he
understood this was very difficult.
Couch asked Nykonenko to explain why Ukraine needed additional,
legally binding security assurances, . . . Nykonenko responded that
Ukraine had no doubts about the commitment of the United States;
however, Ukraine had serious concerns about Russia’s commitment. .
. . Nykonenko explained that if the United States would agree to new
security assurances with Ukraine, then Russia would likely agree to
join in the document . . . .
142. See e.g. U.S. Dept. of State, Cable 10-THE HAGUE-7, ¶ 3 (Jan. 8,
2010) available at http://wikileaks.org/cable/2010/01/10THEHAGUE7.html#
(discussing the US-Dutch Agreement of Cooperation . . . . Concerning Access
To and Use of Facilities In the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba For Aerial
Counter-Narcotics Activities (“FOL”)) (“This bilateral agreement allows the
USG access to and use of the Hato International Airport in the Netherlands
Antilles and the Reina Beatrix International Airport in Aruba . . . solely in
connection with aerial counter-narcotics detection and monitoring . . . .”); id. at
¶2 (“The MFA has requested a letter signed by the Ambassador confirming
that the U.S. abides by the provisions of the March 2, 2000 Agreement . . . .”);
id. at ¶ 5 (“Nonetheless, the MFA [Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the
Netherlands] has requested a letter from the U.S. Ambassador stating the
airfields are only being used as authorized in the FOL Agreement.”); id. at ¶ 6
(“Still, it is to our benefit to assist the Dutch Government to state explicitly
that confirmation of compliance with the FOL Agreement has been received
from the U.S.”); U.S. Dept. of State, Cable 08-MADRID-1280, ¶ 8 (Dec. 4,
2008) available at http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/12/08MADRID1280.html#at
¶ 8 (discussing the Agreement on Defence Cooperation (“ADC”) between US
and Spain)
The ADC provides us the extremely valuable use of two military bases
in southern Spain midway between the continental U.S. and the
theaters of operation in Afghanistan and Iraq. . . . By unfortunate
coincidence, the ADC was already in the press in recent weeks thanks
to MOD Chacon’s repeated references to her hope that the U.S. would
elevate it to the level of a TREATY (septel).
But see id. at ¶ 3. (“. . . El Pais published a February 2007 letter from the
Spanish President of the joint Permanent Committee which manages
implementation of the ADC, asking the U.S. section to confirm that the U.S.
was in compliance with Article 25.2 of the ADC with respect to U.S. military
flights to and from Guantanamo”); ¶ 9 (“When we do speak publicly on the
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instances in which parties disagreed about the binding nature
143
of the instrument. Given the extensive and rigorous nature of
negotiating practice, this author can only conclude that these
vague constructions on legal value are intentional.
States are indeed negotiating and concluding agreements
and inserting language in those agreements that is slightly
different from the language of instruments that are more
clearly considered treaties. But states are also not commencing
144
legal dispute settlement following violations of MOUs. That
language and practice, as well as the other practices Aust cites,
does not necessarily mean either that the law of treaties
includes an element of intent. Nor does it mean that states
engage in a practice and demonstrate opinio juris that some of
their agreements are not legally binding. The only practice and
opinio juris that can comfortably be found based on this
examination is that violations of diplomatic assurances do not
145
result in a legal enforcement action. It is not clear that this
issue, our mantra is that we have not violated Spanish law and have complied
fully with the ADC.”); ¶ 10:
“Thus far, the MOD and MFA have done a reasonably good job in
their public affairs efforts of making clear that they do not believe we
have violated the ADC. The MOD issued a December 2 statement
saying it knew of no U.S. military flights that were either illegal or in
violation of our bilateral agreements (this echoes what MOD officials
have told us privately -- e.g. ref b).”
U.S. Dept. of State, Cable 08-TRIPOLI-308, ¶ 3 (Apr. 10, 2008) available at
http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/04/08TRIPOLI308.html
(discussing
the
military cooperation MOU between US and Libya)
Section Six: Dispute Resolution Any disputes that might arise
between the two parties regarding the interpretation or the
implementation of this MOU shall be resolved through negotiations
between the two parties solely . . .
Section Nine: Entry into Force, its Scope and Termination
1- This MOU shall enter into force upon its signature by both
parties.
2- This MOU does not include any provisions that entail
commitments under International Law
3- This MOU shall remain effective unless terminated by a
mutual agreement, or by either party, upon 90-day written notice
submitted in advance to the other party.
143. See Mari. Delimitation & Territorial. Questions, supra note 132.
144. But see Heathrow Airport Arbitration Award, supra note 33 (where
the US claimed that an MOU was binding in arbitration).
145. See Hum. Rts. Watch, Still at Risk, supra note 13 (citing Written
Declaration of Samuel M. Witten, Assistant Legal Adviser for Law
Enforcement and Intelligence in the Office of the Legal Adviser of the U.S.
Department of State, Cornejo-Barreto v. Seifert, Case No. 01-cv-662-AHS, ¶¶
11–13
(C.D.
Cal.
2001)
available
at
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/16513.pdf. (“For example, in an
October 2001 statement, a United States Department of State legal advisor
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failure of enforcement means that there is no legal obligation.
In addition, it would seem that the history of the definition
of treaty in the Vienna Convention is not quite as clear as
argued by Aust. Although the delegates to the Vienna
Conference may have used the word “intent” on occasion, the
context in which they used the word does not suggest the
meaning Aust attributes to it.
On first glance, the International Law Commission (“ILC”),
the framers of the Vienna Convention, did not seem to embrace
any notion of an agreement that was not legally binding, but
the ILC’s final position is less clear. Hersch Lauterpacht, the
Special Rapporteur, argued in his second report that the
Vienna Convention project should have as one of its objectives
the establishment of the legal character of obligations whose
146
legal value had previously been questioned. It is questionable
argued that seeking, securing, and monitoring diplomatic assurances must be
done on a strictly confidential basis, with no public or judicial scrutiny, in
order not to undermine foreign relations and to reach ‘acceptable
accommodations’ with the requesting state . . . .”).
146. Second Report on the Law of Treaties, 2YB Int’l L. Comm’n 126-27, ¶.
14 (1954), U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1954/Add.l
The Special Rapporteur has devoted further study to — and has to
some extent modified his view on — this question for the reason that,
in his opinion, the codification of the law of treaties ought to provide
an opportunity not for devitalising such legal element as is contained
in international instruments but for salvaging from them any existing
element of legal obligation. There are, in addition to the types of
instrument referred to above, other categories of treaties whose legal
importance and beneficence may be jeopardized unless that principle
is adopted. Thus the numerous agreements between the United
Nations and the specialized agencies, as well as the agreements of the
specialized agencies inter se, have been regarded by some as purely
administrative arrangements of coordination devoid of legal
character. It is not believed that that view is substantiated either by
their content or form. The same applies to the numerous inter-State
treaties for cultural co-operations; for technical assistance; for cooperation between Governments and public international
organizations of a humanitarian character, such as the Agreement of
19 July 1950 between the United Nations International Children's
Emergency Fund and the Government of the Republic of China
concerning the activities of the former in China; and agreements
relating to military co-operation by way of establishment of military
missions and otherwise. (internal citations omitted)
(citing, inter alia, Agreement relating to a naval mission to Haiti, Haiti–U.S.,
Apr. 14, 1949, 80 U.N.T.S. 38; Agreement for the establishment of a United
States army mission to Honduras, Hond.–U.S., Mar. 6, 1950, 80 U.N.T.S. 72;
Agreement concerning a military advisory mission to Argentina, Arg.–U.S.,
Oct. 6, 1948, 80 U.N.T.S. 92; Agreement relating to a military advisory
mission to Brazil, Braz.–U.S., July 29, 1948, 80 U.N.T.S.112; Agreement
relating to a military mission to Ecuador, Ecuad.–U.S., June 29, 1944, 80
U.N.T.S. 284; Agreement between Thailand and the United States of America
of July 1950, Thai. – U.S., July 1950, 81 U.N.T.S. 62; Basic Agreement
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whether this goal was achieved, though the members of the
ILC must have surely been aware of the problem. The ILC
stated that “[t]he term ‘treaty’ is used throughout the draft
articles as a generic term covering all forms of international
147
agreement in writing concluded between States”, which, with
Lauterpacht’s statement, suggests that the ILC meant to
incorporate agreements of questionable legal value into the
fold. In its proper context, however, this statement actually
appears primarily to establish that the name of the instrument
is not determinative; the ILC continues to state that:
Although the term “treaty” in one sense connotes only the single
formal instrument, there also exist international agreements, such as
exchanges of notes, which are not a single formal instrument, and yet
are certainly agreements to which the law of treaties applies.
Similarly, very many single instruments in daily use, such as an
“agreed minute” or a “memorandum of understanding”, could not
appropriately be called formal instruments, but they are undoubtedly
148
international agreements subject to the law of treaties.

Also the ILC appears to clarify that there is no distinction
149
in law between a treaty and a treaty in simplified form.
Therefore, although the ILC appeared to refuse to recognize
between the U.N., the Food and Agriculture Organization, the International
Civil Aviation Organization, the International Labour Organisation, the
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, the World
Health Organization and France for the provision of technical assistance, Mar.
20, 1951, 82 U.N.T.S. 174; Basic Agreement between the U.N., the Food and
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, the International Civil
Aviation Organization, the International Labour Organisation, the United
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, the World Health
Organization and Colombia for the provision of technical assistance, Nov. 24,
1950, 81 U.N.T.S. 190; Cultural Convention, Neths–U.K., July 7, 1948, 82
U.N.T.S. 260; Agreement relating to the financing of certain educational
exchange programmes, Fr.–U.S., Oct. 22, 1948, 84 U.N.T.S. 174; Exchange of
notes constituting an agreement relating to anthropological research and
investigation, Mex–U.S., June 21, 1949, 89 U.N.T.S. 4; Basic Agreement for
the provision of technical assistance, Thai–U.S., June 11, 1951, 90 U.N.T.S.
46). However, Lauterpacht’s argument to clarify the legal value of these
instruments also appears to implicitly acknowledge that there are instruments
that might not have legal value.
147. Draft articles on the law of treaties with commentaries, Rep. of the
Int’l L. Comm’n, 18th sess, May 4–July 19, 1966, 187–89, art. 2, cmt. 6; U.N.
Doc. A/CN/.4/SER.A/1966/Add.l (1966).
148. Id.
149. Draft articles on the law of treaties with commentaries, Rep. of the
Int’l L. Comm’n, 18th sess, May 4–July 19, 1966, 187–89, art. 2, cmt. 3; U.N.
Doc. A/CN/.4/SER.A/1966/Add.l (1966).
First, the treaty in simplified form, far from being at all exceptional,
is very common, and its use is steadily increasing. Secondly, the
juridical differences, in so far as they really exist at all, between
formal treaties and treaties in simplified form lie almost exclusively
in the method of conclusion and entry into force.
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that a non-binding international agreement was possible, in
fact, the ILC was simply distinguishing between forms of
agreements, all of which are treaties. Although it does not
provide for it, it does not exclude the possible existence of nonlegally binding agreements. Therefore, if an instrument
qualifies under the Vienna Convention as a treaty, then it will
be governed by those treaty rules. If it does not, then it may be
a non-binding agreement.
In the Vienna Convention commentaries, the ILC
addressed the question of the intention of the state and
whether intent was an aspect of the “governed by international
law” element. The ILC commentaries state that the phrase was
meant only “to distinguish between international agreements
regulated by public international law and those which,
although concluded between States, are regulated by the
national law of one of the parties (or by some other national law
150
system chosen by the parties).” By this language, the ILC
appears to understand that all agreements between States are
governed by some law in principle, the question only being
whether the agreement is governed by national or international
law. One finds no room for “political agreements”. Therefore,
where an agreement clearly excludes domestic law, it must
necessarily be governed by international law. The ILC observed
that some international agreements would fall outside the
151
definition in the Vienna Convention.
Initially, this
150. See Draft articles on the law of treaties with commentaries, [1966] 2
Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n, 187, art. 2, cmt. 6, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1966/Add.l.
The ILC continued:
The Commission examined the question whether the element of
“intention to create obligations under international law” should be
added to the definition. Some members considered this to be actually
undesirable since it might imply that States always had the option to
choose between international and municipal law as the law to govern
the treaty, whereas this was often not open to them. Others
considered that the very nature of the contracting parties necessarily
made an inter-State agreement subject to international law, at any
rate in the first instance. The Commission concluded that, in so far as
it may be relevant, the element of intention is embraced in the phrase
“governed by international law”, and it decided not to make any
mention of the element of intention in the definition.
States can and do submit agreements between them to national law; however
we must distinguish between an agreement under national law, and a treaty
whose terms are interpreted or assessed with reference to some national law.
151. Vienna Convention, supra note 35, art. 3. The text reads:
The fact that the present Convention does not apply to international
agreements concluded between States and other subjects of
international law or between such other subjects of international law,
or to international agreements not in written form, shall not affect:
a. the legal force of such agreements;
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understanding covered only unwritten, or oral, agreements,
but it later grew to consider agreements with or between
153
international organizations. Even for those specific categories
of international agreement that are exempted from the Vienna
Convention, however, the ILC makes an effort to reiterate that
154
they are still agreements under international law. Therefore,
agreements will still be legally binding if they are oral and if
they are between or with international organizations. Again,
we find no room for agreements that are non-legal.
When the negotiation of the Vienna Convention moved
from the ILC to the Vienna Conference, the delegates had
another opportunity to insert language regarding intent and
the possibility of non-legal effects. As State representatives,
rather than the independent experts that sit on the ILC,
presumably the delegates would have had a stronger
motivation to demand an intent element, if states truly
155
understood that to be a part of the definition.
b. the application to them of any of the rules set forth in the
present Convention to which they would be subject under
international law independently of the Convention.
152. See Draft articles on the law of treaties with commentaries, supra note
150, art. 3, cmt. 1 (“The text of this article, as provisionally adopted in 1962,
contained only the reservation in paragraph (b) regarding the force of
international agreements not in written form.”); id. 2, cmt. 7 (“The restriction
of the use of the term ‘treaty’ in the draft articles to international agreements
expressed in writing is not intended to deny the legal force of oral agreements
under international law or to imply that some of the principles contained in
later parts of the Commission's draft articles on the law of treaties may not
have relevance in regard to oral agreements . . . .”); id. art. 3, cmt.3.
153. Id. 3, cmt. 3
The first reservation in sub-paragraph (a) regarding treaties
concluded between States and other subjects of international law or
between such other subjects of international law was added at the
seventeenth session as a result of the Commission's decision to limit
the draft articles strictly to treaties concluded between States and of
the consequential restriction of the definition of “treaty’ in article 2 to
“an international agreement concluded between States.”
This understanding was also reflected in the discussion at the United Nations
Conference on the Law of Treaties. See United Nations Conference on the Law
of Treaties, 1st Session, Vienna, Austria, Mar. 26-May 24, 1968, 7th Meeting
of the Committee of the Whole, at 36, paras. 5, 17, 55, 56, 68, 70, 72, 73 U.N.
Doc. A/CONF.39/C.1/SR.63 (Apr. 1, 1968) [hereinafter Vienna Conv. O.R.].
154. See Draft articles on the law of treaties with commentaries, supra note
150, art. 3, cmt. 4. The article accordingly specifies that the fact that the
present articles do not relate to either of those categories of international
agreements is not to affect their legal force or the “application to them of any
of the rules set forth in the present articles to which they would be subject
independently of these articles.”
155. It should be recalled that supposedly non-legally-binding instruments
had been concluded for some time prior to the Vienna Conference.
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Some concern was expressed at the Vienna Conference that
the ILC articles and commentary suggested that all
agreements were subjected to either international or domestic
156
law, without a choice for non-legal agreements. In the records
of the Conference, it was suggested that the ILC omitted
mention of intent to create legal relations because it was
157
inherent in the phrase “governed by international law”. Some
of the participants at the conference believed that states could
158
reach agreements that did not produce legal effects. As a
156. See Vienna Conv. O.R., 5th mtg. at 24, para. 83 (Mar. 29, 1968) (“Mr.
MUTUALE (Democratic Republic of the Congo) said that it would appear from
the commentary that States were free to choose whether a treaty was to be
governed by international law or by the internal law of a certain State . . . .”).
157. See id. at para. 63
Mr. SMALL (New Zealand) . . . pointed out that the International
Law Commission had regarded the intention to create a legal
relationship as an essential element of its draft until 1962, but had
since abandoned the idea of including an explicit reference to that
intention. The Drafting Committee might consider whether such a
reference was necessary; the New Zealand delegation believed that
the element was already implicit in the phrase “governed by
international law” in paragraph l(a).;
Vienna Conv. O.R., 6th mtg. at 31, para. 26 (Apr. 1, 1968)
Sir Humphrey WALDOCK (Expert Consultant) said . . . The only
point regarding sub-paragraph (a) which the Commission had
discussed at length was the question whether to mention the
intention of establishing legal relations between States. The
Commission had preferred not to mention that intention, as it
believed that the words “governed by international law” were
sufficient. He himself had some doubts on the point, since in many
cases an instrument might have the characteristics of a treaty
because of the intention with which it had been drawn up. Certain
communiques now published at the end of important conferences
were in fact agreements between ministers and had legal effects.
158. See Vienna Conv. O.R., 4th mtg. at 21, para. 3 (Mar. 29, 1968)
Lastly, the Chilean delegation thought it would be well to mention in
sub-paragraph (a) that an agreement between States must produce
legal effects. That idea had been included in the 1953 and 1956 drafts,
but had been dropped from the latest draft. . . . [I]t appeared essential
to include that idea in the definition, so as to distinguish between
agreements between States which produced legal effects and those
which did not and reserve the term “treaty” solely for the former. It
often happened that declarations made on the international plane
represented, like treaties, a concurrence of wills, but did not produce
legal effects. Such declarations were often the preliminaries to a real
agreement, which was concluded later when circumstances permitted.
It would be dangerous to confuse them with treaties and to make both
of them subject to the rules of the convention, thereby gravely
restricting freedom of expression in international affairs. . . .
Vienna Conv. O.R., 6th mtg. at 31, para. 16 (Apr. 1, 1968)
Mr. RODRIGUEZ (Chile) explained the intended meaning of the
expression “produces legal effects” in the Chilean amendment . . . [A]
dividing line should be drawn between treaties intended to produce
legal effects and agreements not intended to do so, even though they
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result, some participants thought that the intention to create
legal rights was crucial and was lacking in the Vienna
159
Convention text. However, there was some understanding
160
that establishing intent was often problematic, for, after all,
sometimes did. A definition of a treaty lato sensu, covering all
agreements of whatever kind, would make the convention too wide in
scope and might curtail the international dialogue which was the
necessary preliminary to treaty-making. Some speakers had objected
that the amendment was unnecessary because an agreement which
did not produce legal effects was not a treaty. His reply to that was
that if legal effects were implied in the term “treaty”, the definition
should mention them. Others had maintained that the amendment
would add to the text a condition for the validity of treaties. In fact, it
was not a rule governing validity, which would be out of place in a
definitions article, but merely a criterion for distinguishing treaties
from agreements not intended to produce legal effects.
159. See Vienna Conv. O.R., 4th mtg. at 21, para. 26 (Mar. 29, 1968)
Mr. SEPULVEDA AMOR (Mexico), introducing the amendment . . . ,
pointed out that the International Law Commission’s draft omitted an
important element, namely, the intention to create rights and
obligations. That element had been present in the earlier drafts, but
in 1959 the Commission had decided against including it in the
definition of a treaty, on the ground that it would be preferable to
omit any reference to the object of a treaty, since it was impossible to
cover all cases. The Mexican delegation wished to point out, however,
that the purpose of a treaty was to establish legal relations between
the parties, which was not true of declarations of principle or political
instruments such as the Atlantic Charter, which also constituted
international agreements. The Mexican delegation therefore
considered that the existence of a legal relationship between States
which concluded a treaty should be regarded as an essential element
of that legal act. (internal footnote omitted).
Vienna Conv. O.R., 5th mtg. at 24, para. 65 (Mar. 29, 1968)
Mr. ARIFF (Malaysia) said that the definition of “treaty” in
paragraph 1 (a) was insufficiently comprehensive, since it failed to
indicate the intention of the parties to a treaty. It was a generally
accepted principle of municipal law that the intention of the parties
was to establish a legal relationship, and he therefore supported the
Mexican and Malaysian amendment . . . , with the possible insertion
of the word “legal” before “relationship”.
Vienna Conv. O.R., 5th mtg. at 24, para. 76 (Mar. 29, 1968)
Mr. HARRY (Australia) said that one essential element of a treaty
was the intention of the parties to create legal rights and obligations,
and that was only implicitly suggested in the Commission’s text. . . .
It would be preferable for the text to be more precise in the manner
suggested in the first Chilean and the Mexican and Malaysian
amendments. . . .
160. See Vienna Conv. O.R., 31st mtg. at para. 64 (Apr. 19, 1968)
Similarly, Sir Eric Beckett had claimed that there was a complete
unreality in the references to the supposed intention. As a matter of
experience, it often occurred that the difference between the parties to
the treaties arose out of something which the parties had never
thought of when the treaty was concluded and that, therefore, they
had absolutely no common intention with regard to it. In other cases,
the parties might all along have had divergent intentions with regard
to the actual question in dispute. Each party had deliberately
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if intent was so clear, then the parties never would have
reached a dispute. An amendment by Chile to include intent
161
language was proposed and debated, but was not adopted,
suggesting, though not conclusively, that intent was not seen
by a majority of the Vienna Conference delegates as necessary
beyond what was inherent in the phrase “governed by
international law” as drafted by the ILC, a phrase specifically
acknowledged by the ILC to only contemplate intent to be
governed by either international or domestic law. Upon
signature and ratification or accession, none of the states
parties to the Vienna Convention entered a reservation or even
interpretative declaration concerning intent. In sum, it would
seem that Aust is wrong about state practice and opinio juris,
as well as the drafting history and background of the Vienna
Convention definition.
All of the foregoing does not mean that intent is entirely
irrelevant. Although in the Qatar/Bahrain case, the ICJ held
that the intent of the Foreign Ministers was not important
where there is a “text recording commitments accepted by their
162
Governments”, this is an assessment of the intent to reach an
agreement, consensus ad idem. It is not the intent for the
agreement to be governed by law or not, similar to the holding
in Nicaragua regarding the “political pledge” to the OAS that
refrained from raising the matter, possibly hoping that the point
would not arise in practice, or possibly expecting that, if it did, the
text which had been agreed would produce the result which it desired.
...
See Vienna Conv. O.R., 1st sess., 33d mtg. at 164, para. 4 (Apr. 22, 1968)
[Mr. SINCLAIR (United Kingdom)] . . . [T]he dangers of the
alternative doctrine had been persuasively presented by Sir Eric
Beckett at the Institute of International Law when he had stated that
there was a complete unreality in the references to the supposed
intention of the legislature in the interpretation of the statute when
in fact it was almost certain that the point which had arisen was one
which the legislature had never thought of at all; that was even more
so in the case of the interpretation of treaties. As a matter of
experience it often occurred that the difference between the parties to
the treaties arose out of something which the parties had never
thought of when the treaty was concluded and that, therefore, they
had had absolutely no common intention with regard to it. In other
cases the parties might all along have had divergent intentions with
regard to the actual question which was in dispute; each party had
deliberately refrained from raising the matter, possibly hoping that
that point would not arise in practice, or possibly expecting that if it
did, the text which was agreed would produce the result which it
desired. (internal footnote omitted)
161. See Vienna Conv. O.R., 6th mtg. at 31, para. 16 (Apr. 1, 1968).
162. Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions (Qatar v. Bahr.),
1994 I.C.J. 112, ¶ 27 (July 1).
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lacking an intent to agree to anything in the first place. This
appears to be what the UN Office of Legal Affairs, Treaty
Section, had in mind when it drafted the “Consent to be Bound”
163
portion of the Treaty Handbook. Therefore, intent in this
context cannot be determinative of whether an agreement is
governed by law or not. The subjective intentions of States
agreeing to treaties never have a role in interpreting the
document. Were it otherwise, a signature and ratification of a
treaty would not be definitive evidence of consent to the treaty.
We can only look to the objective intent—i.e., to the document
itself that the parties agreed on as the statement of their
intentions. Therefore, it appears that intent—at least the kind
of intent that Aust argues—is not an aspect of the “governed by
international law” element, but rather an aspect of the
“agreement” element. With respect to the “governed by
international law” element, as the ILC states, intent is relevant
only to whether the agreement is governed by international or
164
domestic law.
Aust clearly believes that States create international law,
not the reverse. Since States created the law, the law is their
creation, not a system that permeates (and perhaps precedes)
everything they do. States are the masters of the law. Indeed
Aust is correct to note that a sovereign state is free to enter
into a treaty or not, but when a state has objectively concluded
a treaty, the state is not then free to argue its sovereignty as an
excuse. States are not “sovereign” to that degree or in that
165
way.
163. The Office of Legal Affairs does not appear to linger on the legally of
the rights and obligations as something the state can entertain intent about,
rather the state can only entertain intent to become a party to the agreement
or not. We can see that the positions of the EU and UN are thus essentially
the same. See UN TREATY HANDBOOK, supra note 117 at 8, § 3.3.1
In order to become a party to a multilateral treaty, a State must
demonstrate, through a concrete act, its willingness to undertake the
legal rights and obligations contained in the treaty. In other words, it
must express its consent to be bound by the treaty. A State can
express its consent to be bound in several ways, in accordance with
the final clauses of the relevant treaty. . . .
164. U.S. v. Pileggi conceivably supports this proposition. U.S. v. Pileggi,
No. 08-4237, 2010 WL 235144, at *476 n. 2 (4th Cir., Jan. 20, 2010) (“Both
parties agree that diplomatic assurances reflecting agreement between parties
to an extradition treaty are to be enforced by the courts.”).
165. We are forced to wonder what Aust’s position would be regarding the
solemn assurances that Hissène Habré would be prohibited from travelling
Senegal offered to Belgium, and apparently to the ICJ itself, in court session
in the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite case. The court was unclear about
the value it attached to the Senegalese assurance. Although the order of the
court seems to consider the assurance a fact in the context of preliminary
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The difficulty with such an extreme consent hypothesis is
that, like many other theories, it creates an abstract “first
world” existing prior to the creation of the first law. It would
argue that states are not only the masters of the law, but they
are even pre-legal entities. While history does matter in the
measures (“there does not exist . . . any urgency”), the separate opinion of
Koroma and Yusuf suggests it was viewed as a legal obligation assumed by
that state comparable to an order of the Court. Compare Questions Relating to
the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belg. v. Senegal), Order, 2009 I.C.J.
139, ¶¶ 68, 69, 71, 73 (May 28)
whereas the Co-Agent of Senegal, at the end of the hearings, solemnly
declared, in response to a question put by a Member of the Court, the
following:
“Senegal will not allow Mr. Habré to leave Senegal while the present
case is pending before the Court. Senegal has not the intention to
allow Mr. Habré to leave the territory while the present case is
pending before the Court.”
Whereas the Co-Agent of Belgium, making clear that he spoke in the
name of his Government, asserted at the hearings, in response to a
question put by a Member of the Court, that such a solemn
declaration given by the Agent of Senegal, in the name of his
Government, to the effect that the latter would not allow Mr. Habré
to leave Senegalese territory while the present case was pending
before the Court, could be sufficient for Belgium to consider that its
Request for the indication of provisional measures no longer had any
object, provided that certain conditions were fulfilled . . . .
Whereas the Court further notes that Senegal, both proprio motu and
in response to a question put by a Member of the Court, gave a formal
assurance on several occasions during the hearings that it will not
allow Mr. Habré to leave its territory before the Court has given its
final decision;
Whereas the Court concludes from the foregoing that there does not
exist, in the circumstances of the present case, any urgency to justify
the indication of provisional measures by the Court;
with id. (separate opinion of judges Koroma and Yusuf) at ¶ 10.
In our view, Senegal’s solemn declaration . . . preserves the rights of
the Parties and ensures against the risk of irreparable prejudice in
exactly the same way as would an order indicating provisional
measures. Accordingly, the purpose of Belgium’s request for the
indication of provisional measures having been served, there was no
further need for the Court to examine the judicial measure requested
by Belgium. In our view, the Court should simply have declared that
following the declaration by Senegal the request for the indication of
provisional measures had ceased to have any object.
Also see South West Africa cases (Ethiop. v. S.Afr.; Liber. v. S. Afr.), Prelim.
Objs., Judgment, 1962 I.C.J. Reps. 319, 418 (Dec. 21) (Jessup, J. Sep. Op.)
(“Surely a formal pledge of the kind just quoted made by the representative of
a State to the Assembly of the League also constituted a binding international
obligation. As quoted above from McNair, Law of Treaties, ‘a declaration
contained in the minutes of a conference’ may embody a binding international
engagement.”)
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assessment of norms, a hypothetical history that probably
never existed could confuse more than it clarifies. Was there
really ever a situation of neighboring States, in the modern
sense of “State”, that one day decided to invent international
law and conclude the first treaty? If not, and it is most likely
not the case, then the theoretical exercise becomes “academic”,
in the pejorative sense of that word. We should consider an
analysis that begins with the common and contemporaneous
development of modern states alongside international law,
admitting that the label “international law” is a retroactive
characterization of the relationships those proto-states had,
precisely insofar as the label “state” is suffering the same
weakness. Aust refuses to see that a legal conclusion can be
assessed by a third-party, even a law professor, though without
direct and immediate consequences. As such he embraces a
kind of legal nihilism about international law that seems
typical of officers of ministries of foreign affairs.
Although it is commonly stated that international law
166
emanates from the will of states, that absolute notion is not
so easily theoretically reconciled with international law in
167
practice. Acknowledging the freedom of treaty, the question is
not sovereignty, but whether the state has objectively
concluded a treaty. Deliberate and careful words have failed
many a drafter. Consider, for example, the influence of the
Draft Articles on State Responsibility. In Article 3 of the Draft
Articles, the ILC adopted the following text: “The
characterization of an act of a State as internationally wrongful
is governed by international law. Such characterization is not
affected by the characterization of the same act as lawful by
168
internal law.”
Although this provision is simply a
169
restatement that internal law of a state is no defense, it
166. The leading illustration of this consent continues to be S.S. “Lotus”
(Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10 (Sept. 7) (holding that international
legal rules emanate from the free will of states).
167. See CHARLES G. FENWICK, INTERNATIONAL LAW 36 (4th ed., 1965)
(“[consent is] inadequate to explain the assumption upon which governments
appear to have acted from the beginning of international law”). See generally
MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA: THE STRUCTURE OF
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ARGUMENT (1989); DAVID KENNEDY, INTERNATIONAL
LEGAL STRUCTURES (1987) (focusing on relationships among doctrines and
arguments and their recurring theoretical structure).
168. See Draft articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally
Wrongful Acts, with commentaries, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001), reprinted in
[2007] 2-II Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 31, U.N. DOC. A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/ADD.1
(PART 2).
169. See e.g. id. at art. 3, comm. (1) (“Secondly and most importantly, a
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appears to inherently contemplate that all acts of states are
governed by international law and are tested for compliance
with international law. It could be argued that there is an
implicit exception for those acts that are not acts of state or
acts that are submitted to the exclusive competence of internal
law, but the latter argument is difficult to sustain. In sum, the
intent of a State for an instrument to be governed by
international law cannot be the sole determinant of the legal
value of the agreement. If a state concludes an agreement that
is expressly legally binding, then that state could never succeed
in arguing that it did not intend for that result. The document
speaks for itself.
2. Jan Klabbers
170

Jan Klabbers has countered Aust’s argument. He argues
that if MOUs are not undertaken in the system of international
law, but rather international politics, then international
politics must be a separate regime from law. He concludes that
there is no evidence of this regime, and no evidence that, if
there was one, its rules would be any different from the rules of
international law. Additionally, he argues that the consistent
case law of international tribunals, chiefly the ICJ,
demonstrates that agreements are binding and enforceable at
international law, sometimes regardless of the legal force the
parties intended.
Klabbers is quite right to argue that there is no separate
regime from international law and that the Permanent Court of
International Justice (“PCIJ”) and ICJ have held that similar
171
agreements are enforceable at law.
However, the
State cannot, by pleading that its conduct conforms to the provisions of its
internal law, escape the characterization of that conduct as wrongful by
international law.”); Vienna Convention, art. 27 (“A party may not invoke the
provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty .
. . .”); Treatment of Polish Nationals and Other Persons of Polish Origin or
Speech in the Danzig Territory, Advisory Opinion, 1932 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No.
44, at 4, 24, 25 (Feb. 4).
170. See generally KLABBERS, supra note 32 (favoring the legally binding
nature of assurances, MOUs and similar communications).
171. See Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions, supra note 162
¶ 27 (July 1) (rejecting the inquiry into the intentions of the Foreign Ministers
in signing the “Minutes”); Land, Island & Maritime Frontier Dispute (El
Salv./Hond.; Nic. interv.), 1992 I.C.J. 351 (Sept. 11) (finding the boundary
agreement binding even though El Salvador had only signed ad referendum);
Border and Transborder Armed Actions. (Nic. v. Hond.), Jurisdiction and
Admissibility, Judgment, 1988 I.C.J. 69 (Dec. 20) (seeming to regard the
Cancun Declaration as legally binding); Continental Shelf (Tunis./Libya), 1982
I.C.J. 70, ¶¶ 93–95 (Feb. 24); Aegean Sea Continental Shelf Case (Greece v.
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International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea appears to have
172
held the opposite. It does not appear that Aust is actually
arguing in favor of an alternate regime, but rather, implicitly,
that all legal systems choose which agreements are enforceable
at law and which are not. Aust is quite right in this assertion.
For example, in common law systems some “contracts” are not
enforceable, regardless of their status as an agreement, if they
lack consideration. These kinds of agreements have only moral
force, not legal force. Aust does not so clearly make this
argument, although it can inferred from his writing. The
difficulty is that international law is not so easily assimilated
to municipal law that has this legal and non-legal distinction
173
between types of agreements. This question will be addressed
in more detail in the section below regarding private law
analogies and intent.
Furthermore, Klabbers appears to believe, diametrically
opposed to Aust, that international law governs States,
regardless of whether they created it or not. The law now exists
as a system and governs the international relations of States,
even if States can modify it and change it. Arguably, States are
the slaves to the law. The problem with master-slave analogies
is that they are quickly prone to Hegelian breakdown. Arguing
that states are slaves or masters of international law is
unhelpful and has been shown through modern legal
174
scholarship to be fruitless. This author takes the perspective
that States and international law developed into modern
notions of States and law in concert (or alongside one another –
in opposition to each other if the reader is prone to a Hobbesian
view of the world). States are simultaneously master and slave.
Turk.), Jurisdiction, 1978 I.C.J. 3 (Dec. 19) (no rule prohibiting a joint
communiqué from being a legally binding instrument).
172. See Disp. Concerning Delimit. Of the Marit. Boundary Betw.
Bangladesh & Myanmar in the Bay of Bengal (Bangl./Myan.), Case No. 16,
Judgment, paras. 92–5 (Int’l Trib. Law Sea, Mar. 14, 2012) (where the signed
“Agreed Minutes” were held not to be a treaty, partly because of the gravity of
the subject matter of the minutes which suggesting that the parties could not
have intended to create legal obligations).
173. We are reminded of Judge McNair’s caution about transposing
municipal legal principles into international law “lock, stock and barrel”. See
International Status of South-West Africa, Advisory Opinion, 1950 I.C. J. 128,
148 (July 11):
The way in which international law borrows from this source is not by
means of importing private law institutions ‘lock, stock and barrel’,
ready-made and fully equipped with a set of rules. It would be
difficult to reconcile such a process with the application of ‘the general
principles of law.’
174. See KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 167, at 265–66.
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They create international law by act of will, but also submit
themselves to it. Although holding such cognitive dissonance is
not pleasant, it seems to best capture the essence of the
international legal system. As a result the international legal
system, to the degree to which we can call it a system,
paradoxically accommodates the sovereign prerogatives of
states while still demanding compliance.
The difficulty for Klabbers is that even if MOUs contain
legal obligations, they have no enforcement mechanism. Does
that not mean that the obligation is removed from law? And
what shall we make of provisions that expressly state that the
MOU is not governed by international law? Can these
declarations be explained away as somehow inapplicable? We
might argue that the principle of effectiveness should result in
enforceability of any norm, but that conclusion is difficult to
reach if the document expressly excludes legality and
enforceability. Klabbers presumes that a violation of
international law is just that, even without a complaint and
assessment of a violation. Essentially he argues that a tree
falling in the woods does make a sound, even though no one
hears it. This author has considerable sympathy for Klabbers’
arguments, but believes Klabbers is not completely correct.
Klabbers appears to hold a certain perspective on international
law—i.e., that it is a completely coherent, unified and,
moreover, formal legal system, where every act must be
objectively discoverable as lawful or unlawful. It is not clear
175
that international is. Klabbers appears to believe that an
arguable violation of a legal right, perceived by a third-party, in
this case a member of academia, is necessarily a violation of a
legal right. Professors of law are not judges or diplomats,
notwithstanding the conceit that they would be good ones. In
176
the largely auto-interpretative system of international law, a
175. The ICJ has found lacunae in the law. See e.g., Accordance with
International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of
Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. 141 (July 22) (esp. Decl. of Simma, J.);
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory. Opinion, 1996
I.C.J. 226, ¶105(2)(E) (July 8). But see Hersch Lauterpacht, Non Liquet and
the Completeness of Law, in SYMBOLAE VERZIJL: SYMBOLAE VERZIJL:
PRÉSENTÉES AU PROFESSEUR J.H.W. VERZIJL À L’OCCASION DE SON LXX-IÈME
ANNIVERSAIRE 196, 205 (Le Baron F. M. Van Asbeck et. al eds., 1958) (arguing
against lacunae).
176. Second Report on the Law of Treaties, [1954] 2 YB Int’l L. Comm’n
123–24, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1954/Add.l
In the first instance, as already stated in the first report, the fact that
the extent of the application of the instrument is left in some respects
to the appreciation of the parties and that, as the result, the scope of
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potential claim of a violation of international law can only be
definitely settled as such where the parties consent to do so and
a conclusive settlement is reached to classify a certain act as
legally legitimate or not. Koskenniemi is correct to identify the
need to remove and ignore the actor making the legal
classification in order for international law to achieve a formal
177
doctrine of sources,
but it is not entirely clear that
international law has concluded this operation fully. The actor
making the classification of an act as lawful or not remains
crucial in international dispute settlement. The UN Charter
provides a number of modes for peaceful resolution of
international disputes, without distinguishing which of those
disputes are legal ones and, if that is a distinction that can be
made, which disputes must be settled through legal means. A
state might reach a negotiated settlement of a dispute over a
diplomatic gaffe such as insulting the ambassador’s wife, and a
state might similarly reach a negotiated settlement of a dispute
over the purported “unlawful” use of force, without an
admission of the act being unlawful. Until international law
ceases to have voluntary, consensual dispute settlement that
accepts non-legal settlement methods as equally valid, we are
left with a system where relatively few dispute outcomes can
conclusively inform us about the law and very few
hypotheticals are clearly unlawful.
3. The Role of Formal Assessment and Enforcement
This author is not willing to adopt either the Aust or
Klabbers views in their entirety. Aust and Klabbers argue past
each other because of their differing notions of the role of
enforcement of international agreements, the master-slave
178
dichotomy and the formality of international law generally.
the obligation is indefinite and elastic, is not a decisive factor for
denying that there is in existence a legal duty to be fulfilled in good
faith. This is so even if, in what must be regarded as the typical case
in treaties of this nature, the instrument contains no provisions, or
purely nominal provisions, for the settlement of disputes arising out
of the application or the interpretation of the treaty . . . .
177. See KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 167, at 265–66.
178. See Gregory C. Shaffer & Mark A. Pollack, Hard vs. Soft Law:
Alternatives, Complements, and Antagonists in International Governance, 94
MINN. L. REV. 706, 715 (Feb. 2010)
The key difference, we believe, between scholars who evaluate hard
and soft law in terms of a binary binding/nonbinding distinction and
those who evaluate it based on characteristics that vary along a
continuum depends on whether they address international law
primarily from an ex post enforcement perspective or an ex ante
negotiating one.
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Many commentators, Aust and Klabbers included, seem to
commingle the notion of whether an obligation is legal or not
with whether the obligation is enforceable or not through third179
party adjudication based on the law. These are not the same
180
thing. Lauterpacht, in his capacity of Special Rapporteur on
179. See AUST, supra note 32 at 34 (“when an instrument contains an
article providing for the settlement of disputes by compulsory international
judicial process, such a provision is hardly consistent with an intention not to
enter into a legally binding instrument”) (citing Hugh Thirlway, The Law and
Procedure of the International Court of Justice, 1991 BRIT. YB INT’L L. 1, 7–8);
Citizens Trade Campaign, The Colombian Free Trade Agreement is an Affront
to Human Dignity, Apr. 14, 2011, available at http://www.citizenstrade.org/
ctc/blog/2011/04/14/colombia-free-trade-agreement-an-affront-to-humandignity
On April 7, Presidents Obama and Santos announced a new
‘Colombian Action Plan Related to Labor Rights,’ paving the way for
a vote on the U.S.-Colombia Free Trade Agreement . . . . More
disturbing still, the ‘Action Plan’ is in no way legally binding. It
provides zero mechanisms for compliance once the Colombia FTA is
implemented — making it in some ways weaker than even NAFTA’s
ineffectual labor side agreement.
UNHCR, Note, supra note 2, ¶ 5
Diplomatic assurances given by the receiving State do not normally
constitute legally binding undertakings. They generally provide no
mechanism for their enforcement nor is there any legal remedy for
the sending State or the individual concerned in case of noncompliance, once the person has been transferred to the receiving
State. . . .
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 13 (arguing that assurances do not provide
for enforcement mechanisms and that this fact has an effect on the legal value
of the obligations undertaken). But see Ahmad, Aswat, Ahsan and Mustafa
(Abu Hamza) v. U.K., Appls. Nos. 24027/07, 11949/08, and 36742/08, Partial
Decision Admissibility, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 78 (Jul. 6, 2010) (“Amnesty
[International] concluded that the assurances lacked a clear legal basis or
mechanism by which the persons concerned could enforce them.”). Some
authors also in turn commingle compliance with effectiveness or utility of the
instrument. See Shaffer, supra note 178; Oscar Schachter, The Twilight
Existence of Nonbinding International Agreements, 71 AM. J. INT’L L. 296, 304
(1977) (“It would seem wiser to recognize nonbinding agreements may be
attainable when binding treaties are not ...”).
180. See e.g., Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14, Judgement [sic] on
the Req. of the Rep. of Croatia for Rev. of the Dec. of Tr. Ch. II of 18 July 1997,
paras. 35–6 (Int’l Crim. Trib. former Yugoslavia, Appls. Ch., Oct. 19, 1997
(distinguishing between legal obligation and power of enforcement of the
obligation). Also see ICCPR, supra note 2, at arts. 6, 7, 14 (providing for what
are undoubtedly legal obligations, but failing to provide third-party
enforcement mechanisms); First Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, opened for
signature Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976)
(providing for the right of individual complaint before a third-party, i.e., the
Human Rights Committee). See generally Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan
Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in International Governance, 54 INT'L ORG. 421,
421 (2000) (“most international law is ‘soft’ in distinctive ways”); Lori Fisler
Damrosch, Enforcing International Law Through Non-Forcible Measures, 269
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the Law of Treaties, argued vigorously that neither
181
enforcement mechanisms
nor self-assessed discretion in
182
compliance is the test for legal nature of obligations. It could
just as easily be claimed that the rulings of the European Court
or the ICJ are not legally binding since the former relies on the
Council of Ministers and the latter relies on the UN Security
183
Council for enforcement of its judgments, both of which are
“political” bodies that entertain discretion whether to act.
Nevertheless, it is recognized that the enforcement mechanism
is distinct and separate from the legal classification of the act
as wrongful or not. In this author’s submission, whether an act
is legal or not is a question of classification of an act as legally
184
legitimate or not. The Vienna Convention requires only that
HAGUE ACAD. REC. DES COURS 9, 19 (1997).
181. Second Report on the Law of Treaties, [1954] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n
125–26, ¶ 12, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1954/Add.l
In particular, there is probably no warrant for the suggestion that an
instrument is not a treaty unless it contains provisions for the
compulsory judicial or arbitral settlement of disputes as to its
interpretation or application. While most multilateral treaties of a
general character and many other treaties contain clauses of this
nature, this is not the case in many treaties which clearly create legal
rights and obligations. The legal nature of rules of customary
international law does not depend upon the existence of compulsory
machinery for their arbitral or judicial ascertainment. There is no
reason for more stringent requirements in this respect in the matter
of treaties.
182. Hersch Lauterpacht, Spec. Rapp., Second Report on the Law of
Treaties, [1954] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 125, ¶ 9, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/SER.A/1954/Add.l (arguing that “purely administrative agreements”
could also have legally binding obligations notwithstanding “their nature and
subject matter, [which] leave a considerable measure of discretion to the
authorities in question [when they] exhibit the essential characteristics of an
international treaty.”) (citing Agreement between the Post Office of the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Shereefian Post and
Telegraph Administration for the exchange of money orders, July 12 & Aug.
28, 1948, 90 U.N.T.S. 84).
183. See, e.g., U.N. Charter, art. 94, para. 2.
If any party to a case fails to perform the obligations incumbent upon
it under a judgment rendered by the Court, the other party may have
recourse to the Security Council, which may, if it deems necessary,
make recommendations or decide upon measures to be taken to give
effect to the judgment.
See also ECHR, supra note 2, as amended by Protocol No. 14, June 1,
2010, art. 46, para. 2 (providing for the Committee of Ministers to
monitor and supervise implementation of judgments by the European
Court).
184. James Crawford, Spec. Rapp., Report of the Commission to the General
Assembly on the work of its fifty-third session: State Responsibility, [2001] 2
Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 33, art. 1, cmt (3), U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.1
(Part 2) [hereinafter Crawford, State Responsibility] (“[E]very internationally
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the agreement be “governed by” international law, not that it
be “enforced by” international legal mechanisms. The question
of enforcement focuses on the compliance with the obligation
following its legal classification. This notion is a distinct one
from that of “governance” or the authoritative legal
classification of the act as lawful or not. Indeed, sometimes the
classification itself is enough to induce compliance, but not
always, though these are separate phenomena.
This analysis of the binding nature of agreements being
measured by their enforcement provisions is difficult business
and trends very close to analyses of why states comply with
international law in the first place and the role of legitimacy of
185
norms. This problem, of course, is not unique to international
law. Domestic legal systems sometimes struggle with
compliance or non-compliance with decisions of legal or illegal
186
tribunals. In those cases too, the line between what is law
and what is not can be blurred. Clearly states look to a variety
of concerns when selecting their course of action on the
187
international plane.
Certainly there may always be
wrongful act of a State entails the international responsibility of that State,
and thus gives rise to new international legal relations additional to those
which existed before the act took place . . . .”). Thus responsibility is objective;
it is not dependent on an assessor definitively characterizing an act as
unlawful, and, impliedly, states cannot exclude it. See also id. at 54–57, art.
12, cmts. (1), (5), (6), (11) (concluding that the origin or character of the
international obligation—whether it is a treaty norm or customary
international law, whether it is a bilateral or multilateral obligation, whether
it is an obligation of conduct or result—is irrelevant to the question of whether
the act is in conformity with it). For discussions of the duties incumbent upon
states committing internationally wrongful acts see generally id. at 88–107,
arts. 29, 30, 31, 34, 35, 36, 37, and their commentaries.
185. See, e.g., LOUIS HENKIN, HOW NATIONS BEHAVE 47 (2d ed. 1979) (“It is
probably the case that almost all nations observe almost all principles of
international law and almost all of their obligations almost all of the time.”);
ANDREW GUZMAN, HOW INTERNATIONAL LAW WORKS: A RATIONAL CHOICE
THEORY 71–111 (2008) (arguing that states desire that their promises be
credible); Shaffer, supra note 178, at 712-15 (discussing reputational costs of
non-compliance); Jose E. Alvarez, Why Nations Behave, 19 MICH. J. INT’L L.
303 (1998) (reviewing a new wave of compliance scholarship).
186. See, e.g., Servai, et al. v. Tamil Nadu, 2011 STPL (Web) 403 SC 1, ¶¶
16–17 (India) (Katju J.), available at http://www.stpl-india.in/SCJFiles/
2011_STPL(Web)_403_SC.pdf (holding that the traditional tribunals of “khap
panchayats” were “illegal” “kangaroo courts” and that their “decrees”
encouraging honor killings were unlawful; ordering non-compliance by law
enforcement officials).
187. See Othman v. Sec’y State For the Home Dep’t, (2007) No. SC/15/2005
(S.I.A.C.), ¶ 296 (U.K.) (“States look not only to the legal status of
international documents when deciding their behaviour but to the whole
political context.”).
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diplomatic consequences for non-compliance, which can operate
188
as sufficient inducements to comply although that conclusion
189
may be more problematic for human rights treaties. However,
failure to effect compliance does not necessarily render the
classification as legally illegitimate or not correct.
The authoritative classification of the act is often
permitted through a number of dispute settlement
mechanisms, including party-to-party negotiations without a
disinterested third party. Negotiations, as opposed to “legal” (or
“quasi-legal”) dispute settlement such as arbitration, do not
clearly result in a legal classification of the acts as lawful or
not, they simply settle the dispute, although they can
potentially inform us of state opinio juris regarding acts of that
type. The mere fact that an obligation may be settled only by
negotiation does not mean that the obligation is, of necessity,
190
not a legal one.
The problem with the objective (third-party) or subjective
(negotiated) legal assessment standards is that legal legitimacy
depends on whether there is a person to hear the tree fall in the
woods, which is the precise problem to begin with. The answer
to the tree falling in the woods question is that we cannot know
188. See Beth A. Simmons, Money and the Law: Why Comply with the
Public International Law of Money?, 25 YALE J. INT'L L. 323, 356–57 (2000)
(finding reasons for compliance to include reputational consequences); HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 13 (concluding that assurances do not have
sufficient inducements to comply with human rights obligations). That is not
to say that there are no consequences when diplomatic enforcement is the only
available mode. See, e.g., Katherine R. Hawkins, The Promises of Torturers:
Diplomatic Assurances and the Legality of Rendition, 20 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J.
213, 241 (2006) (reporting on the suspension of funding for Egypt’s intelligence
services after diplomatic assurances against torture were violated and the
change in policy against extraditing or rendering suspects to Syria following
the Maher Arar incident) (citing Dana Priest, CIA's Assurances on Transferred
Suspects Doubted; Prisoners Say Countries Break No-Torture Pledges, WASH.
POST, Mar. 17, 2005, at A1); Dana Priest & Barton Gellman, U.S. Decries
Abuse But Defends Interrogations, WASH. POST, Dec. 26, 2002, at A1.
189. See HENKIN, supra note 185, at 235 (“The forces that induce
compliance with other law ... do not pertain equally to the law of human
rights.”); Oona Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?, 111
YALE L.J. 1935, 1938 (2002) (“[T]he major engines of compliance that exist in
other areas of international law are for the most part absent in the area of
human rights.”).
190. Crawford, supra note 184, at 34–35, art. 2, cmts. (1)–(3) (finding that
the conditions for responsibility are only attribution of the act to the state and
that the act be a breach of international law, without provision for the nature
and role of a third-party assessor); id. at 87, art. 28, cmt. (2) (finding that any
unlawful conduct that results in responsibility of the state, impliedly,
regardless of any or the existence of dispute settlement mechanism, requires
cessation and reparation).
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191

the answer. A party that violates an MOU is potentially in
violation and responsible to the other party, and only to the
other party. Had Qatar and Bahrain never taken their dispute
to the ICJ, we would not know whether the minutes constituted
a treaty, and perhaps neither would the ICJ as a theoretical
matter. Whether an agreement is legally binding or not is only
addressed by a third-party when the principle parties disagree
192
as to its legal effect. When the parties submitted the dispute
for definitive settlement by the ICJ, they agreed that the
decision of the Court constituted their reality, not their own
self-assessment or mutual negotiations. It was only through the
dispute settlement process, by claiming that an instrument
provides for legal rights, that the binding nature of those rights
is realized. If one state with a right to complain does not claim
a violation, then we do not know whether there was a violation
or not, although we can guess. This is all the more difficult in
191. In this context the socio-legal studies of Malinowski and the early
Hawthorne studies are particularly illuminating. Sociology has long identified
and attempted to account for the “Hawthorne” or “observer” effect of the
researcher on the behavior of the researched. See generally, e.g., BRONISLAW
MALINOWSKI, CRIME AND CUSTOM IN SAVAGE SOCIETY (1926) (characterizing
observer forces in the “primitive” law of indigenous cultures); HENRY A.
LANDSBERGER, HAWTHORNE REVISITED (1958) (conducting a reevaluation of
the conclusions of the Hawthorne studies, as well as the works of its advocates
and critics); Debra Steele-Johnson et al., Goal Orientation and Task Demand
Effects on Motivation, Affect, and Performance, 85 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 724
(2000) (analyzing goal orientation and task demands on motivation, affect, and
performance); Lyle Yorks & David A. Whitsett, Hawthorne, Topeka, and the
Issue of Science Versus Advocacy in Organizational Behavior, 10 ACAD. MGMT.
REV. 21 (1985) (summarizing the Hawthorne and Topeka studies, and the role
of observers in reporting outcomes); Richard H. Franke & James D. Kaul, The
Hawthorne Experiments: First Statistical Interpretation, 43 AM. SOC. REV.
623 (1978) (providing statistical study of the Hawthorne studies, analysis of
which revealed increased worker output simply due to the presence of
observers); Alex Carey, The Hawthorne Studies: A Radical Criticism, 32 AM.
SOC. REV. 403 (1967) (finding significant deficiencies in the basic hypothesis of
the Hawthorne studies). Occasionally, courts also take note of the observer
effect when assessing evidence of a norm. See, e.g., In re Estate of Apachee, 4
Nav. R. 178, 180 (W.R. Dist. Ct. Oct. 11, 1983) (holding that for proving a
Native American customary norm, the court should not seek evidence from
anthologists and ethnologists, but rather the tribal members themselves,
although this practice does not entirely resolve the observer problem).
192. See, e.g., Herbert Bernstein & Joachim Zekoll, The Gentleman’s
Agreement in Legal Theory and in Modern Practice: United States, 46 AM. J.
COMP. L. SUPP. 87, 88 (1998) Although speaking of non-legally binding
commercial agreements, Bernstein and Zekoll argue:
It is extremely difficult to determine, with any degree of certainty,
how widespread the use of permanent 'no-law’ agreements is in actual
American business practice. ... [N]o such agreement will ever surface
in a court of law unless the parties differ as to its effect. Id.
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international law where parties may not seek to enforce their
193
claims due to a variety of political concerns of diplomacy.
4. Private Law Analogies
Before reaching a conclusion on diplomatic assurances and
the law of treaties, we should once again consider analogies
with private law specifically in the context of intent to create
legal relations. Admittedly private law does not necessarily
suffer the international law problem of erecting such a large
additional burden separating legal classification from the
194
available modes of enforcement. But it does reflect some of
193. See, e.g., Alzery v. Sweden, Commc’n No. 1416/2005, ¶ 4.11, U.N.
Doc.CCPR/C/88/D/1416/2005 (Human Rights Comm., Nov. 10, 2006) (noting
Sweden’s diplomatic reasons for not interfering with an Egyptian national
detained in Egypt); Youssef v. Home Office, [2004] EWHC 1884 (QB),
HQ03X03052 [18] (Eng.) (citing the UK Prime Minister’s letter to the Home
Office requesting that terms of assurances be narrowed for diplomatic reasons)
Diplomats are often quite candid that their top priority is to ensure
friendly relations with other states, sometimes at the expense of
confronting governments about possible human rights violations,
including about breaches of pre-agreed diplomatic assurances. For
example, when the former Swedish Ambassador to Egypt was asked
why he let five weeks lapse before visiting two Egyptians expelled in
December 2001 from Stockholm to Cairo following diplomatic
assurances, he replied that the Swedes could not have visited the men
immediately because that would have signaled a lack of trust in the
Egyptian authorities. . . . Inter-state dynamics at the diplomatic level
are by their very nature delicate, and diplomats often invoke the need
for “caution” and “discretion” in diplomatic representations and
negotiations. As a result, serious human rights issues—even those
involving the absolute prohibition against torture—are often
subordinated to diplomatic concerns. . . . Blair’s Private Secretary
detailed those concerns in an April 1999 letter to the Home Office
stating, ‘[W]e are in danger of being excessive in our demands of the
Egyptians . . . why [do] we need all the assurances proposed by the
F[oreign] C[ommonwealth] O[ffice] and Home Office Legal advisers.
Can we not narrow down the list of assurances we require?’;
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 13 (alteration in original) (citations
omitted) (citing former Swedish Ambassador to Egypt’s statement: “What do
you think [would] have happened if I had come rushing in after four or five
days and demanded to see those people? It had been to signal from the start
that we don’t trust you Egyptians.”)
194. Although the American experience of Andrew Jackson’s, probably
apocryphal, statement in reaction to the judgment of the Supreme Court in
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832), does come to mind as an exception:
“John Marshall has made his decision, now let him enforce it!” The modern
case of Labsi in Slovakia could be another example where the executive
appears to have ignored the judgment of the Supreme Court. See Labsi v.
Slovakia, Statement of Facts, Eur. Ct. H.R., Appl. No. 33809/08 ¶ 3 (Jun. 8,
2010) (noting that the Slovakian Executive expelled Labsi despite a stay
entered by the Slovakian Constitutional Court), the case is pending as of this
publication).
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the same debates over the relevance of intent in forming of a
195
contract. Again, care should be given in drawing private law
analogies, but here the analogy is particular helpful because
the same questions are at issue in a highly similar context.
Furthermore, both sides of the analogy, the national legal
system and the international legal system, share a common
feature, which is that all agreements are concluded within and
submitted to the legal system, and it is the system that
determines whether the parties concluded a legally binding
agreement based on, inter alia, whether there is an agreement,
whether the parties had the requisite objective intentions, etc.
A particularly relevant example within domestic contract
law is the treatment of agreements that are variously termed
“letters of intent” (“LOIs”) or, unfortunately, “memoranda of
understanding” (“MOUs”). LOIs and MOUs are often entered
into between corporations, usually as a preliminary stage in
negotiations over purchases, mergers and acquisitions. These
agreements often include express language that they are not
legally binding. Nevertheless, they also often provide for legal
196
197
rights and obligations. In the case of Venture v. Zenith, one
195. For the “objective” school, see SAMUEL WILLISTON, THE LAW OF
CONTRACTS § 21 (1st ed. 1920) (citing Davison v. Holden, 10 A. 515 (Conn.
1887) and Wellington v. Apthorp, 13 N.E. 10 (Mass. 1887) (summarizing the
law related to the non-necessity of intent in formation of contracts). However
it is interesting to note that in one of the cases that Williston cites, namely
Wellington, the court probed the question of intent: “[W]hether it appears
there was a promise by the defendant’s testator sufficiently definite to be
enforced, and made with the understanding and intention that she would be
legally bound thereby.” id. at 13 (emphasis added). For the “intent” school, see
GUENTHER TREITEL, THE LAW OF CONTRACT 149 (10th ed. 1999) (“An
agreement, though supported by consideration, is not binding as a contract if
it was made without any intention of creating legal relations.”) (footnote
omitted); WILLIAM REYNELL ANSON, PRINCIPLES OF THE ENGLISH LAW OF
CONTRACT AND OF AGENCY IN ITS RELATION TO CONTRACT pt. 2, at 11 (11th
ed. 1906) (including intent as part of the first element of a legal contract). An
interesting middle ground is Sulzbach v. Town of Jefferson, 155 N.W.2d 921,
923 (N.D. 1968) (“It is not necessary that the parties are conscious of the legal
relationship which their words or acts give rise to, but it is essential that the
acts manifesting assent shall be done intentionally.”) The court appears to
hold that it is not the intent to have a legally bound result that is at stake, but
that the acts that result in the binding contract are done intentionally. Lastly,
some courts have held that the legally-binding nature of the agreement could
even be auto-interpretive, further justifying the analogy with international
law. See, e.g., Empro Mfg. Co. v. Ball-Co Mfg., 870 F.2d 423, 425 (7th Cir.
1989) (Easterbrook, J.) (citations omitted) (“Parties may decide for themselves
whether the results of preliminary negotiations bind them . . . .”).
196. Courts have adopted one of two perspectives for dealing with these
kinds of preliminary agreements. Either the agreement is seen as legally
binding but the court needs to supply the missing terms, or the court holds
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corporation sent the other a non-binding LOI that included a
paragraph providing that the parties must negotiate in good
faith regarding a potential purchase agreement and excluding
the parties’ right to negotiate with other parties. Eventually
when the negotiations broke down, the buyer sued. Judge
Posner found that the LOI “established a binding agreement to
negotiate in good faith toward the formation of a contract of
198
sale” and regarding damages as follows:
Damages for breach of an agreement to negotiate may be, although
they are unlikely to be, the same as the damages for breach of the
final contract that the parties would have signed had it not been for
the defendant’s bad faith. If, quite apart from any bad faith, the
negotiations would have broken down, the party led on by the other
party’s bad faith to persist in futile negotiations can recover only his
reliance damages—the expenses he incurred by being misled, in
violation of the parties’ agreement to negotiate in good faith, into
continuing to negotiate futilely. But if the plaintiff can prove that had
it not been for the defendant’s bad faith the parties would have made
a final contract, then the loss of the benefit of the contract is a
consequence of the defendant’s bad faith, and, provided that it is a
foreseeable consequence, the defendant is liable for that loss—liable,
199
that is, for the plaintiff’s consequential damages.

This conclusion does not mean that the parties are easily
able to claim damages, since the corporation would need to
prove what the terms of the final agreement would have been
200
but for the bad faith. Significantly for our purposes, Posner
that there is no agreement aside from the obligation to continue negotiating
the agreement in good faith. See E. Allan Farnsworth, Precontractual Liability
and Preliminary Agreements: Fair Dealing and Failed Negotiations, 87
COLUM. L. REV. 217, 249–55 (1987) (presenting two types of negotiating
agreements; one where the parties agree to be bound, and the other where
they do not); Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass’n of Am. v. Tribune Co., 670 F.
Supp. 491, 498–99 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (finding that in order to determine if a
preliminary agreement is binding, the court must look to the intent of the
parties).
197. See Venture Assoc. Corp. v. Zenith Data Sys. Corp., 96 F.3d 275 (7th
Cir. 1996). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 21 (1981)
(“Neither real nor apparent intention that a promise be legally binding is
essential to the formation of a contract . . . .”). But see Balfour v. Balfour,
[1919] 2 K.B. 571, 578 (U.K.) (requiring intent to be bound); Baird Textile
Holdings Ltd v. Marks & Spencer plc, [2001] EWCA (Civ) 274 (Mance L.J.)
(searching for certainty as evidence of intent); United Nations Convention on
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, art 14(1), Apr. 11, 1980, 1489
U.N.T.S. 3, (entered into force Jan. 1, 1988) (“A proposal for concluding a
contract addressed to one or more specific persons constitutes an offer if it . . .
indicates the intention of the offeror to be bound in case of acceptance.”).
198. Venture Assoc., 96 F.3d at 277 (emphasis added).
199. Id. at 278.
200. Insofar as we might apply this rule of international law, we might
note that many cases brought at international law result only in a declaratory
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concluded that that problem “goes to the practicality of the
201
remedy, not the principle of it.” This holding seems to affirm
the distinction between legal classification and remedy. This
202
approach has been followed in other jurisdictions, though
203
others have clearly rejected it.
In Logan v. Sivers, the Oregon Court of Appeals found that
204
there are four types of LOIs. The first is a binding contract in
which all terms are agreed and written, despite it being titled
an “LOI”. The second is a binding agreement in which some
terms are not entirely settled and the court will move to settle
them and render the agreement effective. The third is a
generally non-binding contract where certain provisions may
nonetheless still be binding, such as the obligation to negotiate
in good faith. The last is a completely non-binding agreement in
which the parties have clearly and deliberately excluded any
205
binding legal obligation.
Where the parties have expressly manifested their intent
judgment. See generally, e.g., Statute of the International Court of Justice, ch.
III, June 26, 1945, 1 U.N.T.S. 16, 59 Stat. 1055 (outlining the general
procedure the ICJ follows in administering judgments). But see generally
ICSID , supra notes 99–100 (noting ICSID cases where declaratory judgments
were not given).
201. Venture Assoc., 96 F. 3d at 279.
202. See, e.g., Vestar Dev. II, L.L.C. v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 249 F.3d 958
(9th Cir. 2001) (leaving open the question of expectation damages for breaches
of agreements to negotiate); Coal Cliff Collieries Pty. Ltd. v. Sijehama Pty.
Ltd., (1991) 24 NSWLR 1, 40–41 (Supreme Court) (Austl.) (finding a binding
agreement to negotiate possible, though not present on the facts); Hillas & Co.
Ltd. v. Arcos Ltd., [1932] UKHL 2, [1932] Ll. L. Rep. 359 (H.L.) (appeal taken
from Eng.) (holding that where there is consideration, a promise to negotiate
in good faith is a legally binding agreement).
203. See, e.g., Walford v. Miles, [1992] 2 A.C. 128, 136-38 (H.L.) (appeal
taken from Eng.) (reaching the opposite conclusion in a more modern case
than Hillas). Other jurisdictions rejecting this rule include some American
ones. See, e.g., Goodstein Constr. Corp. v. City of N.Y., 604 N.E.2d 1356, 1362
(N.Y. 1992) (rejecting claims for lost profits based only on agreement to
negotiate). Cf. PECL, supra note 82, art. 2:101: Conditions for the Conclusion
of a Contract (“(1) A contract is concluded if: (a) the parties intend to be legally
bound, and (b) they reach a sufficient agreement without any further
requirement.”).
204. Logan v. D.W. Sivers Co., 141 P. 3d 589, 593–95 (Or. Ct. App. 2006
aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 169 P.3d 1255, 1258–59 (Or. 2007)) (enforcing
certain terms in an otherwise “non-binding” LOI).
205. See also Jarvis Interiors Ltd v. Galliard Homes, [2000] CLC 411 (A.C.)
(Lindsay J.) (finding in a document entitled “Contract Preliminaries” that: (a)
there could be no contract unless and until there was a deed between the
parties—without which the agreement was equivalently “subject to contract”
and (b) nothing that occurred afterwards overtook that—including the
“handshake agreement” which was itself subject to a formal contract being
entered into).
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to be bound in certain terms, the court will find the provisions
enforceable. This conclusion also holds for “if–then” contracts,
where a binding contract is conditional only upon performance,
206
remaining non-binding prior to the performance. In Logan,
the particular language was the “[s]eller agrees to be bound to
provide the required due diligence documents within the time
required
to
comply
with
the
[n]on-[s]olicitation
207
provision . . . .” Where that intent was clearly expressed and
the terms were definite, the court found the obligation binding.
These cases demonstrate that, in private law, parties may
elect to agree on non-legally binding terms, but the language
doing so must be express, and terms capable of creating legally
binding obligations may still do so, even if the overall document
purports to be non-binding. There is no a priori instrument
that is binding or not in its entirety: each case must be
analyzed on its own merits, and each term analyzed on its own
208
merits. The role of intent is in looking for what the parties,
209
objectively, intended to agree upon.
What governs is the
210
terms the parties intended to agree on. That the parties may
have contemplated that there would be a final contract after
the conclusion of the LOI is not determinative of the legal value
211
of an LOI if the LOI clearly expresses agreed-upon terms.
The judge can look at all the surrounding circumstances to
determine this intent, and not only at the language of the
206. In these cases, there is a non-binding document that imposes binding
obligations only if the other party performs. See, e.g., British Steel Corp. v.
Cleveland Bridge & Eng’g Co., [1984] 1 All E.R. 504 (Q.B.) (Robert Goff J.)
(Eng.) (finding quantum meruit for plaintiff for work performed in expectation
of a contract); Baird Textile Holdings Ltd. v. Marks & Spencer Plc, [2001]
EWCA (Civ) 274 ¶ 6 (Mance L.J.) (Eng.) (noting plaintiff’s allegations that if it
performed certain conditions, defendant would be bound to an implied
contract).
207. D.W. Sivers Co., 141 P.3d at 591–92.
208. See Twintec Ltd. v. GSE Bldg. & Civil Eng’g Ltd., [2003] EWHC 605,
[67] (Kirkham J.) (Eng.) (“There is no settled law on the meaning and effect of
letters of intent. The court must decide each case on its facts.”).
209. Or perhaps an even stronger conclusion would be to look for intent to
agree on language that expressed an objective intent to be bound.
210. See Harvey Shopfitters Ltd. v. ADI Ltd., [2003] EWCA (Civ) 1757
(Eng.). The case reflects two principles. First, it is sufficient that the parties
are agreed on all material and necessary terms. Id. at [9]. Second, the labels
the parties attach to their documents are not determinative. Id. What matters
is the intention of the parties to be gathered from all the relevant evidence
including, so far as admissible, the factual matrix in which the documents in
question were written. Id.
211. See, e.g., Westminster Bldg. Co. Ltd. v. Beckingham, [2004] EWHC
(TCC) 138, [10]–[11] (Thornton J.) (Eng.) (finding a simple contract created by
an LOI even where LOI stated another contract was to follow).
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document. Furthermore, the expectations arising from a nonlegally binding agreement may be so difficult to prove that they
cannot be recovered as a remedy, though reliance expenses may
213
be recoverable.
Therefore, LOIs and MOUs in the corporate world can be
(1) Completely binding; (2) Partially binding – some terms are
binding and some are not and the court may or may not move
to fill gaps and render it effective; or (3) Completely nonbinding. For agreements that are completely binding, the
parties have committed themselves to perform the obligations
214
discussed.
A partially binding agreement will have some
portions that are non-binding and some portions that are
binding. For example, there may be no obligation to negotiate
to a final transaction, even as some clauses, such as
confidentiality, exclusivity and good faith clauses, are binding.
An agreement may specify stipulated damages for failure to
215
complete the negotiation. An agreement may even contain
terms, the binding force of which is contingent on practice. The
last category of agreements, completely non-binding, has no
legal effect whatsoever. Documents fall in this category where
216
the parties’ intentions are purely speculative.
212. See, e.g., Hackwood Ltd. v. Areen Design Serv. Ltd., [2005] EWHC
(TCC) 2322, [17] (Field J.) (Eng.) (finding it necessary to look at the “matrix of
facts” in order to determine the terms of an interim contract).
213. See Vestar Dev. II, LLC v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 249 F.3d 958, 962
(9th Cir. 2001) (finding that an exclusivity provision in a clearly non-legally
binding LOI was enforceable, resulting in a damages award for reliance
expenses but not expectation expenses).
214. See Allen Wilson Shopfitters v. Buckingham, [2005] EWHC (TCC)
1165, [12]–[17] (Coulson J.) (Eng.) (using language of obligation in the contract
to discern legal obligations from LOI); Eugena Ltd. v. Gelande Corp. Ltd.,
[2004] EWHC (QB) 3273, [104], [108] (Hegarty J.) (Eng.) (noting obligations to
perform based on LOI); Hall & Tawse S. Ltd. v. Ivory Gate Ltd., [1997] EWHC
(TCC) 358, [34] (Eng.) (determining the obligations of work to be done from an
LOI).
215. See, e.g., Copeland v. Baskin Robbins U.S.A., 117 Cal.Rptr.2d 875,
882–84 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (holding that the LOI was not binding but
nonetheless did constitute an obligation to negotiate, with the possibilities of
reliance damages where that obligation is breached); Schwanbeck v. Fed.Mogul Corp., 592 N.E.2d 1289, 1291 n.2, 1292–93 (Mass. 1992) (citing an LOI
stating “this letter is not intended to create, nor do you or we presently have
any binding legal obligation whatever” yet the next paragraph stating
“[h]owever, it is our intention, and we understand, your intention immediately
to proceed in good faith in the negotiation of such binding definitive agreement
. . . .” and finding that the second obligation was binding even though the LOI
generally was not).
216. See, e.g., Stephen Donald Architects Ltd. v. King, [2003] EWHC (TCC)
1867, [67]–[68] (Seymour J.) (Eng.) (finding that the evidence as to the
agreement was far too vague to base a clear obligation on).
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5. Conclusion on the Law of Treaties
It appears that NewCenturySchlbkof the question. Either
states come before and are the masters of the law, or states
come after and are the slaves. Either subjective intent governs
in the final analysis or objective agreed terms do. Either those
objective terms are truly objective or simply the imposition of
value by a third-party adjudicator.
These questions bring up the issue of whether legal or nonlegal relations is the normal, default situation. We can begin
this inquiry with a hypothetical: could, two states agree to
exclude the entirety of their bilateral relations from
international law? Partly, yes. They could merge into a new
state, thus transforming their international inter se relations
217
into domestic constitutional legal relations. They could not,
however, excuse themselves from any erga omnes obligations or
human rights obligations. Setting aside those exceptional
situations, it does not appear objectionable that two states
might agree to have non-legal relations between themselves on
a wide range of topics.
Our usual means of interpreting international law point in
differing directions for resolving this problem. The state
practice and opinio juris seems vague and confusing. It is clear
where disputes are not legally enforced or submitted to binding
third-party arbitration, suggesting, though not conclusively
that they are legal, but lacking effective enforcement. The
drafting history of the Vienna Convention is unclear, but
appears to show that the ILC and delegates to the Vienna
Conference understood that intent is not an aspect of the
“governed by international law” element, rendering all
agreements, where they are agreements, governed by either
international or domestic law. Private law analogies, on the
217. See, e.g., Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 518–19 (1832) (describing
the fusion of the Cherokee Nation with the United States—although
admittedly it is unclear whether the Native American tribes were states in the
sense of international law in the first place); Land and Maritime Boundary
(Cameroon v. Nigeria; Eq. Guinea intervening), Judgment, 2002 I.C.J. 303, ¶¶
200–09 (Oct. 10) (discussing “treaty” relations between Great Britain and the
“Kings and Chiefs of Old Calabar” to determine legal rights to fusion of state
territories). See also Reservation Entered by the German Democratic Republic
(GDR) to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, 500
U.N.T.S. 95 (entered into force Apr. 24, 1964) (on Feb. 2, 1973 to articles 11(1),
48, and 50 to which the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) objected on Sept.
5, 1974, although permitting the convention to enter into force between the
two states notwithstanding the objection. 856 U.N.T.S. 321. The current
status of these communications remains unclear following the absorption of
the GDR by the FRG.
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other hand, suggest that even in a legal system where the
actors are individuals beholden to a hierarchical, coercive legal
authority with mandatory enforcement powers, the actors are
still free to conclude non-legally binding agreements; however,
the agreements will be carefully examined and the legally
binding portions will be severed from the non-legally binding
ones. In this process, there may be a presumption that
communications be legally binding, rather than not, but this
question will be addressed in more detail below. Surely states
would have the same freedom to treaty or not in the
international legal system.
The ILC (Koskenniemi more precisely) wisely concluded
218
that lex specialis is always in the eye of the beholder. If we
adopt the perspective that the international system, in as much
as it is a system, is one based on law, then we must conclude
that the lex specialis in the hypothetical above is the non-legal
relations on particular topics; the lex generalis is that relations
are governed by international law. If, on the other hand, we
adopt the perspective that law is the creation of states acting in
their sovereign capacity, then we might conclude that the lex
generalis is the Hobbesian world of power and the lex specialis
is relations governed by international law. This understanding
of which condition is the lex specialis and which the lex
generalis then plays a role in our understanding of whether
there is a presumption in favor of non-legal or legal relations.
How do we cut this Gordian knot? It is important to
recognize that in all of these hypotheticals, the states are able
to adopt such a non-binding agreement because the law permits
them to do so, not as an inherent aspect of their sovereignty, at
least insofar as the legal system is concerned. The reason for
this conclusion is the premise that international law is law
made between equal sovereigns, who, in acting in their
sovereignty, reflect and develop international law in a
symbiotic relationship. After all, states would not even be
sovereign equals without that conclusion already being a legal
postulate. We all know that neither the chicken nor the egg
came first. The two exist together, one necessitating the other
and the two evolving together in parallel. This analogy comes
closest to describing the relationship between state sovereignty
218. See Martti Koskenniemi, Fragmentation of International Law:
Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International
Law: Rep. of the Study Group of the International Law Commission, 11, ¶ 8,
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.682 (Apr. 13, 2006) (discussing the legal pluralism of
international law).
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and international law. Each reaffirms the other. This author
proposes to find a way forward by choosing to see international
law as permeating international relations because states
appear to have chosen that the law should do so. Where they
purport to excuse certain obligations from the law, they use
legal structures, legal devices, legal language and legal
argument to accomplish this end. If a claim for enforcement of
an instrument without mandatory third-party dispute
settlement mechanisms was lodged at the ICJ, the court would
be prohibited from entertaining it, not because the agreement
was not existing in the international legal system, but because
the agreement does exist in the international legal system, and
that system provides that the Court shall not have jurisdiction
to hear the case. It is only by operation of the law that the
sovereign right to exclude legal effect can be realized. At the
very least, the agreement in a non-binding document that the
document is non-binding, is itself binding, otherwise the
document might be binding.
Therefore, this author understands that there must be an
implied exception to the Vienna Convention permitting states
to exempt certain communications and understandings from
enforcement and legal accountability. This exception must be
narrowly construed—where legally binding aspects of the
communication can be severed from the non-legally binding
ones—and there is likely a presumption that communications
are legally binding. There appears to be a widespread
agreement among scholars of international law, including those
along the spectrum of positive and natural law, that there is a
presumption that agreements between and among states will
219
be governed by international law rather than politics. Given
219. See, e.g., Lauterpacht, supra note 81, at 125, ¶ 11.
While in the sphere of private law the informality and variety of
private arrangements may permit an inquiry into the question
whether the nature of the promise is such as to create legal rights and
obligations, it is believed that with regard to formal international
compacts such intention must be implied from the fact of the
formality of the instrument unless there is cogent and conclusive
evidence to the contrary. Undoubtedly, the legal rights and
obligations do not extend further than is warranted by the terms of
the treaty. The fact that the instrument is a treaty does not imply an
intention of the parties to endow it with the fullest possible measure
of effectiveness. They may intend its effectiveness to be drastically
limited. But, subject to that consideration which must be evidenced
by the terms of the treaty and any other available evidence, the
guiding assumption is that the instrument creates legal rights and
obligations. Any measure of discretion and freedom of appreciation,
however wide, which it leaves to the parties must be exercised in
accordance with the legal principle of good faith. Although the parties
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the track record of the ICJ in holding that most of the
instruments that were challenged before as not being treaties
were found to have been treaties, we might guess that the ICJ
agrees with this presumption. In addition, this presumption is
borne out in state practice. Drafters of treaties never appear to
trouble themselves to expressly state when an instrument is
may have intended a treaty to mean little, no assumption is
permissible that they intended it to mean nothing and that the
instrument concluded in the form of a treaty—with the concomitant
solemnity, formality, publicity and constitutional and other
safeguards—is not a treaty.
See also Kelvin Widdows, What Is An Agreement in International Law?, BRIT.
Y.B. INT’L L. 117, 142 (1979) (finding intention of the parties critical to
understanding a treaty’s binding nature); 22 Code. Fed. Reg. §181.2(a) (US)
(a) General.
The following criteria are to be applied in deciding whether any
undertaking, oral agreement, document, or set of documents,
including an exchange of notes or of correspondence, constitutes an
international agreement . . . .
(1) Identity and intention of the parties. A party to an international
agreement must be a state, a state agency, or an intergovernmental
organization. The parties must intend their undertaking to be legally
binding, and not merely of political or personal effect. Documents
intended to have political or moral weight, but not intended to be
legally binding, are not international agreements. An example of the
latter is the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference on Cooperation and
Security in Europe. In addition, the parties must intend their
undertaking to be governed by international law, although this intent
need not be manifested by a third party dispute settlement
mechanism or any express reference to international law. In the
absence of any provision in the arrangement with respect to
governing law, it will be presumed to be governed by international
law. This presumption may be overcome by clear evidence, in the
negotiating history of the agreement or otherwise, that the parties
intended the arrangement to be governed by another legal system.
Arrangements governed solely by the law of the United States, or one
of the states or jurisdictions thereof, or by the law of any foreign
state, are not international agreements for these purposes. For
example, a foreign military sales loan agreement governed in its
entirety by U.S. law is not an international agreement. (emphasis
added).
Cf. OSCAR SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 98
(1991) (“[T]he designation by the parties that their agreement is a treaty or
international agreement should be accepted as conclusive evidence that a legal
relationship is intended. . . . [However,] [s]tates are entirely free to decide that
they do not wish to be bound legally by a particular instrument or
declaration.”); Oscar Schachter, The Twilight Existence of Nonbinding
International Agreement, 71 AM. J. INT’L L. 296, 297 (1977) (arguing that the
presumption is the reverse—against legal obligations—at least where
indefinite principles are being declared); J.E.S. Fawcett, The Legal Character
of International Agreements, 30 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 381, 400 (1953)
(“[I]nternational agreements are to be presumed not to create legal relations
unless the parties expressly or impliedly so declare”).

2012]

DIPLOMATIC ASSURANCES

323

220

legally binding. They only take pains to state the legal value
of the document where it is purportedly non-legally binding.
This practice suggests that states feel a need to rebut
something when reaching agreements that might be
misunderstood as binding and it appears that silence is meant
to be understood as establishing a legal obligation. This
exception is also not dependent on the existence of enforcement
or third-party legal qualification of the acts, but could be
informed by them. International law is only partly formalized,
so law professors and other commentators are invited to offer
their legal classifications of acts, recognizing that they could be
wrong, but that submitted classifications might contribute to
the meaningful, inter se legal assessment. That inter se
assessment might include binding, third-party assessment, but
simply by its being assessed by a third-party does not mean it
221
is not inter se.
Based on the foregoing, this author proposes the following
analytical framework. An agreement between states could be
non-binding, partly binding or fully binding in international
law. In all three cases, it will not be such because it is removed
from law but because of law. Terms within agreements will be
legally binding where the parties clearly reached agreement
(including agreement that the remainder of the instrument is
non-binding), and will be non-binding where they did not. Since
there is not necessarily a judge in international dispute
settlement, the aggrieved party may interpret the law and
sustain a claim itself. This classification of whether the terms
of the understanding are binding will be done on a case-by-case
analysis of the particular terms.
A first possibility is that there might be an express
statement of intent in the agreed text as to the legal effects of
the instrument. For example, the U.S.-Israel Free Trade Area
Agreement clearly states that its provisions are “not . . . legally222
binding”. Aust also refers to an instrument that is explicitly
220. See, e.g., Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 35;
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, supra note 217; U.N. Charter; U.
N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397; Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90.
All of these agreements are undoubtedly treaties, though none of them
explicitly states they are meant to be binding.
221. Crawford, supra note 184, at 33, art. 1, cmt (4) (finding that
responsibility is an essentially inter se relationship, aside from obligations
erga omnes).
222. See Free Trade Area Agreement, Declaration on Trade in Services,
U.S.-Isr., Apr. 22, 1985, 24 I.L.M. 653, 679 (providing in its preamble that the
“principles set forth below shall not be legally-binding”).
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titled the “Non-Legally Binding Authoritative Statement of
Principles for a Global Consensus on the Management,
Conservation and Sustainable Development of all Types of
223
Forests”. The proposed MOU with Libya regarding military
cooperation provides that “[T]his MOU does not include any
provisions that entail commitments under International
224
Law”.
The question for this possibility would be how explicit
would the provision need to be to be considered an express
statement. The NATO-Russia Founding Act refers to “political
225
commitments” and the Stockholm Disarmament Declaration
states that it embodies commitments that are “politically
226
binding.” These examples do not explicitly exclude legally
binding commitments which could exist in parallel with the
political commitments. However, if we understand that all legal
commitments are also political commitments, then expressly
providing for the political ones implicitly excludes the legal
ones. That being said, Hersch Lauterpacht argued that express
designation of an agreement as “a declaration of policy” did not
227
suffice to remove it from being a legal agreement.
Apparently, the designation would need to be more specific
than that example to succeed.
There could, of course, also be implied intent to establish
whether commitments are legally binding or not. Subjective
intent for an instrument to be legally binding (or not) is
228
essentially impossible to prove. Instead, we must look for
objective implied intent. And by “objective”, we mean the
223. AUST, supra note 32, at 28 (citing U.N. Conference on Env't & Dev.,
Non-Legally Binding Authoritative Statement of Principles for a Global
Consensus on the Management, Conservation and Sustainable Development of
all Types of Forests, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.151/26 (Vol. III), Annex III (June 13,
1992)).
224. U.S. Dept. of State, Cable 08–Tripoli–308 (Apr. 10, 2008), ¶ 3, § 9(2),
available at http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/04/08TRIPOLI308.html.
225. See Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security,
N.A.T.O.–Russ., May 27, 1997, 36 I.L. M. 1006.
226. See Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and
Disarmament in Europe, Final Stockholm Document, art. 101, Sept. 19, 1986,
26 I.L.M. 190, 195.
227. Lauterpacht, supra note 81, at 125, ¶ 8 (citing Declaration by the
French Republic constituting an agreement on commercial policy and related
matters, May 28, 1946, 1951 U.N.T.S. 84, 152) (“Neither is the legal nature of
the instrument affected by its designation as a declaration of policy, especially
if it is described as an agreement and if in other respects it imposes
ascertainable obligations upon the parties.”).
228. See Widdows, supra note 219, at 121 (declaring such a search to lead
to a tautology).
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objective understanding of the parties to imply legal value, not
our objective understanding. Therefore, we cannot rely on the
individual parties’ subjective intent, but rather evidence of
their objective intent: the words that they agreed to and the
circumstances of the time, and the inferences we can draw from
229
them. Insofar as international law is partly formalized, we,
as scholars and commentators on the law, can at least submit
our opinions on what objective intent is expressed, and to the
degree that a dispute involving a third-party dispute resolution
mechanism might be engaged, that arbiter might do the same.
A variety of cues have been identified that supposedly
track state practice in designating which agreements are
treaties and which are not. The title of an agreement (“treaty”
or “Memorandum of Understanding”) is suggestive, but not
230
determinative.
An agreement could speak in aspirational
231
terms, use the word “will” or “shall”, or employ “entry into
229. See Schachter, supra note 219.
230. See Peace, in OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW (Vol. 1), pt. 2, § 586,
at 1209 (Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts eds., 9th ed. 1992) (“[S]tates cannot
avoid an instrument being a treaty merely by giving it a title suggesting
otherwise”). In Treaties in Force, the U.S. State Department has recorded 768
documents which were entitled “Memorandum of Understanding” as treaties.
See generally U.S. DEP’T STATE, TREATIES IN FORCE (2010) available at
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/143863.pdf.
231. See Second Report on the Law of Treaties, II Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 124–
25, ¶¶ 5–7, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/87
In a sense these provisions, which leave for future agreement the
determination of the extent of the substantive obligations of the
parties, are no more than pacta de contrahendo. They are further
weakened by qualifications such as that the amount of assistance
shall be such as the Government in question shall authorize.
Nevertheless, it would not be accurate to maintain that an
instrument of that character is no more than a pious statement of
intention as distinguished from an assumption of binding legal
obligations.
(citing, inter alia, Preliminary Agreement, U.S.-Czechoslov., July 11, 1942, 90
U.N.T.S. 258 (relating to the principles applying to mutual aid in the
prosecution of the war against aggression); Agreement, U.S.-Den., Apr. 27,
1951, 94 U.N.T.S. 45 (regarding the defense of Greenland); Agreement, Den.Pol., Dec. 7, 1949, 81 U.N.T.S. 22 (concerning the exchange of commodities);
Exchange of notes constituting an agreement regarding the placement of
Netherlands agricultural workers in Luxembourg, Lux.-Neth., Aug. 17 & 25,
1950, 81 U.N.T.S. 14; Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement, U.S.-Fr., Jan.
27, 1950, 80 U.N.T.S. 172; Customs Regime between Germany and Austria
(Protocol of Mar. 19, 1931), 1931 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 41 (Sept. 5). Cf. Legal
Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia
(SW Afr.), Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory
Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. 16, ¶ 114 (June 21)
It has also been contended that the relevant Security Council
resolutions are couched in exhortatory rather than mandatory
language and that, therefore, they do not purport to impose any legal
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232

force” language.
However, again, the ICJ has ruled that
233
terminology cannot alone be sufficient,
and states have
234
concurred. Lastly, the instrument could follow an “if-then”
structure, further suggesting that a quid pro quo is envisioned.
Whether an instrument is recorded or registered has been
235
suggested as evidence that it is not a treaty, however, this
author has argued above that failure to register – even a
prohibition on registration – does not exclude binding effect.
Turning to the content, where pre-existing obligations are
additionally inserted and where states are under no obligation
to restate them, they may be meaningful—i.e. creating new
binding obligations between the parties regarding that
obligation. If the obligation is already owed erga omnes,
perhaps this implicit creation of a new obligation is less clear.
Even if the terms of an agreement generally were
considered non-legally binding, we might find specific
provisions within it that are severable and binding on their
own, despite the fact that other aspects of the communication
did not result in binding commitments. The most glaring
example cited above is the binding nature of provisions in
agreements ordering that the agreement itself is generally not
binding. We should keep in mind that agreements are
presumed to be generally binding and that non-binding aspects
are generally the exception. This conclusion suggests that not
duty on any State nor to affect legally any right of any State. The
language of a resolution of the Security Council should be carefully
analysed before a conclusion can be made as to its binding effect. In
view of the nature of the powers under Article 25, the question
whether they have been in fact exercised is to be determined in each
case, having regard to the terms of the resolution to be interpreted,
the discussions leading to it, the Charter provisions invoked and, in
general, all circumstances that might assist in determining the legal
consequences of the resolution of the Security Council.
For an example of aspirational terms, see Organization of American States:
Inter-American Convention Against Corruption, art. III, Mar. 29, 1996,
reprinted in35 INT’L LEGAL MATERIALS 724 (“to consider the applicability of
measures within their own institutional systems . . . .”).
232. Other terminology could include the verbs used (e.g. “will”, “shall”,
etc.) and provisions (such as “entry into force”, “breach”, “termination”, etc.).
AUST, supra note 32 at 27; Juris A. Lejnieks, The Nomenclature of Treaties: A
Quantitative Analysis, 2 TEX. INT’L L.J. 175, 179 (1966). But see 22 C. F. R. §
181.2(a)(5); AUST, supra note 32, at 27–32.
233. See Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions (Qatar v. Bahr.),
1994 I.C.J. Reps. 112, 122 (July 1).
234. See AUST, supra note 32, at 32.
235. See U.N. Charter art. 102, para. 1 (“Every treaty and every
international agreement entered into by any Member . . . shall as soon as
possible be registered with the Secretariat and published by it.”).
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only must agreements be analyzed assurance-by-assurance, but
also obligation-by-obligation. There could be obligations of
confidentiality, monitoring among other possibilities that could
be legally binding even though the principle obligation(s) were
not. Furthermore, the state expelling the person who then
suffered mistreatment might attempt to claim reliance
damages.
Lastly, there is probably at least an obligation of good faith
in complying with the non-binding obligations or at least good
236
faith in continuing negotiations. This is a legal obligation. In
principle a state party should be able to maintain an
international dispute over whether the other party pursued its
obligations in good faith, though the obligation was not itself
binding, although its inability to resolve the dispute through
third-party adjudication might be limited. The difficulty in
terms of remedies would be showing the situation the state (or
its national) would have been in had the state acted in good
faith. And in any event, that remedy would most likely be
requested through diplomatic channels rather than third-party
dispute resolution.
Lastly, where we find that the individual terms of the
agreement are not governed by international law, we will want
to also examine whether the terms are binding under domestic
law. Where the parties are clear that the assurances do not
create any legal obligations at all, then it is hard to deny them
that force. We should conclude that there is no legal obligation.
6. Application to Diplomatic Assurances
It has been submitted that in the practical application of
assurances, the receiving state would simply not engage in the
prohibited act because of the political repercussions. In the case
of Canada and Egypt, the court in Mahjoub, discussed above,
237
held that Egypt had “too much to lose”. Since the process by
which Egypt would lose—i.e. being either legal or extra-legal—
was unclear, the legal nature of the assurances is thrown into
doubt. In Othman, SIAC understood that Jordan would not
jeopardize its bilateral relationship with the UK in such a

236. See Voting Procedure on Questions Relating to Reports and Petitions
Concerning Territory of South-West Africa, Advisory Opinion, 1955 I.C.J. 67,
88, 99, 105, 119–20 (June 7) (separate opinion of Judge Klaestad) (separate
opinion of Judge Lauterpacht).
237. See Mahjoub v. Canada (Minister of Citizen and Immigration), [2006]
4 F.C.R. 247, ¶ 61 (Can.).
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However, it is important to observe that whatever
way.
Jordan or Egypt lost, they would lose it through one of the
agreed modes of peaceful settlement of international disputes,
specifically, negotiations. Notwithstanding the multiple
submission that the assurances were not legal, a negotiated
settlement of a dispute and repercussions of non-compliance
are not necessarily non-legal.
Looking at the language of the UK MOUs, specifically
those with Libya, Jordan, Lebanon, and Ethiopia we do not see
any language that would suggest that the obligations assumed
are anything but legally binding ones, but that is not to say
that effective, legal enforcement mechanisms are contemplated.
The titles of the instruments are all “Memorandum of
Understanding” but the MOUs with Libya and Lebanon are
“Concerning the Provision of Assurances in Respect of Persons
239
Subject to Deportation” whereas the MOU with Jordan is
“Regulating the Provision of Undertakings in Respect of
240
Specified Persons Prior to Deportation”. In the latter case, a
stronger legal value is suggested, and the fact that the United
Kingdom used a different title when it could have used the
same title also suggests a change in intent, but that is merely
indicative by the title. All three instruments then have a
241
section entitled “Application and Scope”.
The principle
provision in this section uses very mandatory wording and
states that “This arrangement will apply to any person
accepted by the receiving state for admission to its territory
following a written request by the sending state under the
242
terms of this arrangement.”
This section also contains a
direction on the procedure for request of assurances, and
requiring that the assurances be requested and issued in
238. See Othman v. Sec’y State Home Dep’t, Appeal No: SC/15/2005
(S.I.A.C.) ¶ 279 (U.K.)
The agreement could not be enforced legally by the Appellant or by
the UK Government but Mr Oakden said that he would be very
surprised if the Jordanian Government decided not to respect it.
Conversely, the parties were not approaching the MOU as if it were
to be the basis for legal argument about narrowly defined obligations,
which one or other could seek to get round. Commitment had been
firm on both principle and practice. It was that firmness of
commitment at all levels which had persuaded Mr Oakden that the
MOU would work as intended.
239. U.K.–Leb. MOU, supra note 6; Libya–U.K. MOU, supra note 6.
240. U.K.–Jordan MOU, supra note 6.
241. U.K.–Jordan MOU, supra note 6; U.K.–Leb. MOU, supra note 6;
Libya–U.K. MOU, supra note 6; U.K.–Eth. MOU, supra note 6.
242. U.K.–Jordan MOU, supra note 6.
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243

promptly in writing. In the case of the MOU with Jordan, the
instrument contemplates oral assurances, but still demands
that they be eventually issued in writing before the expulsion
244
can be affected.
Still in the Application and Scope section, the Libyan and
Lebanese MOUs provide for compliance with human rights.
The MOU with Jordan also provides for compliance with
human rights, but strangely does so in the following section
regarding “Understandings” rather than in the “Application
and Scope” section. It is not entirely clear why this placement
was used in this case and whether any change in meaning is
intended. It could be that the imperative nature of the
obligations as well as their nature as separate and independent
obligations apart from the pre-existing obligations under
international law is affected. For example, the language in the
Jordanian MOU simply says that “[i]t is understood that the
authorities of the United Kingdom and of Jordan will comply
with their human rights obligations under international law
245
regarding a person returned under this arrangement,”
whereas the Libyan and Lebanese MOUs state that the parties
“will comply with their human rights obligations under
246
international law.”
This latter language of “will comply”
suggests an additional obligation more clearly than the former
language of “understands that they will comply.” In any event,
in all three MOUs, that language is followed by mandatory
language about the application of certain assurances. The
Libyan and Lebanese MOUs use somewhat less compelling
language, though not necessarily non-binding language: “The
assurances set out in the following paragraphs . . . will apply to
247
such a person . . . .” while the Jordanian MOU characterizes
248
the assurances as “conditions.” This latter usage suggests a
greater sense of reliance on the assurances as a condition for
the expulsion.
It was noted above that the Ethiopian, Libyan and
243. U.K.–Jordan MOU, supra note 6; Libya–U.K. MOU, supra note 6;
U.K.–Eth. MOU, supra note 6.
244. U.K.–Jordan MOU, supra note 6.
245. Id.
246. U.K.–Eth. MOU, supra note 6; U.K.–Leb. MOU, supra note 6; Libya–
U.K. MOU, supra note 6.
247. U.K.–Leb. MOU, supra note 6; Libya–U.K. MOU , supra note 6.
248. U.K.–Jordan MOU, supra note 6 (“Where someone has been accepted
under the terms of this arrangements, the conditions set out in the following
paragraphs (numbered 1-9) will apply, together with any further specific
assurances provided by the receiving state.”).
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Lebanese MOUs provide for a monitoring body and that such a
provision appears to be an additional one, therefore an
agreement. The next question is whether this agreement is a
legally binding one. The reasoning for including the monitoring
body provision in the Libyan and Lebanese MOU “Application
and Scope” section and in the Jordanian and Ethiopian MOU
“Understandings” section, is unclear; however, the obligation is
249
provided for in mandatory language.
Then the agreements proceed to lay out several obligations
on the states such as “will be brought promptly before a
250
judge,” “will be informed promptly . . . of any charge against
251
252
Firstly, they are already existing obligations
him”
etc.
under international law, so arguing that they are not binding
here is a bit difficult. It is strange to imagine that a state would
agree to non-binding obligations to perform tasks that are
otherwise binding. Surely, where a state agrees to something,
and we have already concluded that there is an agreement to
do the task, it would agree to do it with the same legal
compulsion. We can consider the presumption in favor of
binding agreements to buttress this argument. Secondly, even
if we were tempted to see the agreements as non-binding,
though still otherwise binding under general international law,
we should follow that temptation since the obligations were
expressed in mandatory language once again.
Lastly, the terms on withdrawal sound almost identical to
those usually used in treaties, in this case, that either party
may withdraw by giving six months notice. However, what is
particularly interesting, and what reaffirms that these are
legally binding obligations, is that the MOUs provide for
surviving obligations: “Where one or other government
withdraws from the arrangement, the terms of this
arrangement will continue to apply to anyone who has been
253
returned in accordance with its provisions.” It is difficult to
249. E.g., typical language is in the Libya–U.K. MOU, supra note 6:
An independent body (“monitoring body”) will be nominated by both
sides to monitor the implementation of the assurances given under
this Memorandum, including any specific assurances, by the receiving
state. The responsibilities of the monitoring body will include
monitoring the return of, and any detention, trial or imprisonment of,
the person. The monitoring body will report to both sides.
See also U.K.–Jordan MOU, supra note 6, at Understanding 4; U.K.–Leb.
MOU, supra note 6; U.K.–Eth. MOU, supra note 6.
250. U.K.–Jordan MOU, supra note 6, at Understanding 2.
251. Id. at Understanding 3.
252. Id. at Understanding 4–8.
253. Id. at Withdrawal.
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interpret this document as anything but a legally binding
agreement.
In U.K. practice, the MOUs are supplemented by specific
assurances in each case. These instruments are also difficult to
locate, however in the case of RB before the House of Lords, the
specific assurances were publicized and the House made a point
to argue that the person subject to expulsion must be informed
254
of the assurances in his case. The assurance stated that the
person at issue “will enjoy the following rights, assurances and
guarantees as provided by the Constitution and the national
255
laws currently in force concerning human rights: . . .” This
provision does not expressly refer to international human
rights, but appears to transform domestic obligations into
international ones. The House did not appear to consider these
legal obligations, although it did not reach a decision on that
point, but instead simply observed that the assurances were
256
meant to be followed.
Turning to an example of Canadian-Egyptian practice, the
precise text of the assurances in the Mahjoub case is difficult to
locate, but the Canadian court did refer to them in its
judgment:
Egypt had given assurances to Canada that Mr. Mahjoub would not
be tortured upon his return, in the form of two diplomatic notes and a
letter from Major General Omar M. Soliman, GIS Chief. The delegate
254. See RB (Algeria) et al. v. Sec’y State Home Dep’t, [2010] UKHL 10,
[2009] 110 (H.L.) ¶ 102 (U.K.)
[W]e wish to make one point clear, which emerged more clearly
during the substantive appeals. It is our view that the SSHD cannot
rely on any substantive assurance unless it is put into the open. . . .
[T]he key documents or conversations relied on to show that an
Appellant’s return would not breach the UK’s international
obligations or put him at risk of a death sentence or death penalty
have to be in the open evidence. SIAC could not put weight on
assurances which the giver was not prepared to make public; they
would otherwise be deniable, or open to later misunderstanding; the
fact of a breach would not be known to the public and the pressure
which that might yield would be reduced. They must be available to
be tested and recorded.
255. See id. ¶ 25 (including “the right to appear before a court . . .”, “receive
free legal aid”; “presumed to be innocent . . .”; “right to notify a relative”; “right
to be examined by a doctor”; “right to appear before a court”; and right to
“human dignity”).
256. See id. ¶ 192
The arrangements with Algeria were negotiated at the highest level
and it was plain to the Algerian authorities that what the United
Kingdom required was an assurance which would enable it to
comply with its obligations under article 3. On the other hand, the
assurances had to be expressed in language which would respect
the dignity of a sovereign state.
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reviewed the trustworthiness of the assurances “as to their nature,
their content as well as precedents and incentives with regards to the
Egyptian government”. She gave little weight to the letter in view of
its unofficial nature. However, she did accord considerable weight to
the diplomatic notes as they constituted “part of the official record of
bilateral relations between Canada and Egypt”. She decided that
Egypt would not torture Mr. Mahjoub after officially denying it would,
concluding it had too much to lose in the event it reneged on its
257
guarantee.

The court is not entirely clear what legal value it believes
the assurances have. On the one hand, they are “part of the
official record of bilateral relations” and despite the letter being
“unofficial,” the assurances were not, suggesting that they were
“official,” whatever that means. On the other hand, they are
enforceable only to the degree that Egypt had “too much to
lose.” We are left wondering what Egypt would lose if it failed
to comply and whether it would lose whatever it might lose
through legal or extra-legal process.
Another text of assurances between Egypt and Sweden was
revealed in Alzery v. Sweden before the Human Rights
Committee:
On 12 December 2001, a senior official of the Swedish Ministry for
Foreign Affairs met with a representative of the Egyptian
government. . . . The state secretary of the Swedish Ministry for
Foreign Affairs presented an Aide-Mémoire to the official which read:
“It is the understanding of the Government of the Kingdom of
Sweden that [the author and another individual] will be awarded
a fair trial in the Arab Republic of Egypt. It is further the
understanding of the Government of the Kingdom of Sweden that
these persons will not be subjected to inhuman treatment or
punishment of any kind by any authority of the Arab Republic of
Egypt and further that they will not be sentenced to death or if
such a sentence has been imposed that it will not be executed by
any competent authority of the Arab Republic of Egypt. Finally, it
is the understanding of the Government of the Kingdom of
Sweden that the wife and children of [another individual] will not
in any way be persecuted or harassed by any authority of the
Arab Republic of Egypt.”
. . . The Egyptian Government responded in writing: “We herewith
assert our full understanding to all items of this memoire, concerning
the way of treatment upon repatriate from your government, with full
respect to their personal and human rights. This will be done
according to what the Egyptian constitution and law stipulates.” In
oral discussions with representatives from the Egyptian government,
the Swedish Government also requested that the Embassy would be
allowed to attend the trial. The author states that it remains unclear
257. See Mahjoub v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),
[2006] 4 F.C.R. 247, ¶ 61 (Can.).
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what other kind of follow-up mechanisms were discussed and decided
upon prior to the expulsion. While the Swedish Government had since
indicated that there had been discussions about the right to visit the
258
author in prison, this remained unconfirmed. . . .

The Human Rights Committee found the assurances not to
have been sufficient because
the assurances procured contained no mechanism for monitoring of
their enforcement. Nor were any arrangements made outside the text
of the assurances themselves which would have provided for effective
implementation. The visits by the State party’s ambassador and staff
commenced five weeks after the return, neglecting altogether a period
259
of maximum exposure to risk of harm. . . .

It is unclear whether the Committee believed that the
monitoring and enforcement mechanism would need to simply
exist or would need to constitute a legally binding obligation. In
any event, the committee clearly believed that an additional
commitment, not a mere restatement of existing obligations,
would need to be made to render the assurances effective. This
260
agreement appears to be a mere “piece of paper.”
One court has found that diplomatic assurances along
these very lines are treaties, the European Court. In Babar
Ahmad v. United Kingdom, the Court held:
It is true that these assurances have been given by the United States
Government to the United Kingdom Government and not to the
applicants. On this basis, Amnesty International has observed in its
report that there is no mechanism by which the applicants could
enforce the assurances which have been given. However, in the
Court’s view that would only be relevant if it were established that
there was a real risk of a breach of those assurances. It is the
President of the United States who would be responsible for any
designation as enemy combatants and it has not been alleged that
those responsible for the prosecution of the applicants would wish to
258. See Alzery v. Sweden, Comm. No. 1416/2005, ¶¶ 3.6–3.7, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/88/D/1416/2005 (Human Rights Comm. Nov. 10, 2006).
259. See id. ¶ 11.5. See also Maksudov, et al. v. Kyrgystan, Comm. Nos.
1461, 62, 76, 77 2006, ¶12.5, UN Doc. CCPR/C/93/D/1461, 1462, 1476 &
1477/2006 (Human Rights Comm. July 30, 2008) (citing Alzery)
. . . The procurement of assurances from the Uzbek General
Prosecutor's Office, which, moreover, contained no concrete
mechanism for their enforcement, was insufficient to protect
against such risk. The Committee reiterates that at the very
minimum, the assurances procured should contain such a
monitoring mechanism and be safeguarded by arrangements made
outside the text of the assurances themselves which would provide
for their effective implementation.
260. Note that the oral communication about permitting attendance at the
trial could never constitute a treaty since it is not written, but it could be
classic example of binding oral promises if the expulsion relied on them. See
infra Sec. III.
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breach (or indeed be capable of breaching) the assurances by another
means. Consequently, the only question is whether the President
would breach the assurances which the United States Government
have given. Whatever the breadth of the executive discretion enjoyed
by the President in the prosecution of the United States
Government’s counter-terrorism efforts, the Court is unable to accept
that he, or any of his successors, would commit such a serious breach
of his Government’s assurances to a extradition partner such as the
United Kingdom; the United States’ long-term interest in honouring
its extradition commitments alone would provide sufficient dissuasion
261
from doing so.

While the real thrust of the passage is the enforceability of
the assurances and the risk of prosecution in anything other
than civilian courts, the Court appears to implicitly understand
assurances to be legally binding, or at least potentially legally
binding, though without enforcement mechanisms. Firstly, the
Court repeatedly refers to “breach” of the assurances, a word
that is more usually linked to a failure to comply with legally
binding commitments. Secondly, and perhaps more
significantly, the Court argues that the lack of an individual
right to enforce the assurances is not relevant until and unless
there is a “breach.” The fact that the Court highlights the lack
of a breach as the only reason why an individual enforcement
right is irrelevant suggests that if there was a breach, then the
mechanism for enforcement of the assurances would be entirely
relevant. But that issue presupposes that there is something to
be enforced by the Court—a legal obligation. Since the Court
jumps over this question, it suggests that the Court does not
see it as an issue whether the assurances are legally binding—
they clearly are.
The European Court stated that its assessment of
diplomatic assurances included an assumption of good faith
and suggested that the good faith assumption was based on the
262
United States’ good human rights record.
Good faith in
fulfilling obligations is the same standard applied to
international legal obligations. It is difficult to understand how
the same standard would govern both political and legal
commitments when legal commitments are supposed to have a
261. See Ahmad v. United Kingdom, App. Nos. 24027/07, 11949/08 and
36742/08, 51 Eur. H.R. Rep. SE6 , ¶ 108 (2010). But see Saadi v. Italy, App.
No. 37201/06, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2008) (where the European found the assurances
not legally binding). The inconsistent approach of the European might be
indicative of the need for a case-by-case examination.
262. See Ahmad v. United Kingdom, App. No. 24027/07, 11949/08 and
36742/08, 51 Eur. Ct. H.R. SE6, ¶ 105 (2010) (“it is appropriate that [a
presumption of good faith] be applied to a requesting State which has a long
history of respect for democracy, human rights and the rule of law . . . .”).
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greater binding force. If the Court is correct that the
assurances are to be judged by the good faith standard, then
the Court may have been legalizing political commitments.
This conclusion also suggests that it is possible to sever legal
obligations from a mostly non-legally binding assurance.
The prior European Court case is suggestive, but in a final
case to examine, the Court is more explicit. In the case of
Einhorn v. France, the U.S. State of Pennsylvania had
requested the extradition of Ira Einhorn from France, and the
French Government had received diplomatic assurances from
the U.S. Embassy that Einhorn would be treated correctly upon
return to the United States—, e.g. that he would receive a fair
trial and that he would not face the death penalty. The Court
held that the assurances amounted to treaties.
13. In a diplomatic note of 2 July 1998 to the French Government,
the United States embassy stated: . . .
[T]he U.S. Government provides its assurances that if the
Government of France extradites Ira Einhorn to the United
States to stand trial for murder in the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania, the death penalty will not be sought, imposed or
executed against Ira Einhorn for this offense. The sworn affidavit
of District Attorney Lynne Abraham, dated June 10, 1998, and an
earlier assurance by Abraham sworn June 23, 1997, affirms that
under Pennsylvania law it is legally impossible for a prosecutor
to seek or a court on its own motion to impose [the] death penalty
for murders committed in Pennsylvania prior to September 13,
1978. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision, Commonwealth
v. Truesdale, dated September 15, 1983, unequivocally prohibits
the imposition of the death penalty for murders committed prior
to the enactment of the Pennsylvania Death Penalty Statute on
September 13, 1978. This decision binds all Pennsylvania courts,
district attorneys and prosecutors regarding the imposition of the
death penalty. . . .”
Those assurances were reiterated in a diplomatic note of 24
September 1999, in which it was also stated that the Supreme Court
had held that laws enacted after a criminal judgment had been
delivered, particularly where they might benefit the accused, were not
inconsistent with the prohibition on ex post facto laws (see Collins v.
Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37-1990), a fact which served to confirm the
constitutionality of the 1998 Pennsylvania statute guaranteeing the
applicant a new trial on his return to the United States.
....
30. . . . The [French] Government added that even supposing a
Pennsylvania court were to hold that the statute was
unconstitutional, such a ruling could not call into question the
validity and scope of the undertaking which the United States
Federal Government had given France. The diplomatic assurances
given to the French authorities came under the “executive
agreements” defined in the Federal Constitution’s provisions
concerning the executive. By Article VI, section 2, of the Federal
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Constitution, such agreements were binding on the federal
Government and the federal States, and in particular on the federal
States’ courts, notwithstanding any indication to the contrary in the
Federal Constitution or the legislation of any federal State. The
precedents of the United States Supreme Court were consistent on
that point (the Government cited United States v. Belmont, 301 US
324 (1937), United States v. Pink, 315 US 203 (1941), and United
States v. Rauscher, 119 US 407 (1886), from the latter of which it
appeared, in particular, that anyone extradited to the United States
was entitled to ask the federal or State courts to enforce those
fundamental rules). . . .
If, by some extraordinary chance, Mr Einhorn was unable to be
retried in Pennsylvania, the Government considered “that he should,
in principle, be released by the American authorities”. The “speciality
rule” of international customary law – whereby the requesting State’s
authorities were required to comply with the terms of an extradition
order and were prohibited from taking any coercive measures against
the extradited person other than those permitted by the order –
precluded the applicant’s being kept in prison in order to serve the
263
sentence that had been imposed on him in absentia in 1993.

The language of the assurance is the very kind that has
featured in other assurances examined above, a re-statement of
the existing law without provision for legal enforcement
mechanisms, aside from diplomacy, accompanied by the
mandatory language of “will not be sought” but failing to state
264
the legal value of the assurance itself. One difference here is
that the restatement of law is only a restatement of municipal
law, not international law, but for purposes of this analysis the
distinction is not important because we are focusing on the
value of assurance itself. The European Court concluded that
the diplomatic assurances given by the United States
amounted to an “executive agreement,” which is a municipal
law classification for what is, under international law, a treaty.
Because it was a treaty, the European Court held that the
assurances were, quite simply, legally binding on the United
265
States.
This conclusion appears to be correct since the
263. See Einhorn v. France, 2001-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 275, ¶¶ 13, 30 (2001).
264. Note that the assurance states that “[t]his decision binds all
Pennsylvania courts, district attorneys and prosecutors regarding the
imposition of the death penalty” but that that statement is not referring to the
binding force of the assurances, rather the binding force of the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court precedent. Id. ¶ 13.
265. See Einhorn v. France, 2001-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 275, ¶ 30 (2001); See
also Klein v. Russia, Judgment, Appl. No. 24268/08,Eur. Ct. H.R. (2010)
(Kovler & Hajiyev, JJ., dissenting) (“The Court does not have valid reasons to
foresee with any degree of certainty that Colombia would fail to comply with
its obligations arising from international law (see, mutatis mutandis, Einhorn
v. France (dec.), no. 71555/01, § 33, ECHR 2001-XI)”). It is unclear whether the
dissenting judges believed that the obligations were binding on Russia under
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language of the assurance was clear and unequivocal that
something was being agreed to and that it was not exempting
the pledge from international law.
A final case study will be diplomatic assurances issued by
Germany to South Africa in an extradition request. The specific
case was later litigated in Harksen v. President of South Africa
where Germany and South Africa did not have an extradition
treaty in place so the proposed transfer would be solely
pursuant to this exchange. In this case the communications
read in part:
. . .Germany . . . ask[s] for the extradition of the German citizen
Jürgen Harksen . . . the Embassy would be most grateful if all items
found at the time of Mr Harksen’s arrest could be handed over to the
German prosecuting authorities as they could be judicial evidence . . .
After extradition, the Embassy would appreciate information on the
time Mr Harksen spent under arrest in South Africa for the required
extradition.
The Embassy would like to point out that the Federal Republic of
Germany is prepared to extradite persons with similar criminal
offences to South Africa if these persons do not have German
citizenship and if German extradition laws are satisfied.
The Embassy would like to assure that Mr Harksen will only be liable
for punishment for offences for which extradition is sought and that
no other proceedings may be introduced.
The Embassy further assures the Department that Mr Harksen will
not be extradited, transferred or deported to another country without
the permission of the South African Government and that he may
leave the Federal Republic of Germany after conclusion of the legal
proceedings for which the extradition has been granted.
The Embassy wishes to advise that in the case of sentencing by a
German court Mr Harksen will not be punished for political, military
or religious reasons and that the time of arrest in South Africa for
extradition will be taken into account for a possible penalty.
....
The Embassy should be most grateful for any co-operation in this
matter and looks forward to hearing from the competent authorities
266
in due course.

The Constitutional Court concluded that the agreement
was not a treaty because the promises were not seen to have
been intended to be binding, largely because of the way nontreaty-based extradition operates under South African domestic
law, being a mere reply by the office of the President that the
request is being forwarded to the appropriate agency for
international law due to the assurances themselves or other sources (e.g.
ICCPR, etc.) or both.
266. See Harksen v. President of the Republic of South Africa & Others
1999 (A), aff’d 2000 (2) SA 1189 (CC), ¶ 19 (citing Diplomatic Note 96/94 (8
Mar. 1994)), reprinted in 132 I.L.R. 529, 537 (S. Afr. (A) 1999).
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267

processing.
It is submitted that this conclusion was plainly wrong. This
assurance is clearly issued between states and is made
pursuant to extradition, an inter-state matter on the
international plane, though it does involve some aspects of
domestic law. In particular, Germany asks for South Africa to
perform an act of transfer, although aspects of the transfer of
evidence and information do not appear to be a mandatory part
268
of the request. Germany stated that at least some of the
usual rules of extradition would apply to this ad hoc case of
269
extradition: the rule of speciality,
the rule prohibiting
270
prosecution for political offenses, and the rule that Germany
would not extradite him to another state subsequently.
Germany then states that it would be “prepared” to reciprocally
extradite persons, even though it does not have an extradition
agreement with South Africa. We know that extradition
treaties are treaties as such and this informal arrangement in
lieu of an extradition treaty appears to embody most of the
same requirements and conditions as an extradition treaty.
Although several of the terms are worded in less mandatory
terms, others are quite specific such as the application of the
rule of speciality. Although it is not mentioned whether this
agreement is legally binding or not, especially given the fact
that extradition is normally conducted pursuant to a treaty, it
would seem entirely reasonable for South Africa to consider
Germany responsible if, for example, the accused was
prosecuted for a political crime following extradition. Although
the agreement may have required action on the domestic
plane— i.e. the domestic processing of an extradition request—
the question is whether the agreement to trigger that domestic
process was made on the international plane—i.e. the request
is made by a foreign state, and can only be made by a foreign
state, to another state for that state to render a person
internationally with all the protections of international law. It
267. Harksen v. President of the Republic of South Africa & Others, 1999
(A), aff’d 2000 (2) S.A. 825 (CC)829 (S. Afr.), reprinted in 132 I.L.R. 529, 558
(S. Afr. (A) 1999).
268. See Harksen v. President of the Republic of South Africa & Others
1999 (A), aff’d 2000 (2) SA 1189 (CC), ¶ 19 (S. Afr.) (citing Diplomatic Note
96/94 (8 Mar. 1994)), reprinted in 132 I.L.R. 529, 537 (S. Afr. (A) 1999) (“the
Embassy would be most grateful” . . . “the Embassy would appreciate”)
269. See id. (“only be liable for punishment for offences for which
extradition is sought”).
270. See id. (“will not be punished for political, military or religious
reasons”).
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matters not which government agency is fulfilling the
obligation.
The analysis of the foregoing instances of assurances has
shown that the case-by-case analysis is correct. Some of the
obligations assumed in assurances are legally binding and
some are not, depending on the objective intent expressed. Note
in addition that if the obligations regarding treatment of the
expelled persons are not legal, then they are just “pieces of
paper” documenting the bilateral relationship and difficult to
base an expulsion on. If a state feels a need to request
assurances, surely there is some concern about a risk of
271
mistreatment. If there is a risk that the person will be illtreated upon expulsion, then the court reviewing the expulsion,
in assessing the fact of the likelihood of abuse, will have to
consider that the receiving state was unwilling or unable to
agree to legally binding commitments to treat the person
humanely. This is already two strikes against expulsion. Where
the evidence of a likelihood of mistreatment is exceptionally
weak beyond those consideration, those non-legal assurances
might suffice. Where there is any additional evidence pointing
to a likelihood of mistreatment, however, it seems difficult to
understand how the assessor of fact could conclude that mere
“pieces of paper” and general unwillingness to agree to
anything legal and binding, would suffice to establish the fact
that the risk is too low to qualify for non-refoulement.
III. DIPLOMATIC ASSURANCES AS BINDING
UNILATERAL STATEMENTS
Diplomatic assurances might also be legal obligations if
they are binding unilateral statements. This analysis focuses
on the legal force of the assurances after the person has been
expelled by a state in reliance on them. Unilateral statements
have consistently been held by the ICJ and PCIJ to create legal
271. See Independent Expert on the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms while Countering Terrorism, Report of the
Independent Expert on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms while Countering Terrorism, transmitted by Note of the High
Commissioner for Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2005/103, ¶ 56 (Feb. 7,
2005) (by Robert K. Goldman) (“the mere fact that such assurances are sought
is arguably a tacit admission by the sending State that the transferred person
is indeed at risk of being tortured or ill-treated”); Commissioner for Human
Rights, Report by Mr Alvaro Gil-Robles, Commissioner for Human Rights, on
His Visit to Sweden, 21–23 April 2004, C.O.E. Doc. Comm. DH (2004) 13 (July
8, 2004) (“[t]he weakness inherent in the practice of diplomatic assurances lies
in the fact that where there is a need for such assurances, there is clearly an
acknowledged risk of torture or ill-treatment.”).
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obligations. These have included pledges to submit cases to the
272
court’s jurisdiction
but also pledges on matters of
273
substance.
The most articulate statement of the doctrine
comes from the Nuclear Tests case, in which the ICJ stated:
It is well recognized that declarations made by way of unilateral acts,
concerning legal or factual situations, may have the effect of creating
legal obligations. Declarations of this kind may be, and often are, very
specific. . . . An undertaking of this kind, if given publicly, and with
an intent to be bound, even though not made within the context of
international negotiations, is binding. In these circumstances,
nothing in the nature of a quid pro quo nor any subsequent
acceptance of the declaration, nor even any reply or reaction from
274
other States, is required for the declaration to take effect. . . .

This text contemplates an intention to be bound. The Court
continued to state, however, that “the intention is to be
ascertained by interpretation of the act. When States make
statements by which their freedom of action is to be limited, a
275
restrictive interpretation is called for . . . .” Thus, discovery of
intent is limited to an examination of the text itself. Courts in
other cases have acknowledged that diplomatic communication
necessarily entails statements made in good faith—that is, with
276
an intention that they be followed. After that consideration,
272. See Free Zones (Fr. v. Switz.), 1932 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 46 (June 7);
Rights of Minorities in Upper Silesia (Minority Schools), 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A)
No. 15 (Apr. 26); German Interests in Upper Silesia, 1926 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No.
7 (May 25); Mavrommatis, 1925 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 5 (Mar. 26). That being
said, this author is mindful of the argument that submission of a dispute to
the Court’s jurisdiction is a very special kind of agreement that may not be
very helpful in supporting this argument.
273. However, it must be conceded that the ICJ was not particularly clear
about the role of reliance. In the Nuclear Tests cases, neither Australia nor
New Zealand truly relied on the promises to its detriment in the usual sense of
estoppel. The Court appeared to convert the type of reliance in estoppel to
reliance on the international plane which is far more abstract. See Nuclear
Tests Case (Austl. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. 253, 267–68, ¶¶ 43–46 (Dec. 20). In fact,
the Court later backed away from the reliance requirement in the Burkina
Faso and Mali Frontier Dispute case. See Case Concerning the Frontier
Dispute (Burk. Faso v. Mali), 1986 I.C.J. 554, 574, ¶ 40 (Dec. 22) (holding that
the promise by France could only have been made as a binding promise
unilaterally and so, since it was a unilateral statement, it should be
understood to have been binding). If we follow this reasoning, then a far
greater amount of diplomatic assurances would be swept into the legally
binding category.
274. Nuclear Tests Case (Austl v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. 253, ¶ 43 (Dec. 20).
275. Id. ¶ 44.
276. See Ahmad, Aswat, Ahsan & Mustafa (Abu Hamza) v. United
Kingdom, Partial Decision Admissibility, App. Nos. 24027/07, 11949/08 &
36742/08, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 105 (2010)
The Court recognises that, in extradition matters, Diplomatic Notes
are a standard means for the requesting State to provide any
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the analysis is simple: if the state limited its freedom of action,
then it is bound.
Moreover, the Court does not appear to require an
intention to be legally bound, just an intention to be bound:
When it is the intention of the State making the declaration that it
should become bound according to its terms, that intention confers on
the declaration the character of a legal undertaking, the State being
thenceforth legally required to follow a course of conduct consistent
277
with the declaration.

The Court appears to exclude the possibility that a state can
choose which obligations are legal and which obligations are
not.
The counsel for Australia submitted specifically that an
“assurance” was not received from France. That the ICJ
eventually found the unilateral statements to be binding, even
278
though an “assurance” was not given,
suggests that an
“assurance” would have more legal gravity than a unilateral
statement. The language used in the statements made by
France was that “France will be in a position to pass on to the
stage of underground explosions as soon as the series of tests
279
planned for this summer is completed . . . .”
“[t]hus the
atmospheric tests which are soon to be carried out will, in the
280
normal course of events, be the last of this type.”
This
language seems even less committal than the MOUs and
assurances examined so far in this paper. Although the Court
also observed that the statements were communicated both
assurances which the requested State considers necessary for its
consent to extradition. It also recognises that, in international
relations, Diplomatic Notes carry a presumption of good faith. The
Court considers that, in extradition cases, it is appropriate that that
presumption be applied to a requesting State which has a long history
of respect for democracy, human rights and the rule of law, and which
has longstanding extradition arrangements with Contracting States.
Consequently, the Court considers that it was appropriate for the
High Court, in its judgment concerning the first and second
applicants, to accord a presumption of good faith to the United States
Government.
277. Nuclear Tests Case (Austl v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. 253, ¶ 43 (Dec. 20).
278. See id. ¶ 32
At the hearing . . . the Attorney-General of Australia made the
following statement :
You will recall that Australia has consistently stated it would
welcome a French statement to the effect that no further
atmospheric nuclear tests would be conducted. Indeed as the
Court will remember such an assurance was sought of the French
Government by the Australian Government by note dated 3
January 1973, but no such assurance was given. . . .
279. Id. ¶ 34; see also id. ¶ 39.
280. Id. ¶ 35; see also id. ¶¶ 36–38.
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publically and directly to other states, what it found to be
crucial was that other states would be understood to rely on the
281
statements.
In the Einhorn case the European Court held that the
assurances amounted to a treaty, but the Court also held that
the assurances could alternatively amount to binding
unilateral statements. France argued that the diplomatic
assurances it had received were unilateral statements, legally
binding under international law, citing the Nuclear Tests cases,
282
inter alia. The Court agreed with this view and declared the
application inadmissible, partly for this reason.
30. . . . The diplomatic notes could also be regarded in public
international law as a unilateral international undertaking requiring
the United States to fulfil the obligations it had entered into, failing
which its international responsibility would be engaged; that position
was established in the case-law of the International Court of Justice,
and in particular in the “Nuclear Tests” judgment of 20 December
1974 (New Zealand v. France, ICJ Reports 1974, §§ 45-63). The
Government accordingly inferred that “inasmuch as the fulfilment of
the obligation to afford Mr Einhorn the possibility of a new and fair
trial [was] an essential prerequisite of his extradition, the French
authorities [could not] seek additional guarantees in the event of such
283
an obligation not being be fulfillable”.

France did not refer to the Vienna Convention in its
argument in order to argue that the assurances amounted to a
treaty, perhaps because neither France nor the United States
was a party to the Convention. But it did argue that the
Nuclear Tests standard operated to make the assurances
legally binding because the individual was only extradited in
reliance on the condition stated in the assurances
Most of the cases examined in this paper, however, were
decided prior to expulsion, meaning that the state had yet to
fully rely on them. However, it is not clear that reliance, at
least as understood in the municipal law of estoppel as reliance
to one’s detriment, is a part of the international law of binding
unilateral statements. If, indeed, reliance in this sense is not
required, then diplomatic assurances are very good candidates
to be legally binding from the moment of their issuance.
281. See id. ¶ 51
In announcing that the 1974 series of atmospheric tests would be
the last, the French Government conveyed to the world at large,
including the Applicant, its intention effectively to terminate these
tests. It was bound to assume that other States might take note of
these statements and rely on their being effective.
282. Id.
283. Einhorn v. France, 2001-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 275,¶ 30 (2001).
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If reliance in the stricter sense is required, then it is a
matter of debate what actions amount to such reliance.
Reaching an expulsion decision based on assurances might
amount to reliance even prior physical expulsion. Or reliance
might qualify as such only after the physical expulsion of the
person to the receiving state. Without question, reliance to a
detriment would exist when an expelled person is mistreated
and the expelling state has potentially incurred state
responsibility for failing to uphold its non-refoulement
284
obligation.
Even if reliance is required, and assurances only become
legally binding at the moment of reliance, one can still find
reliance in expulsion cases concluded on the basis of
285
assurances. In the case of MSS v. Belgium and Greece , in
which extradition was concluded pursuant to assurances
promising that an asylum status determination hearing would
be conducted, the European Court held that:
However, the Government pointed out that the order to leave the
country had been issued based on the assurance that the applicant
would not be sent back to Afghanistan without the merits of his
complaints having been examined by the Greek authorities.
Concerning access to the asylum procedure and the course of that
procedure, the Government relied on the assurances given by the
Greek authorities that they had finally accepted responsibility, and
on the general information contained in the summary document
286
drawn up by the Greek authorities . . . .

The fact that another state is placing its responsibility for
compliance with non-refoulement and other obligations in the
hands of another state when it expels a person on the basis of
assurances constitutes reliance. If the state then commits acts
that trigger the expelling state’s responsibility, even only
potentially, then the expelling state has relied on the receiving
state to its detriment.
Taking this conservative view, after an expulsion is
physically completed, reliance on the assurances is also
complete, converting the assurances into a legal obligation to
284. This raises the difficult question of whether the assessment of the risk
of mistreatment is an obligation of result or conduct. For the first, the
eventual mistreatment would mean that the state did expel a person to a
situation of risk of mistreatment, in the second, the eventual mistreatment
would only contribute evidence to whether there was a risk at the time of the
expulsion. It could be imagined that there might be no risk at the time of
expulsion and that the risk only appeared after the person had been expelled,
thus there was no violation of the non-refoulement obligation.
285. M.S.S. v. Belgium & Greece, Judgment, App. No. 30696/09, Eur. Ct.
H.R. (2011).
286. Id. ¶ 328.
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comply with what was pledged. Nevertheless, this conclusion
might not operate to block an expulsion, because at the time a
decision is being made there would not yet be reliance because
the expulsion is not complete.
IV. DIPLOMATIC ASSURANCES AS SUBSEQUENT
PRACTICE
A further way in which diplomatic assurances could
operate to create legal effects is through the interpretative
provisions of the Vienna Convention—in particular, the role of
subsequent practice.
The Vienna Convention provides a general rule of
interpretation: “A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in
accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms
of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and
287
purpose.” The context of a treaty shall comprise the treaty’s
preamble and annexes, and
(a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all
the parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty;
(b) any instrument which was made by one or more parties in
connection with the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other
288
parties as an instrument related to the treaty.

Furthermore, the interpreter must take into consideration,
along with the context,
(a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the
interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions;
(b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which
establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its
289
interpretation; . . .

An MOU was examined in the Heathrow User Charges
290
arbitration. In that case, there was a treaty called “Bermuda
2” and a subsequent Memorandum of Understanding of April 6,
1983. There was a difference of opinion between the United
States and the United Kingdom regarding the legally binding
nature of the agreement: the United States contended that the
291
MOU was legally binding and the United Kingdom denied
292
it. The United States argued that the MOU satisfied the
293
definition of treaty in the Vienna Convention, The United
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.

Vienna Convention on Treaties, supra note 35, at art. 31(1).
Id. at art. 31(2).
Id. at art. 31(3).
See Heathrow Airport Arbitration Award, supra note 33.
See id. ¶ 6.2.
See id. ¶ 6.3.
See id. ¶¶ 6.2, 6.5.
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Kingdom replied that “it was not to be taken as denying any
legal effect whatsoever to the provisions of the MoU,” but that
the “both parties to the MoU clearly expected and anticipated
that the ‘understandings’ embodied in it would be honored . . .
even if [the U.K. Government] did not regard them as
294
amounting to treaty obligations in the strict sense.”
The
tribunal essentially accepted the position of the United
Kingdom, holding that the MOU was not in itself a legally
binding instrument, but that its terms were evidentiary for the
interpretation of the initial Bermuda 2 agreement that was
binding. In short, that the “MoU constitutes consensual
295
subsequent practice of the Parties.”
To apply the same reasoning to diplomatic assurances, it is
necessary to identify the treaty that serves as the dock to which
the subsequent practice of assurances might be moored. In the
context of U.K. practice, one such possible type of treaty is an
umbrella MOU under which individual assurances are given. If
the umbrella MOU itself qualifies as a treaty, as this article
has argued it might, then even if individual assurances fail to
qualify as treaties themselves, they could still be considered
subsequent practice under the binding MOU.
Alternately, treaties that provide for the various non296
refoulement obligations might serve as the relevant treaty.
The assurances issued to clarify and condition the risk of
mistreatment, and serve to overcome the non-refoulement
obligation, would then be binding insofar as they clarified the
applicable treaty. This might then impose a legal obligation
between the states to provide for monitoring treatment, and
could even mean that where the treaty’s non-refoulement
obligation has been overcome through the use of diplomatic
assurances, that the receiving state incurs responsibility under
the treaty where it violates the rights of the person, as per the
sending state.
V. CONCLUSION
Diplomatic assurances are potentially legally binding as
treaties under the Vienna Convention, or, failing that, as
binding unilateral statements, at least once the expelling state
has relied on them. Applying the Vienna Convention and the
doctrine of binding unilateral statements, to the language of
294. See id. ¶ 6.6.
295. See id. ¶ 6.7.
296. E.g. the Refugee Convention, Torture Convention, etc.
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representative MOUs and assurances, we find that such
pledges appear to be binding, and in turn result in state
responsibility when not honored. Even if both of those legal
theories could be refuted, certain assurances would at least
qualify as subsequent practice.
That does not mean that states have either clear
enforcement rights or clear enforcement mechanisms through
legal dispute settlement. Nor does it meant that states will ever
seek to enforce their rights outside of negotiation—seeking to
enforce assurances through a claim of right would be perceived
as exposing the claiming state to similar treatment, which is an
option states may want to avoid. Nor does it mean that the
assurances themselves are clear enough to be capable of
assessing violations, except as to a generalized good faith in
pursing vague ends, and here too, a state might be reluctant to
claim a violation of good faith.
In sum, there is no debate that diplomatic assurances are
politically and diplomatically binding, but these do not
constitute an alternate normative regime. They are merely
types of peaceful international dispute settlement under
international law. That these solutions to disputes can result in
situations in which states may appear to excuse or forgive
violations of the law does not mean that violations did not
occur—the relevant state simply did not “press charges”. Nor
do these dispute resolutions mean that the relevant state could
not have pursued a legal claim. In the world of diplomacy, it
would appear that there are agreements that do qualify as
legally binding treaties but for which the parties tacitly
understand not to invoke legal dispute settlement procedures.
Such agreements are not political or diplomatic only, without
legal force; it is just that their legally binding nature may not
be tested.

